Incident 13 May 15

I have wondered long and hard about making this post as I suspect there will be as many opinions on whether I did the right thing or what I could have done differently. I have finally decided to make the post and face whatever reception I get for the following reason. After having seen a similar post not 6 months ago about an incident that was very similar to my own, I asked a lot of questions of people and did a lot of research that I think held me in very good stead when this incident happened to me. Because of that if someone reads my post and as a result considers the possibility of something similar happening, and it helps them in their decision making process then I can live with any flack that I receive.

So the thread that certainly started me asking questions was the one about what I would do given the same set of circumstances is ( http://recreationalflying.com/threads/lockyer-valley-accident-2-july-14.120331/ )

So the incident on 13 May, exactly 11 months to the day after my first TIF and on Friday the 13th.

After making 10 nm approach call to Kingaroy airfield, at 5700' and just after having switched fuel tanks from left to right, my wife (who has had a lifelong fear of small aircraft and has only been up with me probably a dozen times which I guess is a testament to her trust of me) noticed smoke coming into the cabin of the aircraft. I immediately suspected a fire and identified suitable landing site and commenced descent to the nominated site. The smoke was coming from under my wife's feet and that in conjunction with the smell and knowing the location of the Auxiliary Fuel pump helped me to identify very quickly that it was an electrical problem.

So far immediate responses were to :-

1. Identify suitable landing area.

2. Cut the power asap and get the aircraft descending at the fastest safe rate. (the first figure that popped into my head was Vne followed by how fast can I side slip this thing.) Both figures that I recommend everyone learn about every aircraft they fly before they fly it.

3. Switch everything off except the Magnetos but including the electrical master switch.

4. Evaluate the situation as it stands.

Now at this stage it may be pertinent to point out that right through training and up until I read the above mentioned post, I was of the total belief that when the fan stops, the one friend that you have is height. (Select best glide speed, do not panic, put the aircraft on the ground in a relaxed calm manner).

This is where the above post is relevant, after reading it several times and asking lots of questions I had worked out the following basics. Now this is where I leave myself open to criticism.

1. When you are on fire you need to get on the ground asap.

2. Height is not your friend. The higher you are the longer the fire has to reach you or something critical in the aircraft.

3. When the smoke hits you the world is going to turn to SH*T in a big hurry. (Trust me it does).

4. Which way to sideslip the aircraft. (trust me this was the toughest decision that I had to make all day but more about that later).

5. Know your aircraft. The capabilities, the wiring, the speeds and anything else that you can learn.

6. Very important, always know the ground height, and how far above it you are. (Some of these may be obvious to big hour pilots but they were not to me and I thank the above thread for making me think of them).

So following my immediate responses, I had the aircraft descending at 1500 ft/min according to the VSI. I might add that this was the last thing that I could see before the instrument panel was totally obscured by smoke. This was the point that I had to make the toughest decision of my life. Sideslip the aircraft to the right and because of the vents in the aircraft direct the worst of the smoke away from my wife. Or sideslip to the left and force the smoke towards my wife of 36 years and risk harming her but allowing me to see the ground and attitude of the aircraft out of the door. Obviously in hindsight there was no choice but when it is your wife and you only have 1/2 a second to decide then it was the toughest one that I have ever made. At the end of the day if I could not see or lost consciousness, then she was not going to be able to land the aircraft.

Everything turned off.

Emergency landing site identified.

Plane descending at 1500 ft/min

All good but then I lose site of everything except the view out the passenger door. Not Good.

Every cloud has a silver lining. At about 3500-4000 ft I noticed 2 things.

1. the smoke is not getting worse in fact now I can see the altimeter so it may be clearing "at least on my side of the aircraft"

2. I remember that the last thing I heard before turning off the master switch was radio traffic. This told the back section of my brain that the problem was not the radio. So fighting all my natural instincts, I turned the Master switch back on after checking that everything except the radio was turned off. When the radio was on line I gave a mayday call as at that time I had full intention of landing in the field I had picked. Yes I could have given a Pan Pan call but at this stage, I still thought that we were on fire and we were conducting an emergency landing in a field about 5nm north of Kingaroy.

At about 1000 feet above ground level ie. 2500 ft amsl I realised that the smoke was still clearing and I could actually see most of the gauges. At this time I decided to paddock hop into Kingaroy. This would do 2 things.

1. Give me a safer landing spot.

2. Allow me to give the emergency services a known location to aim for. (Isn't it amazing the silly things that we think of).

So we paddock hopped into Kingaroy, At some stage I remember turning the Transponder back on. (There must be something about Human Nature that wants people to find our bodies LOL.) I know it s not funny but it is my story so I can laugh at myself if I want to.

Obviously because I am here writing this we landed safely. The emergency services and Brisbane control whoever they are where absolutely brilliant and I can not say how great it was to be in touch with such professional people throughout the whole experience. If I could identify them I would without doubt like to buy them a scotch or 2.

As people ask questions I will be willing to answer the them honestly and frankly and there is so much more I could say about the whole experience. I through my trade background have found some serious deficiencies that really need to be sorted and to date have not been to my satisfaction. And in fact probably never will be. Suffice to say at this stage that 24 rego is no guarantee of safety as I thought it was. There are some serious problems that really do need addressing.

All in all this was a terrifying experience. My wife has not been back up and at this stage I am not sure if she will. In fact I doubt that she will even though she says she is going to. I was that ill/unsettled after the experience that I felt unable to sit in the backseat of a car for the return journey from Kingaroy to Caboolture. In fact I spent the night in a motel in Kingaroy. I did at great cost to myself mentally fly the same aircraft home the following day after repairs. It took me a month to fly again after that and today was the first time I actually enjoyed a flight in the same aircraft.

So have at me folks, tell me what I did wrong, tell me what I should have done better, and tell me how you would have done it.

The one certainty from all of this is that when I take off and ask myself how I will react in an emergency (as I always did and still do), I can answer that question with experience and honesty. I know the answer and I hope that I never have to answer that question again. But I am prepared and hopefully this thread can help others prepare.

Well I'm not going to dig at you Geoff, sounds like all the right decisions to me ( I mean you are still here to post it so could have been a lot worse)

I could open the doors in my plane in flight but that could just give more oxygen to a fire which could work out worse rather than better. IMHO congrats on handling it as good as you did.

In regards to pan pan vs mayday calls I reckon you called right, after all smoke filled cab plus probable out landing who would argue with that?

As for the Brisbane centre help IMHO they do an awesome job and it's a pity some people are hesitant to use them. (Not just saying that to suck up to the controllers)

You got back down safely that's really all that matters . I doubt that you will have too many critics . Well done ... Bob

Geoff, thank you very much for sharing this with us, thankfully a good outcome.

Geoff

you were PIC and you're here to tell the tale, is there a better outcome available?, if there is I don't know what it would be. Sure, in the quietness of your own company I'm sure you'll analyse and dissect all that happened, so that if the same circumstances were to happen again you'd probably do things slightly differently, but would they be better???

So, that all said, what actually was the cause of all the smoke? was there protection available, (fuses/cct brkrs ) and did they perform? Why was the Aux fuel pump on (assumption on my behalf, possibly wrong,from what you have written) when you were at significant altitude, is that iaw the POH?

What Aircraft type?

Andy

Oh one other thing...if the smoke was so thick you couldn't see the panel, what physiological impact did it have on you and or the wife....was breathing an issue, were you breathing through cloth to try and filter etc..coughing? Any post incident medical checks? What was the exact component that let out the smoke, was it wiring of the device itself, I ask in that we generally should select wiring insulation that doesn't melt and produce toxic smoke etc.... be keen to hear your thoughts

Thanks for the post Geoff. Very well done. Quick thinking and a very good result. I would like to make a couple of points.

Firstly, I was always taught if you do something (like turning on a pump or changing tanks) and something goes wrong, undo whatever you did if you have time. I presume you switched on the aux pump before changing tanks and it was the fuel pump or it's wiring that smoked.

Secondly, getting to the ground as quickly as possible while side slipping. I think I will experiment to see what combination of speed, flaps, sideslip gives me the best rate of descent and arriving near the ground at a speed that can be controlled quickly so as to land. As you say knowing this could come in very handy.

Ok so the problem was in fact two fold. The initial fault was in the auxilliary fuel pump. The pump was turned on to change fuel tanks.

Proceedure as taught to switch tanks.

1. Identify emergency landing area in case needed.

2. Aux pump on.

3. Fullest tank on.

4. Wait a few seconds then lowest tank off.

5. Wait a few more seconds then Aux pump off.

This is what I did on the day. I was at height to overfly some hills just North of Kingaroy. I switched tanks as per proceedure above. I had turned the pump off then given my inbound call. My wife and I had been dicussing emergency proceedures so I was well aware of safe areas below me having just pointed them out. The pump strarted to smoke some 10 to 15 seconds after having been turned off. Whether that was due to residual heat or the seized/faulty pump shorting out the switch or not I do not know. I do know now that the aux pump was not fused and although the majority of the wiring was suitable aircraft grade teflon wire, the last 6 inches to the pump was standard automotive plastic coated wire. Having said that the smoke came from the pump getting hot enough to melt through the metal case 1cm below the fuel inlet and allowing the smoke out and not from the wiring. Had the fuel caught fire, it could have been a far worse outcome.

This was in a 24 reg Factory built Foxbat. It is the only one in Australia fitted with an Aux fuel pump from what I can find out. The wiring diagram for the pump was not in the POH but I have since gotten it from the factory. The pump was to the best of my knowledge not wired as per the diagram.

As for the effects of smoke. I was quite ill for several days (stomache upset), but I simply wrote it off as stress/ adrenalin. Maybe I shouldn't have but thats how it was. My wife appeared to have no lasting effects apart from a headache for a couple of days.

Follow up.

I believe that all aircraft should be fitted out with Teflon wiring as a bare minimum. (I had already done that with the rewire of my own for that very reason).

Anyone who fits any device without the recommended fuse had better not walk in front of me.

I am also in light of this incident covering all my fuel hoses with fire retardent containment hoses, not just the ones forward of the firewall. (The thought of a fuel line fire through the cabin is almost beyond comprehension).

In addition I now not only practice ccts/emergency landings and engine out landings more often, but also I practice getting to the ground as quickly as possible. I do this practice as often as possible and at least every 2nd time that I fly.

Am I scared to fly after this incident? No but I certainly have a far larger understanding for the need the practice emergency proceedures.

I believe that most pilots probably question how they will react in an emergency. At least the smart ones will. Well I have answered that question for myself once so I will not be so nervous of asking myself the same question every time I go up.

Geoff,

Sounds to me like you handled your situation as best you could at the time, under some stress with your wife on board. Smoke in the cockpit and loss of visibility are probably two of the worst possibilities ( next to a snake in the cockpit) one could imagine in flight.

I have yet to see any pilot handle an emergency and do everything absolutely copybook, and this includes Mirage fighter pilots in the Airforce and commercial pilots, as demonstrated by the ATR pilot in China who recently retarded the good engine. How often does this happen.

One youngish Bell 206 pilot and his ship-pilot passenger at Hamilton Island while I was there, experienced a total engine failure over water on the way out to a ship. His first ever major emergency. He blew the floats and put the chopper into fairly choppy seas. The chopper turned turtle in fairly short time and sank, and they were rescued in quick time after inflating their life vests.

The pilot walked into the hanger next day in pretty good shape after his swim and I had a chat to him. I explained to him that in every emergency I had experienced there was always something I had neglected to do, and I asked him what did he forget ?.......he looked at me and said " I forgot to brief the passenger"........last I heard he is now flying real big helicopters out to oil rigs somewhere.

For those who don't have a battery master in their aircraft to isolate battery power from the aircraft electrical system, I would strongly recommend you fit one.

Geoff you have done well on many counts.

Posting about it. So we can all benefit from your experience.

You have assessed your performance and this is a good thing and should be done after any flight even when you haven't had as critical an event as you have with this one.

In flight fire is one of the WORST things that can happen. Isolating possible causes is the thing to do (which you did).

Getting down quickly is the next.

Evacuating smoke has to be done too. Smoke can ignite depending on what it consists of and electrical/plastic sources may be quite dangerous chemically. You have to be able to see, also..

Descent can be higher air speed or slow with sideslip. ROD is the key to time in the air.

If you prang when already on fire you aren't in a good situation either, so extra pressure on a good landing. Talking to ATC is OK but they can't fly the plane for you so give the right priorities your attention first. Don't talk to the detriment of your flying requirements.

Good job done.. (As Maj says everyone will forget some item(s))

Having an ammeter on the panel may indicate a failed component to you if the higher than normal current is noticed as you switch something on. A circuit breaker/fuse doesn't always guarantee that you won't get a fire, but it should protect the circuit. Nev

Wow Geoff!!!

That was an awesome read. I don't mean to make light of the seriousness but it literally had me on the edge of my seat. And I think I literally cheered when the smoke cleared.

I think you succeeded wonderfully. I am sure I could' t have done better in the same circumstances.

Geoff, I just hope that if I ever have a similar experience, I have the same presence of mind that you demonstrated. Well done.

Excellent outcome

Well done

Thanks for the writeup. It is a great help to us all to be reminded of in flight fire and the actions you safely took.

More success to you

If the aux pump was something like a commonly used Facet automotive pump (or a cheaper copy) it has fixed automotive wiring (positive red & negative black) which has to be connected to the aircraft wiring system. The pumps are totally sealed so you cannot replace the wiring. BTW you did exceptionally well in all aspects of your emergency. Well done.

Glad you dealt with it without panic, the good news is if there ever is another drama you know you won't panic !

I believe you get the best outcome if you don't panic! Good work !

Hi Geoff you handled that the right way and kept a cool head well done,our 2 foxbats don't use aux pumps at all just gravity and the rotax mechanical pump they must have added them in the LSA ,the saddest part of the whole show is the effect on your wife I hope she puts it behind her and gets back in the sky:)

well done, I don't believe you could have done anything better great result

I would just like to say, re the question of Mayday v Pan Pan, smoke in the cockpit is a Mayday. Any unknown aircraft malfunction is a mayday. Pan Pan is probably more suited to something like ATC putting you in a hold when you are on fixed reserve fuel. History has taught us that disregarding a failure as a pan pan can often lead to fatal consequences. If in doubt, mayday is the correct call, dont be afraid to use it (I say this as a person involved in marine rescue).

In response to a couple of issues mentioned. One of them was absoloutely a critical failure on my part. At no stage during the whole process did I think to explain to my passenger/wife what I was doing or why. This was a mega fail at so many levels. The most important of all of these was she watched me start to hit the switches and turn things off. She naturally thought that I had gone mad and had also turned the engine off. One of her first questions to me when back on the ground was "why didn't the engine stop when you turned everything off?" Little did she know that during the whole thing I kept thinking why couldn't it be something simple like an engine out.

I should have done more to keep her in the loop. I do remember looking towards her twice during the whole incident, and both times she had a death like grip on one of the overhead bars and her eyes closed and was crying. At one stage I thought to get the EPIRB out of its spot in my wing root and get her to activate it as I had taught her how to do that. The problem was that I really never had a spare hand to get it out and hand it over. There is a lesson there. It my plane I intend to velcro it to the dash panel.

As for the smoke. At several stages I considered opening the door. At one stage I had my hand on the handle and had undone it to the first detent. The things I cosidered where.

What if the extra air fans the fire?

Although I am aware that the Foxbat can fly without doors, but I was worried about the effect of only having one opened and not both. I was sure that I would not be able to convince Julie to open hers.

I was very worried about the door coming of its hinges as it was opened and causing damage to the control surfaces.

I also thought that if I did open the door and it was the wrong decision, that it would not be able to be undone.

Two other things. As I came into Ykry I decided that with the wind as it was I would land on Rwy23. ATC at about this time told me that the main Rwy was 16/34. For some reason I thought they were advising me to land on 34 because that would put me closer to the terminal and emergency services. I am not sure why I thought that but I did and so landed on 34 with a fairly strong crosswind. I can assure you it was not pretty and I am glad that I wasn't being tested on that one landing. So a lesson in listening to ATC but still be aware of making your own decisions.

As for the Mayday call, I am sure it was the correct call and would not hesitate to use it again in a similar situation. Had I not successfully gotten the plane on the ground undamaged, those few minutes lead time given to the emergency services may have made all the difference.

So Facthunter and Maj as well as others have highlighted some extremely relevant points. In hindsight I wish that I had talked Julie through my thought process and actions at the time, but I will be honest, I simply didn't even consider that. What I did consider were things that I felt were critical to getting safely on the ground and seem to have forced the niceties out of my mind to allow room for the necessities. That is probably not going to help with getting Julie back into the plane.

We shall see I guess.

In response to a couple of issues mentioned. One of them was absoloutely a critical failure on my part. At no stage during the whole process did I think to explain to my passenger/wife what I was doing or why. This was a mega fail at so many levels. The most important of all of these was she watched me start to hit the switches and turn things off. She naturally thought that I had gone mad and had also turned the engine off. One of her first questions to me when back on the ground was "why didn't the engine stop when you turned everything off?" Little did she know that during the whole thing I kept thinking why couldn't it be something simple like an engine out.I should have done more to keep her in the loop. I do remember looking towards her twice during the whole incident, and both times she had a death like grip on one of the overhead bars and her eyes closed and was crying. At one stage I thought to get the EPIRB out of its spot in my wing root and get her to activate it as I had taught her how to do that. The problem was that I really never had a spare hand to get it out and hand it over. There is a lesson there. It my plane I intend to velcro it to the dash panel.

 

As for the smoke. At several stages I considered opening the door. At one stage I had my hand on the handle and had undone it to the first detent. The things I cosidered where.

 

What if the extra air fans the fire?

 

Although I am aware that the Foxbat can fly without doors, but I was worried about the effect of only having one opened and not both. I was sure that I would not be able to convince Julie to open hers.

 

I was very worried about the door coming of its hinges as it was opened and causing damage to the control surfaces.

 

I also thought that if I did open the door and it was the wrong decision, that it would not be able to be undone.

 

Two other things. As I came into Ykry I decided that with the wind as it was I would land on Rwy23. ATC at about this time told me that the main Rwy was 16/34. For some reason I thought they were advising me to land on 34 because that would put me closer to the terminal and emergency services. I am not sure why I thought that but I did and so landed on 34 with a fairly strong crosswind. I can assure you it was not pretty and I am glad that I wasn't being tested on that one landing. So a lesson in listening to ATC but still be aware of making your own decisions.

 

As for the Mayday call, I am sure it was the correct call and would not hesitate to use it again in a similar situation. Had I not successfully gotten the plane on the ground undamaged, those few minutes lead time given to the emergency services may have made all the difference.

 

So Facthunter and Maj as well as others have highlighted some extremely relevant points. In hindsight I wish that I had talked Julie through my thought process and actions at the time, but I will be honest, I simply didn't even consider that. What I did consider were things that I felt were critical to getting safely on the ground and seem to have forced the niceties out of my mind to allow room for the necessities. That is probably not going to help with getting Julie back into the plane.

 

We shall see I guess.

Thanks for sharing the story Geoff. It seems you made all the right decisions under the circumstances.

Isn't it strange how your mind speeds up in times like this, you can remember making so many plans and evaluating and discarding some in a very short time.

I have also seen my wife terrified, death grip on the dash, eyes screwed tight with tears streaming down her face. It really hurts.

I also was too busy to explain what I was doing or to comfort her. My job was to get back safely, and that is what I focussed on, as did you.

We have since discussed it, and she has flown with me since. I think in some way, it will give your wife more confidence that you will make the right decision if you need to.

Good job mate, I am sure you have learnt some good things from the experience.

Don't beat yourself up. I would be happy to fly with you.

In reference to my Mirage pilot comment in post # 8.........proof that even the 'best of the best' can fuxx up.

We were night flying at Williamtown. Three pilots came in and collected their gear and suited up, one being a particularly skilled Flight Leutenant with a very high number of Mirage hours (1000+)...he was also the squadron 'top gun' and the best air to air shot.

A fairly likeable relaxed individual who was always happy to chat with the boys, unlike some of the others who were definitely running on ego, as frontline fighter pilots often do.

The line hut shook a bit ten minutes later indicating that the three had fired up and were taxiing to the runway at Williamtown. Time to relax for an hour until their return....however about 20 minutes later in walked our Flight Leutenant unexpectantly, white as a ghost, and not saying anything...dropped his gear and left abruptly. I noticed he still had the small ankle straps (sticker straps) on his ankles, which normally remained in the aircraft attached to the ejection seat. These were attached to the pilots ankles and would pull the legs tightly back against the seat during an ejection. It was most unusual that he was wearing them as he passed through the line hut.

The Mirage 3s would take off as a pair with the lead slightly ahead of his wingman, one on either side of the wide Williamtown runway.

I found out two days later what had happened during that night takeoff, from the pilot himself. The final cockpit check prior to takeoff in the Mirage was to latch the main canopy above which normally sat up about 3 inches during taxi. Our friend had neglected that last check which he had no doubt performed thousands of times before. At 70 Kts during the takeoff roll the canopy started to lift, he reached up to grab it and in doing so hit the right brake, immediately blowing the right 400psi nitrogen filled main tire. ( very narrow so they fitted into the Mirages thin wing) His aircraft then passed across the path of the other aircraft just behind him and ran off the runway into the sand. His wingman didn't even see him pass in front of him that night.

With the aircraft now stopped in the sand the pilot performed an on-ground egress, which allows the pilot to get out of the seat and cockpit during a ground emergency, fire etc..which is why he had the sticker straps still on his ankles.

The canopy by the way did depart the aircraft smashing into a million bits on the runway. Four huge Hobart vacume trucks ran up and down for the next two days before the runway was declared usable again. The aircraft spent the next six months in a hangar due damage to the landing gear when it departed the runway and into the sand. The high time and well respected fighter pilot would not fly fighters again at Williamtown and departed a few weeks later to take up an airline pilot career. As the canopy departed that night it took a chunk out of a fin shaped antennae behind the cockpit. Engineers removed this, mounted it on a nice wood plaque and presented it to the pilot during his farewell party. One simple mistake and a fine career over, however the potential for a disaster involving both aircraft was certainly there and the CO probably had no chance but to bounce him.

Geoff - I'd be extremely happy if I could handle that situation as well as you did.

A query if I may: what was the pump - make, model? I'm just about to replace my entire system from the tank forward in my Jab. ST1 and was on the point of ordering a new Facet 'brick' as a drop-in replacement for the old Repco facet-brick one (which won't handle ethanol or aromatics), but your experience makes me wary that there could be better alternatives - though as Nev says, most have auto-style pvc wiring for some inches at least.

In an emergency you must prioratise things and not respond to what may just overload you and not improve your ability to do the job at hand. The aim is to get the plane down safely. Don't be distracted from that, or whatever else you do may be of no avail. Nev

Pilot in the above third from right ..second row...with arms folded...

Geoff , well done on getting to the ground safely, But a couple of questions spring to mind.......................... 1. How was is that an electrical dead short occurred? and 2 . What was the fuse (main or pump) doing while your aeroplane was catching fire? ....Just wondering