Dieselten

Would the moderator(s) please delete every reply that is not immediately relevant to the accident in question to save server bandwidth and reader frustration please? This thread isn't drifting, it's moving away from the subject at Mach 1.2! Back to the subject, I met the pilot in question at Wollongong the day he undertook the ill-fated flight and am very saddened to learn he did not make it home. We must wait until the investigators have done their work before we go speculating on what might have caused the accident. We have lost a fellow-aviator and that ought to make us pause and reflect.

According to reports of ATSB assistance for the ASRA investigation of the gyro accident, it was a separation of the upper part of the mast from the gyro. (The gyro in question was fitted with the folding-mast option.) The instructor who lost his life was 60-year old Mike Waldon, from Kiama. Mike was a friend and colleague, a very good instructor and meticulous about pre-flight inspections. I miss his humour, professionalism and determination. He was one of a kind. Condolences to his family, especially Caitlin and Alexia.

Repeat the test in a wind-tunnel with the airflow over the wing at normal cruising-speed for a better test of a real-world situation. Either way I think there will be significant wing-damage. As for the drone...

One if those killed in the gyro was a personal friend and aviation colleague. RIP my friend, you will be missed.

APF Interim Fatality Report now issued. Situation is a little more complex - and baffling - than I described above. A freefall collison appears likely, but canopies did open; the tandem reserve canopy and both the main and reserve for the solo jumper. Severe injuries to the two jumpers consistent with freefall collision, but the solo jumper also descended to the ground under a "down-plane" at a high rate of descent which may have contributed to his demise. Tandem pair located at the base of a tree with severe injuries and pronounced dead at scene. This is a very complex accident and the investigation is likely to take some time. Losing skydivers with perfectly good canopies open is something which indicates the jumpers were so severely incapacitated they were unable to take control, even after the AADs had done their usually-lifesaving work.

Collision in freefall apparently. Tandem-Master and Camerman both knocked unconscious, camerman's AAD did not activate, he became tangled in the tandem drogue-bridle, the tandem AAD activated but the reserve became tangled with drogue-bridle etc and all three died. Heavy blow for the skydiving fraternity so soon after the double fatality at Picton in July.

The maximum bank-angle for a turn in the circuit (be it crosswind, downwind, base or final) shoud be no more than 30 degrees on any trike wing, be it Wizard, Arrow, P&M Blade or whatever your trike-wing is. For most normal flying away from the circuit a 15-degree banked turn is quite sufficient. I teach the 60-degree banked turn as an emergency avoiding-manoeuvre only, using added engine-power to counteract the potential height-loss due to load-factor, and stressing the need for a gentle recovery to prevent overspeeding as a result of conservation of angular momentum. Anyone needing to do a 60-degree angle-of-bank turn onto final needs some re-training in how to fly the circuit and how to judge angles and distances. Circuit-height is not the place for such potentially hazardous manoeuvres. I lost two friends on an Arrow near Glen Innes in 2015, and as yet I still have no explanation for how the accident occurred, coronial inquest notwithstanding. About the only thing I do know is the Arrow wing has no innate malevolence - it is just a machine, and needs to be correctly handled and kept within the defined operating parameters as set out by the manufacturer. Somehow, in that accident, it was mis-handled to the point of the situation becoming irrecoverable. That much is certain. How it was so mishandled remains a mystery, and seems destined to remain so. Those who decry the Wizard wing have failed to grasp one very significant fact...the Wizard is an excellent training-wing because it is forgiving, yet it does require a pilot to manage the wing through all phases of flight. Landing a Wizard in gusty conditons will give the pilot a workout - and show him just how he needs to fly the wing in every axis all the way down to the ground. He will be a better pilot for it. (I have about 1100 hours on the Wizard and am grateful for each and every one of them.) I train on the Cruze as well as the Arrow and stress to each student the particular characteristics they must keep in mind at all times for whichever wing they are flying. Lastly, I fail to see the need for going any faster than about 60KIAS on a trike, and in fact 50KIAS suits me just fine. If you need to go faster, get a different aeroplane. (If I need to go 100KIAS then the J160 is my aeroplane of choice.)

Here's a trick for flying in rain in Jabirus with wooden props if you simply can't get away from it. Reduce your airspeed below Vfe, then lower half-flap. Now set engine RPM to keep you level at 70KIAS in the J160, 65KIAS in the 170 or 230. In the J160 this is about 2400RPM with half-flap and 2 people onboard. Maintain level flight with elevator. This will take 500RPM (approx) off your prop and greatly reduce the impact of raindrops on the leading-edge, whilst maintaining your chosen altitude. Once clear of the rain, retract flaps and increase power to normal cruise-settings.

Various BBSs have something like a "Gone Home" or "Departed Friends" section. Bandwidth and storage are potential issues as any BBS expands.

"Kalganyi", private strip immediately adjacent to Hume Hwy south of Marulan. Grass surface, faces E-W. Good surface, slopes at either end, more gentle slope to the west.

The pilot has a history. This isn't the first time ambition has exceeded ability. If he never leaves the ground again except in an elevator I will be very pleased.

You may as well ask why aviation, shipping and the scientific and business worlds still use English - because no-one's come up with anything that works better and which people are prepared to adopt. It works, that's why. The Germans persisted with units of angular measure called "grads" in which there were 100 grad in a right-angle and four hundred grads in a circle. Try buying a sextant, or a set-square, or a protractor, or a goniometer calibrated in grads these days (if you can still find a sextant for sale, that is.)

This is gutting. Ross was a colleague and friend back in the skydiving days at Wilton in the early 70s. His passion for sport aviation was evident then, and he never lost it. He survived the crash of a fully-loaded jump-aircraft and although it affected him deeply, he still retained his love of jumping. He was Alan Jay's rigger when Alan was building the "Parasport" equipment, some of the very first custom-built skydiving gear ever seen in Australia. He had seen so much and knew so much in sport avation he became a touchstone, a resource from whom a great many benefitted time and time again. RIP my friend. Our little world is poorer for your loss.

Weightshift:- fly the wing. 3-Axis - fly the wing. Start flying the wing and stop just flying the controls. Works every time! A wing only knows how to make lift. It doesn't know what it's bolted onto. Make the wing do the work, and fly it and only it. That way, if you don't break the wing you probably won't break anything else either, and if you make the wing go where you want it to go the rest ot the aeroplane will follow. Fly the wing.

...and 384 angels can dance on the head of a pin.

The engine is a consumable item on an aeroplane. The airframe is just hardware, and is replaceable, as is the engine. But people, human-beings, fathers, brothers, husbands etc are not so easy to replace. Those two individuals are irreplaceable to their families and frends. Yes, I know a human-being can be created by two congenital idiots, both of who are thoroughly enjoying themselves at the time (how else do you explain some of the more "loopy" politicians we see on the media every time there is anissue needing a seven-second sound-bite), but the result isn't quite the same. I refuse to pass judgement on the PIC simply because I wasn't in his shoes, I didn't face the circumstances he had to face, and I didn't make the decisions he made. There were deficiencies in airmanship, yes, but at least the pilot now has the time to reflect on his decision-making process and perhaps revise his estimation of his own abilities given that the abilities of the aircraft have given him the chance so to do.

Under no circumstances are we going to see entire passenger airliner fuselages being lowered to earth under huge parachutes. It's commercially untenable. Airlines accept the statistical probability of lising a few hundred people at a time and factor it into their business plan. They pay for it in insurance and lawsuits from aggrieved relatives after an accident. It's just one of the many costs of doing business. The fact that the travelling public still is prepared to travel by air in ever-increasing numbers is a tacit acceptance of the fact as well.

The error of judgement in this case is overflying a number of airfields with a low oil-pressure warning. The good judgement-call was using the CAPS - as he would have been trained to do by Cirrus if he did the sim course they like all new pilots to do. A Cirrus airfame tech would look at that and say "yes, that can be repaired and returned to the air", and the investigating Police would have said, "yes, they used the parachute and they're both still alive as a result." As for electing to use the CAPS rather than land in the paddock, it comes down to the decision made by the PIC at the time and under the pressures he was handling in the heat of the moment. It is debatable which of the two alternatives would have cause more damage to the aircraft; land under the CAPS and break the undercarriage, or land on the paddock and risk flipping the aircraft over on its back if the surface was too soft. I imagine he decided to use the CAPS after seeing the nature of the surface at relatively low altitude and realising it was not as firm a surface as it first appeared...another prudent decision. Again, the CAPS has saved two lives after a poor decision (not to land at an airfield whilst the engine was running) was made. We can all be armchair experts and claim we could land the same aircraft in that particular paddock but only the man flying the aircraft at the time knows all the factors he had to take into consideration before making the decision. Ultimately, he did well and has lived to profit and learn from the experience.

Just another comment, if I may:- The design of the Cirrus undercarriage is aimed at absorbing the impact of a BRS-landing and minimising airframe damage. Obviously much depends on the surface on which the aircraft actually alights at the end of the descent, but in many cases the airframe is capable of being repaired and put back into service. Comparatively few are written off due to damage from the parachute-landing itself. Damage to the airframe prior to the use of the parachute may result in the aeronautical equivalent of an insurance "constructive total loss", but that is an entirely different matter. Oscar's comment that "...descent under the BRS will result in, more-than-usually, totalling the airframe." is an over-simplification. Some airframes are indeed written-off, but many are repairable - at which point insurance comes into play. Basically, if the airframe lands on the undercarriage, intact, on a reasonably flat surface, in most cases the damage is not great and is repairable. Since the aircfraft is now the property of the insurance company (assuming it was insured and an asset of such high value should have been) then they have the last word. More than one Cirrus that landed under a parachute has been repaired and flown again by the owner who had recourse to use the BRS in the first place. I am not aware of any Cirrus Owners who have had to use the BRS a second time. It would seem the lesson is learned and a wiser and more prudent pilot is the result. Disclaimer: I am not a Cirrus-owner, nor am I a Cirrus-pilot. However, if I had the wherewithal, and needed a high-performance, piston-powered 4-seat cruising aircraft, the Cirrus SR22T would be No. 1 on my list of aeroplanes to test-fly. It wouldn't be a very long list, either.

Novus No. 1, Novus No. 2, Novus No. 3, or Craftex Plasti-Polish, or Meguiars No 17 Plastic Cleaner. Brasso is good but contains ammonia which can adversely affect some plastics. Test an inconspicuous area first if you are going to try using it. All the others are perfectly safe on pretty much all plastics. They contain finely-divided Diatatomaceous Earth in a light hydrocarbon carrier with waxes. Clean the scratched area well before applying polishes etc.

Confidence for a pilot is a bit like money in the bank. You have to build up enough in the account until it begins paying some useful interest. Then you use the interest to get what you want whilst not having to draw down on the capital, so it is there and continues paying interest. Confidence comes from flying frequently, but also from having instructors who recogise what you are apprehensive about and take steps to get you through your fears by explaining things properly first, then demonstrating them with you in the aeroplane, then getting you to demonstrate them without the assistance of the instructor, to the point where you are so familiar with the manoeuvre it is no longer an issue. Stall and recovery is a typical case in point. Many, many students have an intrinsic fear of this "perilous and dangerous manoeuvre" because they don't know what causes it and how to recover. Once it is explained as a knowable and repeatable phenomenon, in which you can maintain control of the aeroplane at all times, then the fear is replaced by knowledge - and knowledge is power. With knowledge comes confidence. Turbulent air isn't fun to fly in at all, and we need to remember that basically we are all flying for fun - even instructors are flying for fun because you can't make any sort of living out of teaching people to fly RA-Aus aeroplanes. A good instructor will recognise when the air has become such that the student has stopped learning and will call a halt to the flight before the student loses the confidence he or she has been trying to gain for the lesson. The instructor will say something like:- "In my opinion the air has changed and we are now at a point where it isn't fair to try and teach you to fly in these conditions so we will land and call it a day". (I have yet to meet a student-pilot who hasn't agreed with this statement!) The student will appreciate the instructor's judgement because it reinforces their own appraisal of the conditions - and thus their confidence is enhanced. It is also quite likely the student was simply too afraid to suggest stopping ("my instructor can fly in this so I should be able to, too"). Instructors can fly under far more taxing conditions that students, and there is always a commercial imperative to make the aeroplane "earn its keep" but the needs and progress of the student must take first place in these conflicting requirements. It is basically unfair and discourteous to try and teach a student in air they simply cannot learn in. It's also commercially very poor business practice. Every pilot sets their personal limit as to the conditions in which they are prepared to fly or not. Some are very conservative, and live long lives although they may not accrue as many flying-hours as those of a more "adventurous" disposition. Others are bolder, and live more exciting, but possibly shorter, lives. "There are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but there are no old, bold pilots" is a truism which contains much wisdom behind its obvious triteness. To gain confidence, fly as often as you can. Fly in the best conditions you can. Build up that "bank-account", little by little, until it begins paying interest. It is said the student pilot begins learning to fly with two buckets; one marked "Luck", which is full, and one marked "Experience" - which is empty. The trick is to fill the bucket marked "Experience" before the bucket marked "Luck" is empty. A third bucket, marked "Confidence", is attached to the bucket marked "Experience", and (miraculously) they fill at exactly the same rate. Experience comes from flying regularly and flying well, with good decision-making allied with a knowledge of when it is better to be on the gound than in the air. Most pilots are obssessed with how many flying-hours they have already done. For quite a few of us the better yardstick is "how many flying-hours are left in me", and the corollary of that is "how many of the flying-hours I have already done that I treasure as great moments in my life?" An experienced pilot is a confident pilot, and pilots gain experience by having experiences - both good and bad! Good experiences build up the confidence in that bank-account. Bad ones force you to make a small withdrawal. Maximise the good experiences and keep the bad ones to an absolute minimum. Trust your instructor's judgement, but if you feel it is flawed, then be prepared to question it. A good instructor will not be offended but will appreciate your concerns. Instructors really crave feedback from students; continued dumb acquiescence isn't exactly reassuring if the instructor suspects the student is having difficulties but refuses to acknowledge them. Find instructors who recognise your personal limits and stick within them. If you're not happy with the conditions, say so now rather than sticking with it because the instructor seems quite happy to grind away. Above all, recognise that instructors are not God - they are simply experienced pilots who have an ability to pass on knowledge to the next generation of pilots, and who have a desire to do so for whatever reasons. They are guides on a journey of discoveryand most of them want their students to be the best pilots they can be. Most students are just happy to find an instructor who relates to them and recognises their limitations and doesn't ask them to exceed them. The student-instructor relationship and dynamic is critical to the building of confidence. Like students, instructor are human, and fallible too.

My "anecdote" comes first-hand from a presentation given to a group of pilots by the Cirrus sales reps in Australia. They went through the design philosophy, added the fact that in the hands of a well-qualified and properly-trainned pilot the Cirrus can recover from a spin without using the CAPS (but it takes time and altitude, which may not be in plentiful supply), and then told us about the number of highly-qualified pilots who augur the sim in simply becausde they believe they can recover an irrecoverable situation. Once I had absorbed the very large amount of information they gave us, I revised my opinions of the Cirrus considerably. They also answered some very cogent and penetrating questions honestly, fully and to the satisfaction of the assembled pilots, several of whom were multi-thousand hour experience, others of whom were instructors.

The Cirrus CAPS has a significant number of lives saved due to its timely use inside the operating envelope. These are pilots who over-estimated their abilities, or believed that a high-tech, high-performance airframe would make them bullet-proof. So the prerequisite for a Cirrus parachute-deployment is a pilot who has made a series of errors of judgement which culminate in his using the superior recovery systems in the aeroplane to make up for his inferior decision-making or lack of judgement. The Pipistrel system now also has one success, and the reason for it is much the same. Let us hope the number of successful saves with the Pipistrel system equals the number of times it is used, and that both numbers remain vanishingly small. Someone queried how much value I put on a passenger's life. In the case of the Pipistrel incident, since I was not the pilot concerned, the question is irrelevant. A better question would have been "how much value did the pilot place on his passenger's life?" The answer is "enough to fire the 'chute when it became imperative to do so." Self-preservation obviously played a part as well, and in preserving himself he also did the same for his passenger. A good result all round. But fitting a BRS in itself isn't enough...the pilot must be prepared to actually use it in a timely manner. Prospective Cirrus owners are put in the Cirrus sim at the factory and deliberately placed in irrecoverable situations - and even some very high-time IFR pilots still "augur the sim in" a few times until they begin to reach for the handle when the job has gone "tits-up" beyond their ability to recover it. Some have to do it six or seven times before the message begins to filter through their cranial bones and into "the little grey cells". Maybe similar training should be required for all prospective purchasers of BRS-equipped aircraft? It might well save some lives which would otherwise be lost as a pilot stubbornly refuses to admit defeat and flies the aircraft into terrain, or breaks it up in mid-air, just to prove his point that he knows more than the weather, or the law of gravity has been temporarily repealed by some special NOTAM! I'd rather see a forlorn pilot trudging away from his bent aeroplane, BRS parachute draped over the immediate surroundings, than watch him being carried away, charred and crisp, or in several rather messy pieces, in a body-bag. The Pipistrel involved in the accident was being operated as a high-performance aircraft, at an elevated altitude, and in marginal conditions. It was effectively the ultralight equivalent of a Cirrus. It was also well outside its operational-enevlope, so the result was pretty much a foregone conclusion. A better example of a pilot deliberately lining up some of the holes in the Swiss Cheese would not be easy to find. All it needed after that was a loss of situational awareness, or spatial disorientation on his part, and the scene was set. Neither the Cirrus or the Pipistrel are anything remotely like "a pig with lipstick". But, if pigs are to fly, then they'll fly a whole lot better if they are flown by well-trained pilots who operate them inside their operational limits and use their good judgement to prevent them getting into a situation where they need to demonstrate their superior skills - or resort to the use of whatever BRS the pig is fitted with.

Jabiru specifically advise against the use of any upper cylinder lubricant in their engines. If your engine is under warranty, use of an UCL would most likely allow Jabiru to avoid and responsibiilty under that warranty should it be invoked. If you are flying a 19-registered Jabiru-powered airframe, do what you like, run it on what you like and live with the consequences - unless your engine is still under Jabiru's warranty, in which case you have to stick to what Jabiru recommend. But if you fly a Jabiru-engined 24-registered aircraft, you are bound to follow Jabiru's recommendations - and prohibitions - to the letter, regardless of whether you think they are the right thing to do or not. There is no choice. I know there are people out there who probably know more about Jabiru engines than Jabiru do themselves, but legally you must stick with what the manufacturer says you can do or use - and nothing else. Otherwise you have become an unpaid test-pilot.

So many "exceedences" in the report, but it all comes back to just one exceedence which precipitated all the others - the pilot exceeded his own capabilities which then caused a series of events which caused the aircraft to exceed its design limits. As I remarked before, the pilot failed long before the airframe did. All the ballistic parachute has done (besides saving a passenger) is allowed the survival of a pilot who at least might learn the lessons -but not knowing the individual concerned personally, I can't be too optimistic about that.