Dafydd Llewellyn

Thanks, Kaz. This might be an appropriate point for a little history lesson:

In 1993, the Howard Government had, in its election platform, the introduction of an "American-style experimental category" into the Australian Civil Aviation Regulations; the SAAA and AOPA had been pushing for this, for decades.

The Howard Govt got into power in 1994; and in 1996 the then Minister, John Sharp, set up the Review of Regulations; and one of its marching orders was to make good that election promise. The American Experimental "category" exists because the U.S. constitution gives the individual the right to elect to take a risk, if he so chooses. Australians wanted that same right, in regard to recreational aircraft. The US experimental "category" appears in FAR Part 21, regulations 21.191 thru 21.195. (They are, nowadays, in the same place in CASR Part 21). However, Australia did not have a Part 21 in its regulations in 1996, because the people who wrote Australia's CARs did not dream that anybody here would be so silly as to to actually build an aeronautical product; the regulations were written about importing such products and maintaining them. (Oh, there were a couple of makers of wood propellers, but they were covered by ANO 108.28 and 108.29-which still exist, by the way).

The whole thrust of the CARs was paternalistic - protecting people from themselves, whether they wanted this or not. This was almost a religion within DCA/CAA/CASA; and the problem was (and still is) that the experimental provisions turn that completely upside down; they are based on voluntary acceptance of risk - just as is slowly becoming recognised for any "inherently dangerous" recreational activity, as is shown by the precedents set in NSW by Campbell Vs Rodney Victor Hay, and Echin vs STGC. So we have this little "bubble" of rebellion (or freedom, take your pick) buried inside a vast body of wholly paternalistic regulations that are fundamentally designed to protect Auntie Flo when she flies off to visit her grandchild. Some people have difficulty in grasping this temporary reversal of gravity as one passes across this little section of the CASRs.

So ANY aircraft that is essentially "experimental" in nature - however disguised by an E24 or a 19 registration, or by any other means, should have a prominent placard stating that it does not comply with normal aviation safety standards, and persons flying in it do so at their own risk. (I wanted the words "Abandon hope all ye who enter here", but I was overruled, and the message is toned down more that I think it should be, but a message is required to be there).

This also necessitated that CASA be given an immunity to negligence in regard of these aircraft, in the form of CASR Part 201.003.

The message has not yet fully seeped through to the courts (edited - Mod) - or, indeed to the drafters of the Jabiru engine Instrument, in that they included experimental aircraft. But it is quite clearly evident in CASA Advisory Circular 21.10; and anybody who is still having trouble with the whole idea should read that AC.

(edited - Mod)

Some manufacturers in the U.S.A. wanted to be able to sell what amounted to sub-standard aircraft as fully-manufactured products rather than as 51% rule kits; so they sought a half-way house - the first attempt was the Primary category; but the sole example with an FAA primary category TC was (and still is) the Australian Seabird Seeker. So they tried again, and the "consensus standard" put out by the ASTM was the result - and this made things a lot simpler for new entrants to this manufacture industry; but make no mistake, these are sub-standard products with a limited imprimatur, and limited application. They are only a whisker above experimental, and if you modify them without the manufacturer's consent, (or if the manufacturer ceases to exist) they revert to experimental.

Trying to keep the engine compact.(not too wide) makes the conrod angularity very large. This gives big sideloads on the cylinders . Shear on the studs and load transfer to one side . Cyclicly.? Nev

Question: How can the through-bolts be failing if they are not stressed above the fatigue limit? Surely the cylinder pressures can be measured? I can imagine a sensor hole, a lot smaller than a spark-plug hole, being put into a test engine and connected to a data-logger.Gosh I'll volunteer my engine if CASA can't afford one after all their executive salaries. Dafydd, you did once say that instrumentation was the hardest thing, but is it so hard?

Wow if there are no excessive pressures and the bolts then fail then I will apply for a refund of the

 

fees I paid doing my masters in mechanical engineering. I will sign up for astrology and stuff.

Actually the sump, starter motor, backplate etc are reused, but it's essentially a new engine.

Why on earth would casa not open channels with the people who actually build the engines? I'm dumbfounded.

Yenn, you need to do some reading both here and http://camitaeroengines.netYes Camit make the Jabiru engines, TO JABIRU SPEC under their certification??

They were instrumental in the design and development for a start but appears their ideas and Jabirus separted some time ago

 

They have been working on their own variation of the engine. With serious nvestment in time and money. Plan was to certify and give owners an option. Arguably CAE have some solid skills to strengthen the engine and have done so.

 

Jabiru are obstructive as they no doubt see a threat for some reason.

 

Its a fairly new discussion but you can buy a full New CAE engine currently or a new core. At this point only suitable to experimental aircraft as Jabiru stopped cert process. The all new CAE engines are NOT a Jabiru and not affected by this CASA proposal.

 

Pretty sure core engines are still a modified Jabiru

 

CAE can make parts for certified and LSA Jabirus but cant sell them direct as i understand it.

 

Many would like CAE to complete development process, gain their own ability to make and sell Engine parts and their own engines into LSA aircraft but that requires help from CASA. Currently they are trying to force Jabiru to do something neither party wants

Camit make (to order) either an experimental "core rebuilt" Jabiru engine; or a CAE experimental engine. They are the same thing, physically, because it is cheaper for CAMit to repair the Jabiru engine by 100% "repair by replacement", than to reclaim parts from an existing engine. What that means is that when you take your old engine in, the whole thing goes into the bin, and what you get is 100% new parts. If you simply order a CAE engine, there's nothing to put into the bin - that's the difference. You can check the details with CAMit, but that's my understanding.

This is sad as Camit are keen to manufacture improved engines and if they were improving / making engines for Jab or assisting Jab, then it would ensure that Jabiru and Camit both survive, at this rate both might disappear.

I respectfully request that Ross offer some substantiated proof of his allegation.(edited - Mod)

Is Jabiru working with Camit ? Gossip I heard did not indicate this, sounded like the same head in the sand method from Jabiru ! The survey they sent to flying schools looks like a way out also ! I find it hard to be optimistic with CASA trying to destroy Australian aircraft manufacture with no regard for anyone and Jabiru with it is someone else's fault not ours now let's put our head back in the sand !I do not hold my hopes very high for Jabiru to act appropriately after the responsonse to RAA bulletin about cylinder base cracks. More interest in hours than cracks, in fact it just says cracks pose no threat !

 

Quote. "This investigation also revealed that the cylinder heads on the engine with the cylinder head cracks sent to us had done 2,302.4 hours TTIS and 1,244.9 hours since the previous Top End Overhaul. The hours were done in a period of 2 years 4 months. There appeared to be confusion regarding the correct method of recording engine time in the maintenance log book. Jabiru requires that Hobbs Time be the sole method by which engine time is recorded.

 

The problem with proper recording of engine time has prompted us to release the attached Service Letter (JSL010-1) regarding Service Intervals which clarifies your obligations concerning maintenance records. "

 

After the CFI conference I thought everything will be fine and RAA has a bright future a couple of hours later I want to walk away and forget aviation totally. It is just not worth the agony from a bunch of ignorant fools !

No, as far as I know, Jabiru is not working with CAMit; and moreover, CASA have not made any contact with CAMit since this draft Instrument was issued, other than to verbally confirm that the Instrument did not apply to CAE engines.

In the pre-war days, British engineers tended to be "practical chaps" not contaminated with the likes of university engineering learning. That's why a Spitfire took 14000 man hours to build vs 6000 for an Me109. The Merlin was designed by practical chaps at Rolls-Royce. Their development path was to thrash it until something broke. Then they looked at the wreck, beefed up the broken bit and did it all again. Then it went into service ... from the Wikipedia page ...Initially the new engine was plagued with problems, such as failure of the accessory gear trains and coolant jackets, and several different construction methods were tried before the basic design of the Merlin was set.[14] Early production Merlins were also unreliable: Common problems were cylinder head cracking, coolant leaks, and excessive wear to the camshafts and crankshaftmain bearings.[15]

 

 

The cheerful bit is that it ended up as a pretty good engine.

 

Does this seem familiar? Do the factory people have what it takes to sort the problems faced by owners of Jabiru engines?

I don't believe for one moment that the CAMit parts are in any way inferior to the originals and generally reflect a serious attempt to upgrade and improve quality and therefore reliability of the total package. The CASA action may frustrate that outcome, which would be a pity punitive and wasteful. Certainly I'm amazed that non training aircraft are included in the restrictions. The total aircraft package has proven safe by comparison with anything out there, so putting all the training into some other brands won't statistically improve things . The aim should be to improve the product powerplant -wise, and expedite anything that helps that process.I generally support the M Monk document. Nev

I think the survey will be just a cover up.Until we know the cause of the problems we will not know the cure, so to say fit EFI, may not do any good except to the vendors of EFI equipment. from what Motz has posted it seems his operations are IAW the POH, but he does seem to have a terrible record of failures. What we want to know is "why?"

My jab engine is not supposed to be run at 2400rpm, due to harminics, but I doubt that Jabiru aircraft can run at that speed economically.

 

All the talk of Camit engines bewilders me. I thought Camit made engines for Jabiru, therefore they were Jab engines. If camit started making a modified engine surely it would still be a jabiru, unless they have approval from the designer.

 

On those engines which have failed through bolts has there been any evidence of detonation? I would assume that detonation would add greatly to the tension on through bolts.

The CAE core-rebuilt engine is a Jabiru engine with modifications; there is a master drawing list for those modifications. It has a Jabiru data plate plus a CAE modification data plate, to specify the modification status. It looks virtually identical to a Jabiru engine, apart from the alternator.

CAMit were also scratch-building essentially the same thing as the core-rebuilt engine, but not starting from an existing Jabiru engine, and that has only a CAE data plate.

Because of the obstructions, these versions will now not be taken to certification, as far as I am aware. I assume they will continue to be built to order as experimental engines.

Ian Bent is now concentrating on an engine that cannot be claimed to have any conflict with Jabiru IP. The intention - if it can be realised - is to take that engine through ASTM 2245.

I can't make it any simpler than this.

Dafydd I know you had said that but as everyone keeps quote regs on here I was looking for something in writing.

So is Ian Bent. It's only verbal from CASA so far; we're all waiting.

DCM Is it classed as a Jabiru engine or not in light of this proposed instrument. Or do you not know.Cheers Geoff13

Might explain some variability, failures vs starts?Wouldnt resonance be totally different in 3300 vs 2200?

It is good to see the robust discussion of the mode of failures and analysis of the potential solutions. There is a huge amount of information available from an in depth analysis of the failures. The information from facthunter, motartmerv, Dafydd, Oscar and many others here is critical to gathering information on the failures to determine the route causes of the problems. From what I have observed it would appear that Ian Bent (CAMit) has progressed a lot of this but I still believe that there is more to the problems being experienced.Yes, Jabiru should be doing this. In spite of my open criticism of the CASA actions which I see as using a sledge hammer to repair a precision instrument, I have also argued directly with Jabiru that they should be doing more analysis of not just of the identified failures but also of the out of schedule maintenance being conducted, to determine the root cause of the problems and be doing something to fix the problems. A more reliable, robust and less reactive maintenance engine is a great thing for all who sit behind one and for those that pay the costs of maintaining them.

 

By uncovering the underlying reasons for failure and implementing changes (operation, maintenance and components) it will lead to improvements in reliability and thus safety.

Thanks Dafydd. I have had Harleys move the mainshaft in the flywheel because of the starter engagement shock so it can be a significant force. I agree totally about the flywheel effect. Should be one end only. Nev

I'll take this opportunity to ask Dafydd "do you think the starter engagement has any effect on the flywheel attachment. failure" . It should be on the front of the engine near the prop.ft has anyone suggested the parts prices are too high? That's a pretty outrageous suggestion if you think about it. Keep it dangerous TO MAKE MORE MONEY!!!..Nev

OK then Dafydd, leave the oil pressure out of it, what do you think about the resonance?

As far as the "flywheel" bolts on the 3300 are concerned, I suspect it does contribute - and that can be improved considerably by removing the permanent magnet rotor from the engine - which reduces the moment of inertia of that end of the crankshaft assembly - and replacing it with a belt-driven alternator, which does not contribute to the "flywheel" inertia, but instead supplies some dynamic damping at the torsional frequencies likely to be responsible.

The propeller is the principal "flywheel" and its attachment MUST be capable of handling the transient loads that involves - just as in any direct-drive Lyconental. So putting a Rotax donut between the crankshaft and the propeller is right out. It works (for a while) in the Rotax because the individual firing impulses are relatively small, and at twice the frequency. The Rotax gearbox pinion would fail very quickly without some sort of cushioning effect between the crankshaft and the propeller.

I'm I agreement with him. I've harped on about resonant frequencies (harmonics ) for years. You only get away with wooden props on these motors.. The Sensenich composite started delaminating near the hub. I doubt they expected that.. Haven't we been assured there are no resonance problems in the normal rev range? That could account for the erratic oil pressure too. Nev

Summarising the multiple threads pertaining to this topic over the last week, the following actions seems to be how all of these developments have unfolded:

5. For some time Jabiru Aircraft & Camit have not been working together on the "same page" with each other which have created tensions between both of these Companies ( which are both good genuine Aussie Companies").

 

6. In the meantime if Jabiru Aircraft & Camit can come to together as grown men & forget their differences & sit around a table to work out a viable Commercial Joint Venture for the financial benefit of both Companies in the future, then should this Joint Venture eventuates, then Jabiru Aeroplanes will be kept flying around the world & at the end of the day would in all probability be to CASA'S satisafaction.

CASA does not, I suspect, have the engineering expertise at its fingertips to get to the root of the through bolt issue. Just "make them stronger" isn't the answer; and CASA does NOT supply an engineering consulting service. CAMit does have the answer, and wants to apply it commercially. Jabiru considers that it has in fact fixed the problem; and whilst this may very nearly be so, I doubt that it has really gotten to the root of the problem (my personal opinion). The photo on Post #462 shows why, if you have the engineering knowledge to interpret it correctly; but that is Ian Bent's IP and not for me to discuss on a public forum.

CASA cannot compel CAMit to hand over its IP to Jabiru; and it cannot compel a joint venture. It can issue an Airworthiness Directive; it can also use the regulatory requirement of CASR 21.016 to impose special conditions, including operating conditions ( which is essentially what that draft Instrument was leading to). Either of these measures, unless applied extremely adroitly, will simply destroy both Jabiru and CAMit.

The "bull in china shop" approach so far being applied, is not going to work.

I haven't printed the rest of the post, but I'm very sympathetic to your pain, however I've lived through this over and over again for decades, so I'm probably immune to the emotion to a degree. Personally it stopped me doing what I loved best which was designing unique cars and trucks, many of which have given incident free service for decades.My argument doesn't see the grounding of all GA and RAA, but it does point out that if there is a risk of a fatality, then we as self regulators will face criminal prosecution if we don't address that risk. That's about the most powerful incentive around.

 

It wasn't a solution for Ansett, Ford, Leyland, Chrysler, General Motors, or International Harvester - you can't get away today saying I need to protect my hobby, so surely if only one person dies every two years that's OK.

 

Unfortunately it's black and white.

 

The solution is to remove the alleged risk - fast.

another interviewhttp://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/rn/podcast/2014/11/bst_20141119_0822.mp3

RAA and Jabiru are arguing that no restrictions should apply until someone dies. CASA is saying Jabiru/RAA should act before someone dies.

A more logical approach would be to establish an engine "safe life" as being the time-in-service that corresponds to some arbitrary statistical failure probability; however the probability cannot be zero; for a transport-category aircraft, ICAO sets a target probability of a catastrophic accident as (if my memory serves me) one in 100 million per flying hour. The rate gets higher as you come down the scale from that.

There is an exponential correlation between the average time-in-service to major failure, and cost. In a recreational situation, we normally accept a higher risk, in order to get a lower cost. The problem is that the average TIS to major failure cannot be established, in the real world, before the aircraft goes into service. It's not realistic to demand that the manufacturer runs a statistically-significant sample to destruction in order to establish this - because there is not way such a test can cover all the variables introduced by the users and maintainers. The ASTM standard allows the manufacturer to set the TBO at five times the endurance test hours, for a single test specimen. You want better than that, you are outside the recreational area, pal.

It follows that the manufacturer needs the latitude to introduce modifications on the basis of service experience, because there is no other practical way to improve the reliability. That is the reason why the regulations talk about Service Bulletins. But litigation inhibits that process, so it is fundamentally counter-productive for the majority of users.

Contrary to what a number of people have alleged on this site, I know enough about Jabiru engines to say that Jabiru have never stopped developing their product; in fact, that is becoming part of the problem, because the engines in the field are at all stages of development, they do not all get upgraded every time there is a SB, and you find engines in service with different mod. standards from one cylinder to the next.

I am not by any means saying that this process has always had a beneficial effect; it's arguably been a bit of each; but not for want of trying.

Curse the software; I could not finish my post. Here goes again:

All right, out of all this shouting & tumult, what do we have? Let me see if I can summarise it:

1. We have a statistic - not necessarily a very good-quality statistic, but still, it's about all we currently have - of one engine failure in around 3300 landings - i.e. 0.03% of movements. Roughly a probability of one in a thousand per flying hour.

2. As a result of this statistic, plus a lot of noise from certain persons, RAA demanded action from CASA. In so doing, it is arguable that RAA did not consider the statistic in the proper context of the other statistical risks that apply to any recreational aircraft to a greater or lesser degree; they merely saw that the Jabiru statistic was not as good as that for the Rotax 912, realised their impotence to do anything constructive about that, and lodged a rather unthinking complaint.

3. CASA over-reacted, causing panic amongst Jabiru owners and operators, and degrading the resale value of their assets; the total financial loss is likely to run into tens of millions of dollars. To a monkey with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

4. Many owners have de-registered their aircraft, and many have resigned from RAA, which in all probability threatens to cause RAA to collapse.

5. There are persons who may have a valid grievance, who have either launched or threatened legal action against Jabiru, and who are still making a lot of noise, which may or may not result in a class action against Jabiru. These people are, it would seem, out for blood, and do not care what the collateral damage may be.

6. The threat of any such action can only have the result that Jabiru will resist all claims that their product is defective; to do otherwise would be to admit liability, which would be suicidal.

7. The collateral damage will be that the Jabiru owners who would simply like the probability of an engine failure reduced from 0.03% per movement, to perhaps 0.015%, are most unlikely to have that available from Jabiru.

8. CAMit (CAE) can provide that sort of improvement, but they are hamstrung by their dependence on the ongoing income from manufacturing about ten Jabiru engines a month for Jabiru, to Jabiru's design. If Jabiru folds, CAMit folds. So the collateral damage will also prevent any "fix" from CAMit.

9. Aircraft having either E24 or 19 registration, or VH experimental, are free to fit a CAE engine. In any case, the inclusion of experimental aircraft in the CASA draft Instrument is invalid, and can be expected to be removed. (RAA could do something useful by trying to hasten this).

10. The CASA personalities involved very likely have their back so the wall, with Ministerial "please explains" to answer - so they are likely to do everything possible to justify their actions.

So, in summary, we have a completely stupid situation on all sides. It is not constructive to point fingers at this stage, it's far too late for that. This is a lose-lose situation. Either the rock or the hard place has to back off.

To quote Mark Twain:

"I wish I loved the human race;

I wish I loved its silly face;

And when I'm introduced to one,

I wish I thought "What jolly fun."

All right, out of all this shouting & tumult, what do we have? Let me see if I can summarise it:

1. we have a statistic - not necessarily a very good-quality statistic, but still, it's about all we currently have - of one engine failure in around 3300 landings - i.e. 0.03% of movements. Roughly a probability of one in a thousand per flying hour.