vme

ABC reporting that the pilot has been transferred to a Brisbane hospital with serious injuries.

The missing figure surely is how many registrations are awaiting RA-Aus approval.

Maybe the CEO knows something. CASA has started a project to gain access to ATSB investigations.

Is that something we would want?

Do they have Aussie maps?

Herewith Cloud Dancer exemption:

http://HTTP://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/lib91212/casaex104.pdf

Russ seems to be flying a Gyro, they probably have different rules. Can they enter, just like gliders and balloons can without a CASA PPL?

classified as Class E airspace. (CAO 95.12 and CAO 95.12.1)

Russ .. Unfortunately, unless you hold a private pilots licence or better, you cannot enter controlled or active restricted airspace - irrespective of Air Traffic Control's assistance.

Is there another airfield nearby in Broome that is not a controlled aiport?What would you suggest?

If you leave Derby at first light, you will be able to make Broome before the 7.15am activation and get refuelled by the tanker and bail out early morning when it suits.

Derby is within easy reach of Halls Creek.

Good luck.

Note that Broome is now a controlled airport.

Broome and Karratha will be off-limits to the vast majority of RA-Aus pilots (those without PPL) in a week.

From November 18, 2010 both airports will have control towers from early morning to night, seven days.

For aircraft without endurance, it will also mean an end to coastal transit of northern WA.

And with Airservices evaluating remote tower operation, the situation will only get worse.

USA sport pilot certificates - the direct equivalent of RA-Aus pilot certificates - can get control zone access with just additional training and testing .. no PPL, no medical. What does CASA know that the FAA doesn't? Why should we accept anything less?

There ARE change bars at the side. Unfortunately, it is a requirement to have a current ERSA on board.

It is a real problem as ANR headsets become more efficient. I find that I cannot hear the stall warning sound and only just detect GPS beeps. GPS is easily fixed by wiring it into the audio, but don't know about the stall horn. Have made it a practice to turn ANR off for takeoff and landing.

Cable connection also possible.

Not in Australia unfortunately Howard. Airservices have said they are not interested in providing TIS.

Mathew, I got CAR35 aproval for a fuel line quick release in my VH aircraft. The quick release fittings and fuel pump are now an aproved permanent part of the aircraft. The fuel bladder ferry tank is not a permanent part of the aircraft.

Many thanks

..Vince

Nor will it ever be. The way the RA-AUS hides it's accident reports is a joke.

Hi Ian ..

Have you thought of providing a PayPal donation facility to assist with forum costs?

Regards

..Vince

And just to confuse things further, the new 103 appears to say membership of Ra-Aus will, in fact, be optional ...

Part 103 will also establish a 'parallel pathway' for CASA to administer these activities when individual participants, for whatever reason, choose not to participate as members of an administering organisation.

(From CASA intro to NPRM 0603AS - Sport and Recreational Aviation Operations.

The Ops Manual (an RA-Aus copyright) is certainly available to persons or organisations who are not members of the association. The price is $38.50 plus $5.50 postage but updates not included. Mail the office with your cheque!cheers

 

John (Brandon)

Dear John .. The following is what you said last April. Do you see any inconsistency?

Regards

..Vince

Have to inform you that the online ops manual issue 6 has now been removed. It will be reinstated when the CD is distributed to members. I will start working on the CD tonight which will be posted to Lynn Jarvis Thursday. Lynn has volunteered to do all the necessary work to convert it into a publishable format. The CD will contain the two manuals plus my online tutorials.The reason for the withdrawal was that it was creating far more telephone calls to Mick Poole than he could cope with so please give him and the others in the office a break for a couple of months.

 

cheers

 

John

Hi John

Only prelim at this stage.

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/AAIR/aair200704734.aspx

Regards

..Vince

http://sliderule.ozmanor.com/man/files/kane-01.zip

http://sliderule.ozmanor.com/man/files/kane-02.zip

These are zipped jpegs of the manual from "Greg's Slide Rules"

..Vince

Sorry .. just noticed they are already referenced in this thread.

Dynon v. TruTrak

The Dynon A/P's will be well worth the wait as their functions far outweigh the Tru-Trak units..

Thanks

...Vince

Mr James Donnelly

Manager, Product Safety

Bombardier Aerospace, Regional Aircraft

2001 Australasian Air Safety Seminar

June 2 - 3, 2001

.....

The final example I'd like to bring before you today also deals with a modified aircraft.

Like the first event I described, it's unusual because virtually the entire accident sequence

is captured on videotape.

The accident occurred in August 1992 at the Gimli Industrial Park in Manitoba - a

famous site in Canadian aviation history, where an Air Canada Boeing 767 known as the

Gimli Glider was dead-sticked onto a drag racing strip, following fuel exhaustion.

The accident aircraft is a highly modified de Havilland aircraft. In this case a Caribou had

been converted to turbine power and was operated under the EXPERIMENTAL category

of CAR 4b.

The conversion was accomplished at Gimli, and the aircraft first flew in mid-November

1991, before accumulating about 23 hours on 12 flights by month end.

These preliminary tests revealed the need for the replacement of the aircraft's mechanical

vacuum pumps with a Bendix suction system, the addition of in-line fuel boost pumps

and the installation of a newly designed hydraulic pump.

The accident occurred on August 27, 1992 on the first of several planned trips to flight-

check the fuel and hydraulic systems. The aircraft had been hangared in a partially dis-

assembled state over the winter, and had only recently been re-assembled, including the

re-installation of the complete tail section.

I'll let the video show you what happened - and I will caution you right now that this

footage is extremely graphic -

[Video]

The accident investigation used this videotape and some 35mm photographs as a key

resource in determining what went wrong at Gimli.

With the exception of a slightly higher-than-normal nose attitude at lift-off, the aircraft's

initial climb appeared normal. At about 35 feet AGL, the aircraft made a noticeable pitch-

up movement.

When I tell you that the photography revealed that the elevator control surfaces were

observed to pitch trailing-edge-up for rotation, neutralize and then remain in the neutral

position through the balance of that short flight, I expect most of you will come to the

same conclusion as the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. The aircraft's control

gust locks were at least partly engaged.

A very close examination of the video does indicate rudder movement and minimal

elevator movement, during the start of the takeoff roll.

On the standard Caribou, the gust lock control handle is located forward of the power

quadrant, and it has two positions - forward for Unlocked, and aft for Locked. If the

control surfaces are not in the neutral position when the lock is engaged, any movement

of the surfaces through the neutral position will cause the lock to engage.

In addition, on the factory-standard Caribou, the control handle is designed so that when

it is in the aft-Locked position, the power levers cannot be fully advanced. This is

intended to prevent power application and takeoff when the gust lock system is engaged.

The accident investigation further revealed that the aircraftÃŒs takeoff distance was

approximately 20 per cent longer than anticipated for the conditions. This may provide

further evidence that the gust locks played a part in this event.

Analysis of the recovered debris indicated that, although the aileron and elevator locking

mechanisms were in their respective Disengaged positions, the rudder locking

mechanism was found to have been in the fully engaged position at impact.

Further investigation revealed that in fact, it had been jammed there by the forces of the

impact. In addition, the analysis determined from the damage evidence that the aileron

control lock had been dis-engaged at the time of impact.

In its synopsis of the accident, the Transportation Safety Board concluded that the control

gust lock system had not been fully disengaged prior to flight and that one or more of the

locking pins had become re-engaged after lift-off.

What could have prevented this accident? The most obvious solution was that a complete

six-point control check prior to takeoff would have revealed that free and proper

movement of the control system was compromised.

No control check was seen by witnesses on the ground, nor was one recorded on video or

still photography. As noted earlier, some rudder and elevator movement was observed, at

the end of the runway at the start of the takeoff roll.

The CaribouÃŒs standard procedures do allow for locking the control surfaces for ground

operation, but the aircraft flight manual also requires a six-point control check prior to

takeoff.

Another pointÛalthough not one addressed by the TSB in its reviewÛconcerns the crew.

We understand that shortly before the flight, the scheduled co-pilot - a very experienced

piston-Caribou captain - was replaced by another pilot with considerably less total time

and experience on type. He was, in fact, the aircraft owner's son.

We therefore speculate whether a more experienced co-pilot might have caught the

missed six-point control check, or might have been more aware that the aircraft was not

responding as it should have.

During the post-accident autopsy, a knob from the gust lock handle was found embedded

in the captain's right wrist. The TSB concluded that the captain was attempting to operate

the gust lock handle when the aircraft hit the ground.

Our expectation was that the pilot flying would have had his hand on the power lever

quadrant, which is located immediately aft of the gust lock handle. It is therefore

conceivable that, during the impact sequence, his hand might have moved forward, and

that this might account for the autopsy finding.

This accident investigation was problematic for us as the aircraft's original manufacturer,

as we had not been involved in the turbine conversion, system modifications, or

subsequent flight testing.

As I noted earlier, the conversion required extensive modification of a large number of

the aircraft's systems, and we know from the investigation that these included a re-

designed throttle quadrant.

The TSB report concludes that the newly designed system did not interfere with the

positional relationship between the throttle levers and the gust lock control handle, as full

power could not be obtained with the lock handle in the engaged position.

However, in our minds, since we did not design or participate in the modification

process, we cannot conclusively rule-out interference with normal operation of the

aircraft's original systems.

In this accident investigation our contribution was therefore essentially limited to the

identification of components familiar to us, confirming the operation of the original gust

lock system, and confirming the deflection of the control surfaces' spring tabs when

operation is attempted against the locks.

We had not reviewed the turbine aircraft flight manual but here again, we suspect it was

substantially similar to the original aircraft flight manual.

... full paper: http://www.asasi.org/papers/2001/Four%20Unrelated%20Accidents.pdf

Ian,

Is this the correct location to post questions about the MM?

... Vince

Look at second last page .. needs high torque servos in both axes:

www.aerocraftparts.com/images/Catalog-2006/Avionics%20-%20TruTrak%20Flight%20Systems%20pgs%20261-264.pdf

Regards

... Vince