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tuffnut

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  • Aircraft
    pelican
  • Location
    Queensland
  • Country
    Australia

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  1. The 'Them' refers to some would be pilots that shouldn't be let near an aeroplane. That blokes not going to live a long and happy life. Believe me, I've thought I could train a few. They went on to rearrange some hardware as well as there own appearance. TN.
  2. That bloke reminds me of a famous comment... I wouldn't trust them to build a canoe. Some people need to stick to wheel barrows...Too much political correctness in the aviation game. TN.
  3. The center section spar has been subject to a recent AD which if OK establishes its serviceability. Some models had insulation material glued to the carry through and it was not corrosion proofed. If water ingressed the moisture in the foam encouraged corrosion. However a similar spar is used on the Cardinal as on the C210, so at the much lower AUW there is a bigger margin of safety. As far as I know, there has never been a failure of a Cardinal carry through. Don't buy a Cardinal though without this inspection having been done, signed off and the anti corrosion treatment completed. After the first major inspection the ongoing attention required is really just good preventative maintenance and inspection. More of an on going consideration is the fact that the engine and front wheel retraction mechanism is all carried on a fairly complex chrome molly tubular structure bolted to the fire wall. Bend that and you will bend your wallet severely. No less though than on a 182 which if subjected to the same treatment will require the removal of the fire wall and it's support structure which is a BIG job. The main gear is the same as a 210 and although unique, will not give trouble if proper maintenance and pilot handling is of a good standard. Choose your poison carefully!
  4. The Cardinal is the E Type of the Cessna high wing aircraft. It was refined over the years and the later models with the slotted tail plane and 180hp engine are the epitome of aircraft design and efficiency. Cessna couldn't keep building them because of the amount of hand working required for those beautiful doors and sculptured body shape. They perform wonderfully on the horse power they have cruising at 140knt on 10GPH. Like all sophisticated machinery, they require a little more TLC and operational deftness than the average bush turkey that replaced them. But if you want a real piece of machinery, and like to soar with the eagles, buy a late model Cardinal!
  5. I'm all for 'self reporting'.....20 years after it happened:cool:. No sense in 'crashing' twice...NEVER trust a bureaucracy.
  6. My Flight manual says lubricate control moving parts with ACF 50 or like. WD40 can be used. I use INOX which I find is really good. The hinges on my aircraft are aluminum. Wear from lubrication in these areas is 1% of FA. Follow the manual but in agricultural opperations hinges were always lubricated and I can not recall ever having to change one. TN
  7. Strange days indeed.... I have spent many thousands of hours behind radial engines and experienced all sorts of exhaust problems along the way. Radials are natorious for exhaust cracks, holes, falling off, crook clamps etc etc. It is often very hard to find cracks and faults with these systems due to the visual difficulties seeing in all the nooks and crannies. (so don't be too hard on the LAMES). I have seen these exhaust systems develop really big cracks in 10 or so hours in a place a pilot would normally never see. Another issue is the lack of LAME experience with radials these days. Radial engine exhausts are full of 'slip joints' which if tightenend too tight crack the exhausts very quickly. I never heard of or experienced an incapacitation from this cause even in the time when great numbers of Beavers were accumulating many thousands of hours in super spreading. Intrinsically radials blow air, exhaust gases and oil all over the place and Beavers leak like a sieve. If enough gas could come through those couple of 1/4 bolt holes to cause that crash in the time available, then I must be addicted!! Because these old aircraft are air sieves, I never had a detector either and if I had it wouldn't have worked. Keep looking boys, there are other simpler explanations! TN
  8. From Experience... Airmaster props with the current specification change pitch just as fast as hydraulic propellers. Part 5.8.Manifold Air Pressure Gauge The manufacturer does not require that a Manifold Air Pressure (MAP) gauge be fitted as part of an installation of an Airmaster propeller onto a Rotax or Jabiru engine. As these engines have no published MAP limits, operators do not need to be concerned with exceeding the limits, as they do with some other aircraft engines. You can't accidentally feather an Airmaster prop. You have to remove the blades from the hub and regrease every year which adds some expense, but is not a difficult operation. This is a prop that shines. Designed for aircraft and pilots who require the best performance posible in all operations. TN.
  9. Depending on your perspective, we are also known to be quite naughty. Hopefully that won't change...... TN
  10. A real contrast to the P210 that had an engine failure at FL160 over an airport. If I had to critique the sling performance, I'd say a bit more height on the final approach with a bit of side slip as necessary would have created a better safety margin (with a bonus of less puckering); and, wear the ELT on your arm above the elbow as it has been designed to do. You don't even notice it, and it's always there ready to go! A plus was the excellent choice of a cultivated paddock. Grass can be very tempting but if it's 2 feet high (and you can't tell from the air), it can harbour all sorts of nasties like felled trees, stumps, washouts, large rocks etc. Always choose a surface you can clearly see above any other. A good landing on a ploughed field rarely does any serious damage. A great performance overall and deserving of a hearty 'Well Done'! TN
  11. I don't want to be a to be a Test Pilot Mum. It's been my good fortune to work and socialize with a number of test pilots during my career. There has been a lot of publicity and hype about test pilots ever since the Montgolfier brothers made the first flight of an aircraft in 1783—some of it has even been true. My own perspective is that the very good test pilots tend to be quiet to the point of reticence until they get to know you, have the ability to split a second into more parts than the rest of us—which may explain their quickness of reaction and thought, and have a certain level of confidence in their abilities that comes from having the cockiness of youth knocked out of them by aircraft that made serious attempts to kill them. Types of Flight Test Before going further, it's necessary to point out that there are three different types of flight test: experimental, production and service. Service testing generally involves flights made after maintenance and of new airplanes that are almost ready for production but the manufacturer wants to put a bunch of time on them in a hurry to see what's going to break. As test flying goes, it's low risk. Production testing means the first flights after airplanes roll of the line in order to identify squawks so they can be fixed prior to delivery to the customer. Usually, it's low risk. However, production test pilots often wear parachutes on first flights—some have had to use them. Experimental flight testing is where high risk resides. It includes first flights of off the drawing board aircraft and exploration of their operating envelopes. Despite everything that can be done to assure that the design is safe and the prototype has been assembled with care, things have gone south on first flights and envelope exploration flights in general aviation airplanes. Two fatalities that come quickly to mind were in the prototypes of the Cessna 340 and Cirrus SR20. A few weeks ago a friend of mine who is a retired experimental test pilot, Tom Wallis, sent me a note about some spin testing he did that moved him well along the developmental road from cocky young test pilot to the wise old pelican he became. I think his unassuming words are worth sharing. During his career as a test pilot for Cessna, Tom made a number of first flights of new models, most notably on the Model T303, one of the very finest-handling airplanes ever built. Following his retirement from Cessna, he was a freelance test pilot for many years. He was involved in flight test programs internationally, including the certification of Wipline amphibious floats on the DeHaviland Twin Otter and the first flights of a replica of the historic Sikorsky S-38. Tom's words are in italics. In early 1978, Cessna decided to produce a variation of its aerial application aircraft, the A188B AgTruck, with a turbocharged engine. This was in response to requests from customers in the west, operating at higher density altitudes and struggling to haul heavy loads. The final design incorporated a slightly different version of the Continental IO-520 with a ground adjustable wastegate and a new three-blade, wide-chord propeller. It was designated the T188C AgHusky, and I was assigned as project pilot. First Flight The first flight went well. I liked the smoothness of the engine/propeller combination a great deal. That spring and early summer I completed all the CAR 3 (forerunner of today's FAR 23 certification regulations) Stability and Control tests, and gathered the necessary climb and cruise data for the Pilot's Operating Handbook. I thought the airplane had better low altitude performance than the A188B, and certainly much improved altitude performance, as was expected. [TABLE] [TR] [TD][/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Before starting spin testing, my flight test engineer (FTE) and I went through the available literature on predicting spin behavior—there wasn't much. We focused on the change in inertia about the pitch and yaw axes caused by the heavier engine/propeller combination. Without more data, our predictions seemed little better than educated guesses, although it was obvious that spins would be adversely affected. In addition, the installation of the spin recovery parachute system under and aft of the airframe would make matters worse. Spin Chute As with all conventional gear airplanes, the tailwheel makes installing the spin chute a challenge. We eventually removed the tailcone underneath the rudder, and built a truss extending from its attachment to the aft fuselage, under the rudder, and ending with the parachute canister aft of the rudder by a reasonable margin. One of our goals in flight test was to keep things simple, so my choice for the spin chute "deploy" and "jettison" mechanisms (after using a spin chute, you have to get rid of it because you can't hold altitude once it's deployed) in the cockpit was a pair of ¾-inch ropes on each side of the pilot's seat, just below waist height, angling down and forward. Tied to the steel tubing of the cockpit frame under the panel, they extended back through the aft cockpit bulkhead to wire cables running through fairleads to the spin chute. Pulling a rope from aft to forward and down in what is best described as a pushing motion would activate its mechanism. I decided that the rope on the left should be the deploy control, and the right one the jettison because I would be flying with my right hand and therefore less likely to yank the wrong rope if things got interesting. The structures people did a good job designing the truss and canister arrangement and it passed ground load tests easily. The ropes also did the job, despite their crudeness, in the ground tests. I was confident that it would all work as required in the air. We all were a little worried, I think, that we had, of necessity, made the inertia problem worse because of the spin chute. No one suggested doing the tests without one. As was customary and cautious, we began the spin program at the usually less critical, most forward center of gravity, gross weight loading. My practice was to start the spins around 10,000 feet MSL (about 8500 feet AGL), and use the section lines for recovery inputs and for defining the length of recovery. All of the normal spins were completed successfully, as were spins with abnormal control usage in recovery and spins out of turns. The airplane was reluctant to enter in all cases. In most cases it didn't actually start spinning until at least ¾ of a turn in the entry phase. The rotation rate was rather slow. There was nothing out of the ordinary. Aft Center of Gravity For the first spins at the aft center of gravity, gross weight loading, our chief test pilot, Bruce Barrett, flew the chase airplane, and my FTE manned the camera. I completed the usual ¼ turn, left and right, ½ turn, left and right, and ¾ turn, left and right spins without any problem. The airplane was, as expected, more responsive to control inputs. [TABLE] [TR] [TD][/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] Entry into a one-turn spin to the left initially looked normal; at ½ turn the airplane was steeply nose down. However, at that point it accelerated in yaw and the nose came up rapidly. At the one-turn recovery point, I could see nothing but sky and the rotation rate was very fast. I thought "uh oh," and quickly applied full right rudder and full down elevator. Nothing happened. There were 10 to 15 pounds of backpressure in the elevator control (it took 10 to 15 pounds of force to move the stick forward). After one turn I had to look at the section line reference rather far away, since the pitch attitude had not changed—the nose of the AgHusky slopes down away from the cockpit so it had to be quite high to interfere with the forward view. I went back to pro-spin controls for another turn, and then repeated the anti-spin inputs with the same negative results. The airplane did not respond at all and the backpressure was still there. The rotation rate was fairly fast, 90 to 120 degrees per second, and very stable. I tried pro-spin and anti-spin inputs one more time. No change. Over the radio, Bruce was commenting on my altitude, and I decided that this flight condition would continue until the airplane screwed itself into the ground. I pulled the "deploy" rope. There was a soft deceleration, the rotation rate slowed and then stopped as nose simultaneously came down to well below the horizon, all rather gently. The controls worked again. I pulled the "jettison" rope, the airplane accelerated, I added power (the engine had quit in the spin, but restarted after the chute deployed) and leveled out. As I recall, recovery was complete around 5500 feet MSL. My FTE in the chase plane counted 12 turns, which was more than I'd counted, so I'd missed a few in the heat of the moment. After seeing where the chute landed, I went back to Cessna. Change the Inertia [TABLE] [TR] [TD][/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] It was obvious that the inertia effect of the heavier engine and propeller along with the spin chute installation had overcome the airplane's basic stability and aerodynamic control power. In discussions with structures folks, they thought they could lighten the spin chute attachment assembly, and proceeded to do it. Engineers in flight test, aerodynamics, and advanced design groups began thinking about an aerodynamic fix for the elevator back pressure, a positiv indicator that the tail was completely stalled—elevator and rudder. The second flight at the same heavy, aft loading was conducted with a lightened spin chute attachment structure, and a careful re-weighing and loading of the airplane. I decided to start at 11,000 feet MSL for a little more altitude cushion. I performed the ¼ turn. ½ turn, and ¾ turn spins as before. The airplane seemed to respond a little better in pitch and yaw, indicating that the lightened spin chute installation was a good idea. However . . . the one turn spin to the left had the same result as before with the same backpressure and perhaps a little slower rotation rate—kind of hard to tell. I tried the normal anti-spin input—nada. I the experimented with ailerons with and against the spin in successive tries, going back to pro-spin for about a turn between tries. I then tried an elevator first technique. Then several normal anti-spin inputs with very rapid control inputs. Nothing worked. I went to the trusty deploy rope at about 4500 feet MSL. Happily, it worked. After stabilizing in a steep descent I pulled the "jettison" rope. It didn't release. I tried again—same result. Now I was going down really fast. I finally thought to slow the airplane down as much as possible to lower the tension load on the release hook. I put the flaps down and pulled the stick back until I thought it was as slow as it would go, and then pulled really hard on the rope. It released, and full recovery was obtained at about 700 feet AGL. This time chase counted 32 turns. I took their word for it . . . Why Didn't the Chute Release? Post-flight examination of the spin chute attachment hook showed that the D ring on the end of the chute riser had slightly damaged the hook, preventing its free travel. Sadly, a year or so later we heard that a Piper test pilot had died when, after having his airplane go flat and successfully recovering with the chute, he flew it back to shore (they apparently did their spin testing off the coast near Lakeland) to save the chute. The chute D ring had enough time to damage the hook to the point where it didn't jettison, and he was then too low to bail out. The lesson was to ensure that the Brinnell hardness of the D ring and the hook were the same, and to jettison the chute as soon as possible. We began to work on an aerodynamic means to unstall the tail, since it wasn't feasible to modify the inertia any further. Several things were tried. I went on two weeks active duty (Tom retired as a colonel in the U.S. Marine Reserve) and Bruce Barrett filled in. [TABLE] [TR] [TD][/TD] [/TR] [/TABLE] When I returned, I found that the team had developed small delta-shaped strakes ahead of the horizontal tail. At high angles of attack, the delta shape would not stall, but would shed a strong vortex off its leading edge. This high-energy airflow would help to keep the flow attached to part of the rudder and elevator to provide enough control power to overcome the inertia effects. I re-ran all the longitudinal stability and control tests successfully, and repeated the forward gross spin tests without any problems. I then flew the aft gross loading, and again had to use the chute (right away, this time) in a one turn spin to the left—again—when it didn't recover at the one turn point. That was a surprise. Investigation showed that the airplane had been loaded measurably aft of the aft center of gravity limit. After fixing that, I completed all the normal spins at aft gross successfully. So this cocky test pilot (now somewhat less cocky), learned that what Ernie Gann had written was quite true: that sometimes an evil genie is going to piss all over a pillar of science, just for the hell of it. Tom Wallis is a retired test pilot, now living in Oregon. Learn and Live! Tuffnut.
  12. I wouldn't be to hard on the Bristell. All overseas LSA aircraft should be considered guilty until proved innocent. All AU LSA aircraft are extensively stall/spin tested. Aussies like to know their wings won't fall off etc. etc. I know for a fact that this is not true of Europe, even though we sometimes think they have very strict requirements. A lot gets through over there and you should choose your poison carefully. Read this for an interesting but tragic tale.. https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2017/aair/ao-2017-096/ tuffnut
  13. Certainly this gentleman made the best of a bad situation and did not succumb to the powerful temptation to 'glide stretch' which usually is fatal. Unexpected emergencies in flight are very un-nerving. The only way to overcome the stress and panic from these events is practice and familiarity. This is very much the case with VFR into IFR, and engine failures. Most pilots after a little practice with a qualified instructor and equipped aircraft, can do a reasonable job of straight and level, rate 1 turns, and can keep enough mental capacity for a scan to save themselves in cloud by doing a 180 and flying back out of cloud to live another day. However, take away the instructor; and the little bit of basic IFR done many moons ago is worth nothing when all of a sudden the pilot who is somewhere he should never be anyway, scud running or pushing last light enters cloud, with rain or low terrain or turbulence, and the result is nearly inevitable. IFR is a good example because experience has shown that only constant practice and checking keeps you proficient and safe, and the rules reflect this. Unless you are familiar with a procedure, an emergency will turn your brain to porridge! I have experienced this in IFR, as well as engine failures, and can attest to this phenomena! I was practicing engine out procedures in an aircraft that was supposed to have a 17:1 glide ratio with the prop feathered. Before I became familiar with this aircraft I thought, "how could you go wrong". I quickly found that the serene decent became very critical and scary near the ground as I nearly always underestimated my glide performance. Added to that was probably the fact that with the checking and other cockpit drills my speed control was tardy, and only God could achieve the 17:1 quoted by the manufacturer. It took me a lot of practice in a number of prop and gear configurations to feel confident with an engine failure in that aircraft. Today I still regularly practice engine failures and cross wind landings in all configurations to stop the 'porridge,' when the unexpected happens. I always aim to be 'high' on finals. The old adage of running out of strip with 20knots on the clock is still much better than 'landing' short at 60+knots. I have been flying all my life and I find I can still 'stuff it up' unless I regularly refresh these skills. I would be amazed if any 210 could achieve a 19:1 glide ratio. I think that figure needs checking having flown many 210s over the years. Maybe with the angel Gabriel as a passenger! So don't just 'expect the unexpected', as CASA says, practice and practice and PRACTISE for it!! Safe Flying. T.N.
  14. Apart from pilot incapacitation this is a monumental fail. There are so many 'accidents' that are simply caused by pilot incompetence. I have seen it and examined it many times. We have to accept and realize that we are operating in an unforgiving environment. So many of us think that if a flight goes well in good conditions, that makes us a good pilot. No it doesn't. What makes us a good pilot is being able to handle a given circumstance when things aren't going well. That can be as simple as calling off a flight before getting airborne, but usually it is having to handle something unexpected and potentially life threatening after the throttle is pushed fully forward. All of us need to spend whatever time necessary to become competent in all areas but particularly in X winds, forced landings and precision landings. If you don't fly regularly you can never be competent in these areas. If you do fly regularly but don't practice these skills you will not be competent. In this incident two people have been injured, and a beautiful aircraft probably written off. This equates to much suffering and cost. If anyone is asking 'what is competent', my definition is not feeling panic, undue stress or fear when faced with what in aviation, happens all the time!! ifrduck
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