DreamWorld and the importance of training records.

I use the Hemingway editor and it forces me to clarify my writing. Then I have to go back and join the short sentences to make it flow. It is a good process but time consuming.

Automation is a *much* better way of achieving safety than hard hats and vests.The hierarchy of controls (as stated in Wikipedia) is as follows

 

• Elimination
   
   
  
• Substitution
   
   
  
• Engineering controls
   
   
  
• Administrative controls
   
   
  
• Personal protective equipment
   
   
  

 

 

Automation would count as elimination or as an engineering control, depending on the degree of automation. Automation is a very good method of making people safer. Hard hats and vests are personal protective equipment (PPE), the lowest form of maintaining safety. So, no, the figures do not say if the decrease in serious accidents was due to automation or PPE, but who really cares? The more it was due to automation and the less it was due to PPE the better.

 

As for documentation is for one reason and it not being safe, that cannot be literally true. The miners avoided more and more actual accidents to actual workers and the safety documentation was part of it. That does not mean that the documentation that *you* saw was useful, just that the overall documentation was part of a system that actually worked. If you equate safety with hard hats and hi vis vests, then that might be part of the problem.

I understand what you are saying in regard to equating safety with Hi-Viz and hard hats, but I have yet to meet a person employed in safety that doesn't seem to believe that Hi-Viz and hard hats will fix almost everything. My problem with it is that even though automation may have successfully lowered injury rates, the other controls tend to remain whether needed or not.

You say "Who Cares?". Well, myself and most people who are forced to wear such things and abide by processes that provide no benefit, and sometimes actually create a hazard. If they actually did as Turbo suggests and add or remove processes as actually required in a timely manner, they might get a bit more respect. We like the bare minimum of words to communicate, so why not the bare minimum regulation. Not to mention that Darwin's system work whether or not you try to stop it. They always find a way. Why can't society ditch the idea of having to protect people from themselves.

We had a busload of safety people (employed by the same company) tour our facility today in two groups. Each group was larger than our entire shift. No-one on the floor can work out why we have so many, especially as they keep telling us money is tight and our injury rate is pretty much non-existent and has been for years. (before we had so many)

The documentation is there to cover their arxe if the end with an investigation (see the OP). If they didn't need to cover that, then they wouldn't do it. Every course I've done emphasises the importance of documentation in case you end up in court and highlight it with a video (or several) featuring someone who did something silly then blames his employer for not stopping him.

We had a busload of safety people (employed by the same company) tour our facility today in two groups. Each group was larger than our entire shift. No-one on the floor can work out why we have so many, especially as they keep telling us money is tight and our injury rate is pretty much non-existent and has been for years. (before we had so many)

As far as defence is concerned, I don't think anyone knows what the big picture is, no matter how high up.

The safety people I have to deal with list seven controls including those you listed. Yes, automation counts a a control and is very good. I really care whether automation or other methods improved safety, because once applied, the safety people are very reluctant to remove it.I understand what you are saying in regard to equating safety with Hi-Viz and hard hats, but I have yet to meet a person employed in safety that doesn't seem to believe that Hi-Viz and hard hats will fix almost everything. My problem with it is that even though automation may have successfully lowered injury rates, the other controls tend to remain whether needed or not.

 

You say "Who Cares?". Well, myself and most people who are forced to wear such things and abide by processes that provide no benefit, and sometimes actually create a hazard. If they actually did as Turbo suggests and add or remove processes as actually required in a timely manner, they might get a bit more respect. We like the bare minimum of words to communicate, so why not the bare minimum regulation. Not to mention that Darwin's system work whether or not you try to stop it. They always find a way. Why can't society ditch the idea of having to protect people from themselves.

 

We had a busload of safety people (employed by the same company) tour our facility today in two groups. Each group was larger than our entire shift. No-one on the floor can work out why we have so many, especially as they keep telling us money is tight and our injury rate is pretty much non-existent and has been for years. (before we had so many)

 

The documentation is there to cover their arxe if the end with an investigation (see the OP). If they didn't need to cover that, then they wouldn't do it. Every course I've done emphasises the importance of documentation in case you end up in court and highlight it with a video (or several) featuring someone who did something silly then blames his employer for not stopping him.

It is sad, but that's no reason to tar all the efficient companies with the same brand.

Post 130 sounds like CASA, or should I say the government.

As far as automation making for safety, that would have worked really well in the Dreamworld case, if the participants in the ride had been automatoms.

Whenever you mix machinery and people you are asking for problems.

Post 130 sounds like CASA, or should I say the government.As far as automation making for safety, that would have worked really well in the Dreamworld case, if the participants in the ride had been automatoms.

Whenever you mix machinery and people you are asking for problems.

It should be said that we have only been made aware of the statements of a few people from a small area relating that accident, so we can't draw any conclusions at all as to what the cause was or what the safety system was. For example, it could be that in the past, when the water lowered, following rafts just pushed the raft in front further up the framework, so what happened was not forseeable.

the safety system would not be a person pushing a button to save the lives of the joy riders

I'm curious to know what the overall design safety system was supposed to be - there would have to be that basic overall fundamental thing ................ would n't there be ?

the safety system would not be a person pushing a button to save the lives of the joy ridersI'm curious to know what the overall design safety system was supposed to be - there would have to be that basic overall fundamental thing ................ would n't there be ?

Many safety systems include a manual shutdown; Someone I know was saved from being dragged by his clothes into a crusher, when he used his radio to call for help and the entire mill conveyor system was shut down immediately.

After an event it's often possible to decide that a simple change could have saved the person, and that change is made, but that doesn't mean the event was forseeable.

In determining safety procedures you have to remember that the occurrence of an event has two faces - possibility and probability.

Anything man-made has a possibility of failure. What the safety procedure must assess is the probability of failure. A safety procedure is a gamble based on the odds of a failure.

Our safety people believe that everything can be managed using a 5 x 5 risk matrix and using a "Job Safety & Environmental Analysis" form where no "safe Work Instruction" exists, One problem arising from that is that they are very conservative, for example just the act of driving to a site to recover (carry out onsite unscheduled maintenance) an aircraft is viewed as potentially catastrophic, and as such immediately requires executive approval.

Strangely, the act of driving to work doesn't rate.

Driving to work is normally recognised as your responsibility, although the repeated deaths from fatigue and alcohol has led to bus drop offs and puck ups from coastal cities, and from that a drive towards autonomous operations

The last lot I worked for (same industry) still wanted reporting of incidents to and from work, whether near miss, actual incident or injured wildlife. This lead to the feeling that perhaps these people were running out of thing to keep them employed.

It is a little hypocritical I think to regard driving a work vehicle to a recovery as high risk, but the drive to work or to other destinations using a work vehicle don't rate. Either it is high risk or it isn't.

We both know that it's not, people just want their backsides covered if anything goes wrong.

The last lot I worked for (same industry) still wanted reporting of incidents to and from work, whether near miss, actual incident or injured wildlife. This lead to the feeling that perhaps these people were running out of thing to keep them employed.It is a little hypocritical I think to regard driving a work vehicle to a recovery as high risk, but the drive to work or to other destinations using a work vehicle don't rate. Either it is high risk or it isn't.

We both know that it's not, people just want their backsides covered if anything goes wrong.

The point being, that if they can take an ordinary every day activity, like driving a normal vehicle on a public road with the appropriate licence and make it a "high risk" activity, requiring executive approval and for one task only, then I think they've taken it too far.

Try using the 5 x 5 matrix for all everyday activities.....what are all they things you do every day that could result in catastrophic consequences? Having a shower, making toast, preparing dinner, going shopping. If we're going to be safe at work, we should be extra safe at home.

The work environment is under the control of an organization or an employer and not really comparable with the home environment where YOU have control over that environment. Bit like maintaining your own plane when only YOU fly in it where things could arguably be much more relaxed. It's about responsibility (duty of Care) for others when you are in a public space. Nev

Driving to and from work is definitely part of the work day and as such is included in fatigue and safety management

Driving to and from work is definitely part of the work day and as such is included in fatigue and safety management

The point being, that if they can take an ordinary every day activity, like driving a normal vehicle on a public road with the appropriate licence and make it a "high risk" activity, requiring executive approval and for one task only, then I think they've taken it too far.Try using the 5 x 5 matrix for all everyday activities.....what are all they things you do every day that could result in catastrophic consequences? Having a shower, making toast, preparing dinner, going shopping. If we're going to be safe at work, we should be extra safe at home.

Do you really have to get executive approval, before you can drive anywhere so that they can assess the danger of the drive?

I reckon this does flag a cultural problem in safety management.

Suddenly an activity becomes unacceptably dangerous once it becomes work related.

It admits that either risks are unknown and acceptable (otherwise it would be commonly know you could get hurt doing it)

OR the risk assessment process is flawed and real risk is lower than portrayed

OR

The people take higher risks under a stricter safety web

In any case it means the system is based for the dimmest participant.

In any case it means the system is based for the dimmest participant

In any case it means the system is based for the dimmest participant.

The proof of that is in the accident statistics, which rarely involve people of low IQ, and have a high percentage of rule flouters, who, after the accident, were found to have removed safety guards, and failed to adhere to safety procedures.

...the accident statistics, which rarely involve people of low IQ, and have a high percentage of rule flouters, who, after the accident, were found to have removed safety guards, and failed to adhere to safety procedures.