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IBob

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IBob last won the day on June 25

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About IBob

  • Rank
    Well-known member
  • Birthday 22/04/1948

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  • Aircraft
    Savannah S
  • Location
    Wairarapa
  • Country
    New Zealand

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  1. Hi Mark, the first time I clekoed up my elevator, the skins didn't go on cleanly. The problem was the following: Page 3/10 of the instructions says "Rivet the angulars SE023 on the rear longeron SD011-2 (pictures no 2 & 3): NOTE the angulars must be riveted in such a way that the long side of the angular is riveted on the longeron and the short side is free." That NOTE is correct. However, when you go to Page 4/10, the assembly sketch there shows those angulars, the other way round, with the long side free, and that is what I had done. Evidently this is incorrect: I turned them round to match the Page 3/10 description, the skins went on easily.
  2. The 701 pedal ratio is 1:1, the cables being attached to the sides of the pedals at the same height as the pedal bars.
  3. 6:1 pedal ratio? It's a 701, not a pushbike!!!
  4. Yes......you'd have to have fat feet to get anywhere near that sort of number.....)
  5. Same again with placarding. The CAA love their placarding... Required CO indicator card covers spare hole at far right (the Sav heater is from the exhaust jacket). The XL and S have more panel than the VG. ICP spread the instruments right across it........
  6. Marty, here's my standard Sav panel and instruments as supplied (prior to placarding). Given the type of flying, I wanted the ASI and Slip right under my nose (I bought a decent slip rather than using the one supplied). It made sense to me to have the trim where it could be operated with hand on throttle (not that that's a big issue). And I wanted the radio up where I could see it, I'm also told that being able to steady my hand on the top of the dash while changing channels in bumpy weather is good. The master switch for the avionics I put directly under the avionics, and the on/off switch for copilot comms is right next to the radio, which makes sense to me. Oil pressure and temp are grouped together, as are R & L coolant temps. If I was building again, I would probably be looking at Engibox or similar to replace the engine instruments. I like the idea that you can set alarm points, also that you can log the various values. And I'm all for decluttering.
  7. 'There were multiple factors and the aircrew were responsible for a lot of them.' Maybe so, but the killer factor that the aircrew were not in any way responsible for was a piece of unbelievably bad automation that rendered the aircraft unfliable.
  8. One of the things that happens when big outfits come publicly unglued is they hire 'experts' for damage control. (In this case, reputational damage control, it being tragically too late to do anything about the collateral damage.) These 'experts' will be trying to advise Boeing on what to say and when. And they will also be trying to manage what info appears, via various channels, in the media: they will do that by feeding their preferred view to the media, and they will be endeavouring to do that via the most effective channels they can find. So, a certain amount of what we are now seeing and reading will certainly be the story as Boeing (and it's 'experts') would wish us to see it.
  9. I was quoting the pundit Juan Browne. According to OneTrack here, he said: "Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737" And as I recall now, it was around the time he began pushing that particular angle that I stopped following him.
  10. Nev, I've lost the thread here (!) What have you never heard, that's not likely to be correct?
  11. For me, the problem with a statement like "Because MCAS is not there to make the aircraft stable, it is there to make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations of the 737" is that it may be entirely true...or it may be the chosen 'official line': that being seen to have erred in making an aircraft feel like an older aircraft may be viewed as less culpable than having delivered an aircraft knowing that in some situations it could be unstable.
  12. Hold on. How does a system that trims the nose down in big increments make the aircraft handle and feel like previous iterations?
  13. I'm not entirely sure about this guy. It seemed to me, at one point earlier in the whole debacle, that he suddenly changed his tone and pitch quite markedly. It made me wonder at the time if someone had warned him off....or taken him on as a useful pundit. In any case, I prefer my info from the source rather than filtered through the opinions of others, as this is. But how you get to the source of anything nowadays, I have no idea.........
  14. Dennis Muilenberg under the Members of Congress pump: "At the hearing, the Connecticut Democratic senator Richard Blumenthal sharply accused Boeing of engaging in “a pattern of deliberate concealment”, noting that Boeing’s 1,600-page pilot’s manual mentions the so-called MCAS anti-stall system just once. Blumenthal accused Muilenberg and Boeing of supplying “flying coffins as a result of Boeing deciding to conceal MCAS from pilots”. At issue are recently disclosed internal instant messages that Boeing had not previously handed to committee investigators. The messages, sent by Boeing’s chief test pilot Mark Forkner in 2016, complained of “egregious” erratic behavior in flight simulator tests of the MCAS system, and referred to “Jedi mind tricks” to persuade regulators to approve the plane." egregious = outstandingly bad/shocking https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/29/boeing-dennis-muilenburg-congress-testimony-737-max-mcas
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