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silvercity

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  1. As it turns out, the lack of any progress toward this out come has frustrated me into action.I have engaged an Aeronautical Engineer last week to conduct the necessary inspections and calculations to enable an application for me to increase the MTOW of my GR912s to 544kg. I am only seeking this 64 kg increase.

     

    If it leads anywhere, I will keep this forum up to date. Depending on the cost, I will be able to share any info to allow others to also agitate RAAus for an increase tho their machines as well.

     

    Wish me luck....

    Any progress with the MTOW increase benjam?

     

     

  2. Well, Lawrie has reached three of his destinations despite several delays due to weather and electrical problems.

     

    "I am back "on air” after visiting the far west. I am currently waiting on a three day clear weather envelope, so as to make a dash to overfly Wilsons Promontory, the fourth and final of my planned exteme compass points in my “adventure”. However, that said, it is good to be home for a few days."

     

    Lawrie.

     

     

  3. Remember this?

     

    Date: 19 December 2001

     

    The final report on the Whyalla Airlines Piper Chieftain VH-MZK accident on 31 May 2000, in which all eight occupants died, was released today by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

     

    ATSB Executive Director, Kym Bills, made the following statement: "The VH-MZK accident occurred after mechanical failures involving both engines forced the pilot to ditch the aircraft in Spencer Gulf, about 26km from Whyalla, on a dark, cloudy and moonless night.

     

    Based on careful analysis of the engine failures and recorded radar and audio data, it is likely that the left engine failed first as a result of a fatigue crack in the crankshaft. This was initiated about 50 flights before the accident flight due to the breakdown of a connecting rod bearing insert. The combined effects of high combustion gas pressures developed as a result of deposit-induced pre-ignition, and lowered bearing insert retention forces due to an 'anti-galling' lubricating compound used during engine assembly by the manufacturer, led to this breakdown.

     

    Lean fuel practices used by the operator increased the likelihood of lead oxybromide deposit-induced pre-ignition but were within the engine operating limits set by the aircraft manufacturer.

     

    It is likely that because of the increased power demanded of the right engine after the left engine failed, abnormal combustion (detonation) occurred and rapidly raised the temperature of the pistons and cylinder heads. As a result, a hole melted in the number 6 piston causing loss of engine power and erratic engine operation. The subsequent ditching involved great pilot skill.

     

    The ATSB examined components from a further ten similar engines that have failed since January 2000 (including two engines from another manufacturer) in order to better understand the failure mechanisms. Combustion chamber deposits that may create lead oxybromide deposit-induced pre-ignition were found in these engines. The Bureau concluded that engines that were operated at lean fuel-air mixtures during climb, and towards best economy mixtures during cruise flight, were more likely to show signs of such deposit-induced pre-ignition than those engines operated at full rich mixture during climb and at best power mixture during cruise.

     

    On 30 October 2000 ATSB released recommendations about the risks of detonation and lean running and in relation to the desirability of life jackets and other life-saving equipment on smaller passenger aircraft flying over water. Today, we release further recommendations to:

     

    • the US FAA in relation to engine deposits that may cause pre-ignition;
       
       
    • the US FAA and the engine manufacturer on the use of anti-galling compounds between connecting rod bearing inserts and housings during engine assembly;
       
       
    • CASA in relation to high power piston engine reliability more generally; and
       
       
    • CASA in relation to providing guidance to pilots on ditching.
       
       

     

     

    While there were deficiencies with the Whyalla Airlines safety culture and gaps with the extent of the regulator's surveillance of the operator, neither were significant accident factors.

     

    No-one should be blamed for this accident, but if the lessons from it are learned, both in Australia and internationally, some good will have come from the tragic deaths of eight people."

     

     

    • Informative 2
  4. This email was sent to me via a friend of an airline pilot mate of mine.

     

    :

     

    Subject: EMIRATES B777 CRASH LANDING

     

    Aviation has a way of throwing up unexpected challenges. The case of the B777-300 crash in Dubai is in my opinion a case in point.

     

    Let us examine the possibilities of why the event occurred to one of the world’s safest premier airlines in the world’s busiest international airport. As well Emirates pilots are trained to a very high level - practising emergency/abnormal procedures every 6 months in simulators. The B777 aircraft are probably the safest aircraft now flying.

     

    Firstly Dubai airport on the Gulf coast - huge, modern and in 15 years of flying out of Dubai I never once encountered windshear ( which was a suggested reason for the aborted landing) There is no mountainous terrain nearby and thunderstorms are exceedingly rare. What I have encountered is gusty crosswinds around the landing crosswind limit of 35 knots.

     

    Whatever reason the pilot decided to abort the landing it was the correct decision. However now comes certain factors that can catch an unwary pilot out.

     

    When the B777-300 was introduced several years after the B777-200 it introduced new problems due to its extreme length of approximately 74 metres making it one of the longest aircraft in the world. It is easy to forget as a pilot that you have approximately 70 metres of hardware behind you.

     

    New take procedures were introduced with a slower rotation rate on take-off and stopping at a deck angle of 12 degrees versus 15 degrees for the B777-200. Tail strikes have occurred on take-off by various airlines but that incidence is now very rare.

     

    Go arounds - aborted landings - from a very low altitude are not common. Once on approach to land in London Heathrow airport following a landing Air Canada A340 the tower instructed me to expect a late landing clearance so I left the autopilot of the B777- 300 engaged. Suddenly a Canadian voice said " missed it we'll take the next one" ( missed the high speed runway exit taxiway ). Tower said " Emirates go round" so click TOGA switch on the thrust levers and from a wheel height of 50 feet above the runway the aircraft gracefully performed its automatic go around. Co-pilot called " positive climb " and I called for "gear up". Job done but that Canadian pilot cost Emirates 3 tons of extra fuel burnt as we re-joined the queue for landing.

     

    When you have approximately 250 tons of aircraft descending on approach at 800 feet per minute there is a lot of momentum and height loss will occur after the decision to go around. The aircraft rotates about its centre of gravity which means initially as the pilots are rapidly ascending the tail is rapidly descending. I suggest the pilots felt they were climbing clear of the runway and retracted the gear just as the tail struck the runway causing the aircraft to crunch down on the runway..

     

    This is only speculation but the gear was retracted and the pilots were performing a go around.

     

    Interestingly when we were doing Category 111B auto land, in fog , in the Airbus with a wheel decision height of 15 feet ( CAT111C is 0 feet ) it was expected that the wheels might contact the runway on the go around from 15 feet. The much bigger B777-300 would have a bigger gravity drop.

     

    This is one of the problems when you fly different models i.e. The B777-200 ( like MH370 and MH17 ) versus the much longer B777-300.

     

    I am sure now all operators of B777-300 will introduce extra go around training for their pilots during their recurrent 6 monthly simulator training. A lesson for all pilots really. Just when you think everything is hunky-dory the Goddess of Gravity is just waiting to smite you.

     

    Hard to classify the cause of this accident. I hope Emirates go soft on the pilots - it is easy to classify it as pilot error but it is in my opinion it is more of them being caught out in an unusual situation.

     

    Emirates and Qantas still remain the world’s safest airlines with the best trained pilots. Never lost a passenger and Kudos to the excellent Cabin Staff that got everyone out safely - this being a testament to their training.

     

    Accidents will always happen when humans are involved but flying is still the safest way to travel.

     

     

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