Dafydd Llewellyn

Daffydd, I too have a background in GA maintenance, plus I trained under the FAA system of doing things, and still hold an FAA airframe and Powerplant license, so I do have a good understanding of what you speak. Basically as you must know it all pertains to the GA side of things. Obviously many of the parameters in respect to certification must also apply to most rec aircraft as they do fly fine , and structural failure is about as rare as it is in the GA side of things.But Ultralights are different...they always have been, most weren't designed in the first place to confirm to any 'standards ' and certainly not those laid down for GA ,aircraft. I am reminded of something Wayne Fisher told me once, which is a good example of what I am trying to get across. He was working to gain certification for the Austflight Boonah produced Drifters. The CASA certification inspector (one would imagine a CAR 35 eng) turned up with his clipboard ticking boxes. Wayne demonstrated the aircraft in flight , and on landing the CASA man asked what airfoil is on the drifter. Wayne's response " at what stage of flight ? " This floored the inspector and he had no response and no box to tick.

 

As you know most Dacron sailed wings will change their profile in flight, as wing- loadings change. In fact this inflight inbuilt stability factor went a long way towards making the earlier ULs do what they did , and giving them the inbuilt 'stability factor ' that they possessed . Most weren't built conforming to any standard, in fact many started, as did many successfull aircraft from the very dawn of aviation, as a chalk line on a hangar floor.

 

We must be carefull in attempting to 'pigeon-hole' our unique aircraft, as a lot of their continued success' comes from being able to work a bit outside of the square . Many of our aircraft are unique in their design, development and capabilities..............Maj...

So we must be careful not to erroneously 'pidgeon-hole' our unique aircraft unless we know their history. Newton did the Thruster, Bill Whitney did the Lightwing, I did the Sapphire, and Alan Kerr and I between us did the Skyfox and the early Jabirus. So please do not try to tell me I don't know what I'm talking about. No, CASA people are NOT CAR 35 engineers - tho a few of them have equivalent levels of engineering knowledge.

If we can take a small intermission from the semantics (and legalities) of boards vs directors and the issue of proportional /regional representation, I'd like to ask a couple of questions:

(1) I've spent my working life in the specialty of airworthiness. Airworthiness has no legal definition; the closest one can get is "compliant with relevant standards". However, even if we cannot precisely define it, we can say what is necessary to achieve it:

For an aircraft to be airworthy, it must be (a) Designed correctly - that is, so that its design complies with a relevant statutory standard; (this establishes its Type Design and its operating limitations); (b) Built correctly - that is, so that every part of each example built conforms to the Type Design; © Maintained correctly, so that every part continues to work as the designer intended. One can liken airworthiness to a three-legged stool; if any of the three legs is unsound, it will fall down.

So - How does a Safety Management System for an organisation such as RAAus deal with these three crucial issues? I would very much doubt that the drafters of a SMS would be sufficiently expert in these areas to be able to tackle any of them effectively. RAAus has zero capability in regard to input into design compliance, but it has blundered into this area in accepting shonky data for MTOW; so it does not even know its own level of ignorance. RAAus dispenses with Certificates of Airworthiness, i.e. it turns its back on the prime mechanism for ensuring that the aircraft was built correctly; and it hands maintenance responsibility to the owners with zilch surveillance and no proper maintenance record-keeping. So, airworthiness of RAAus aircraft is about as far from being systematically organised as it could possibly be. Plenty of scope there - if the designers of the SMS comprehend these issues.

(2) What level of safety are we looking for? I've seen waffle about "zero accidents" but that is simple nonsense. A more realistic idea can be gained by looking at the advisory material for FAR23.1309; it sets a goal for the statistical probability of an accident from all airworthiness causes of around one in 100,000 per flying hour - which requires a probability from any single cause of around one in a million per flying hour. This is based pretty much on the statistical failure rate achieved in GA aircraft certificated under U.S. Civil Air Regulations, Part 3 (e.g. old Cessna 172s, Piper Cherokees, etc.). In other words, this level of risk has been being achieved by the GA airworthiness system, including design, manufacture and maintenance. Obviously, one would expect the RAA statistical results, given the vast holes in its system, to fall well below this. I have not seen an adequate study of them; the data provided by RAAus are abysmal.

(3) OK, once we have an airworthy aircraft with defined operating limits, the next step is to make sure the pilots (i) Understand the limits and (ii) Stay within them. I still see blogs asking what MTOW really means - and also advertising that is entirely misleading about the safe speed to fly in turbulent air; and I hear of people spinning aeroplanes that are clearly placarded "Spinning prohibited". So there's something definitely missing in the pilot education. Will the drafters of the SMS pick that one up? Will they also catch the fraudulent Flight Manuals that must accompany aircraft whose MTOW is invalid?

(4) Next comes straight pilot error / incompetence. Flying schools may teach, but they cannot force their students to learn. I await with bated breath to discover what magic can be applied by an SMS in this regard - but as a glider instructor I learned that everybody has a stress level at which they blow a mental fuse, and fail to do anything. So it is essential, in training, to progressively raise the student's "fuse blow" level, until he can cope with an emergency without going catatonic. Still, there is a limit to how far a flying school can go; each individual develops thereafter according to his own fundamental ability. There are definitely some people who should stick to golf.

All this is traditional stuff. Nothing new in any of it, except to those who truly believe that there ought to be a simpler way. On what premise do such people justify this belief? I've never seen any basis for it.

(5) My final question is: What is the point of an SMS when we are now saddled with the legal precedent that flying in a recreational aircraft is an inherently dangerous activity - so that nobody can be punished for negligence in this field? (Rhetorical question - the reason is to be found in S8.2 of the Civil Aviation Act - i.e. it's a piece of flim-flam whose real purpose is to cover CASA's backside.)

A Deed is usually used to avoid reference to the Law of Contract. In a contract, at its simplest level, somebody does something and earns a quid pro quo for doing it. Countless thousands of pages have been written on the Law of Contract and we are not going into that here especially as we are talking about a Deed not a Contract.So, under the Deed of Agreement, obligations are created for CASA and for RA-Aus. Simple enough. CASA does not want it to be a Contract or it would be a contract. CASA does not want to be seen to be paying RA-Aus for services rendered. It wants to give some money to RA-Aus to assist with Administration costs but sees it as an opportunity to get something for the gift.

 

The Deed is not confidential from any member of RA-Aus who merely has to go to Fyshwick and ask to see the document at a time convenient to the office. You may not be allowed to copy or publish what you see but see it you can.

Dafydd: You may in fact be making a valid point (that needs the attention of the board). However at this time the re-structuring of our governance and management systems is the critical issue.Pete

Dafydd: Another way of looking at a "subsidy" is to see it as an administrative fee paid to RAAus by CASA to enact the regulations. This would I think better reflect the relationship between RAAus and CASA where a balance can be struck between the technical development of the rules and regulations and the strategic direction we would see the recreation aviation movement going.To me a subsidy is something that is given, an administrative fee is negotiated. And from a casual glance that fee would appear to be a bit light on. Partnerships with government tend not to be equitable.

Pete

(4) An instrument under subregulation (1) is a disallowable instrument for the purposes of section 46A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.

So, if the Deed of Agreement in any way constitutes part of the conditions for the exemption, it constitutes an instrument in writing, which is by definition a Disallowable Instrument; and as such, it should appear in the Register of Disallowable Instruments (I would assume, the ACT part of the Register) - i.e. it is in the public domain.

So, either it is NOT a confidential document, OR it cannot specify further conditions for the exemptions under which RAAus operates. It cannot be both.

Once again, please excuse my ignorance, but CAO 95.55 exists by virtue of CAR 308(1) (That's what it says in the heading of the CAO):

308 Authority may grant exemptions

(1) CASA may, in relation to a particular aircraft or specified type or category of aircraft, do either or both of the following by instrument in writing:

(a) exempt that aircraft or aircraft of the specified type or category, as the case may be, from compliance with specified provisions of CAR;

(b) exempt persons from compliance with specified provisions of CAR while they are in, on, or otherwise associated with the operation of, that aircraft, or aircraft of the specified type or category, as the case may be.

The exemptions may be made subject to conditions:

(3) An exemption under subregulation (1) is subject to the aircraft or persons exempted complying with such conditions (if any) as CASA specifies in the instrument as being necessary in the interests of safety (having regard to those interests and the exemption concerned).

Both the exemptions and the conditions are specified in CAO 95.55; therefore, the regulatory aspects are, surely, in the public domain?

However, CASA gives RAAus a subsidy of $110K to perform the functions that follow from this - I would assume, matters such as maintaining a register of RAA aircraft, issuing pilot certificates, setting standards for pilot training, aircraft maintenance etc, issuing maintenance authorities and keeping track of the holders, and so on. I would assume that the deed of agreement relates to these services supplied by RAAus, for which CASA supplies the subsidy. Therefore, the Deed of Agreement presumably constitutes some sort of contract between CASA and RAA that defines what CASA expects RAA to do in return for the subsidy.

Therefore, if there are specific requirements from CASA as to the RAA structure, over and above what is required by the ACT rules for non-profit associations, they can only be in relation to the subsidy. CASA can, if it wishes, presumably require the RAA filing cabinets to be purple with pink polka-dots if it wants to, as a condition of the subsidy. RAAus not complying with the terms of the agreement that are a condition for the subsidy are therefore quite a different issue to non-compliance with the CARs.

Or so it would seem to me. Is my understanding correct?

My point also Dafydd. However at some stage the democratic process has to kick in and and the elected reps need to act. If the process is not owned by the board taking the directions as set by interested members, then the risk of a take over is real, and from experience, inevitable.Pete

The draft "Notice of Motion" was posted to deal with the here and now. It is an attempt to re-orient the current and incoming board of RAAus to commence a journey of change. Those changes could of course incorporate some of the constructive suggestions made by members of this forum such as time-lines, the size and make-up of the board, the nomination and appointment processes, and board skill sets. While we as members can make these proposals, it will be the Board that is required to approve and implement.There is plenty of material now available, and individuals and institutions with the specific governance skills, to bring board members up to date with examples of good practice.

 

What I do find concerning however is the total confusion, in the minds of some, about the relationship between CASA and RAAus. CASA has no control over RAAus apart from its contractual Deed of Agreement which spells out what the Government, via CASA, expects of RAAus. A Deed of Agreement which has been buggered up by applying a naive, committee of management approach to its delivery and operation.

 

The Deed of Agreement is a technical document that requires specialised knowledge and staff to implement it. But it is not RAAus, just part of its operation and one of a number of programs that RAAus could take up in the future.

 

Board members, be they from the corporate business sector or from our community based not-for-profits, are required to understand the business they are in. But not necessarily be practitioners in the field. Boards govern and Managers manage .....the concept is not that difficult - both are accountable but for different reasons.

 

Pete

Nothing is ever simple with CASA is it.

Let's look at an example:

21.176 Issue of certain certificates of airworthiness

(1) CASA or an authorised person must issue a certificate of airworthiness to an applicant for the certificate if the applicant:

(a) is eligible, under regulation 21.173, to apply for the certificate;

and

(b) applies for the certificate in accordance with this Subpart; and

© is entitled, under this Subpart, to the certificate; and

(d) otherwise complies with this Part.

(2) CASA or an authorised person may issue a certificate of airworthiness for an aircraft subject to any conditions that CASA or the authorised person considers necessary in the interests of aviation safety.

So there is provision in the CASRs for the appointment of Authorised Persons for the purpose of issuing Certificates of Airworthiness. CASA used to run training courses for people to obtain this authorisation - may still do so for all I know. So the RAAus tech Manager could do what is necessary and obtain such an appointment (if, indeed, he does not already have it - CAO 95.55.1.8 requires a special C of A for LSA aircraft).

Now, how could RAAus utilise this?

Simple; by requiring that all new factory-built aircraft, not just those under CAO 95.55.1.8, must have a C of A, issued under 21.176. That can be done unilaterally by RAAus in its procedures manual (I should hardly expect any argument from CASA).

So this step hardly requires any Earth-shattering effort - and it would immediately achieve the I of A mechanism for that part of the Tech Manager's function. If it were decided to extend this to newly-built kit aircraft, that could likewise be done. It can therefore be introduced progressively to whatever extent is seen as appropriate. If desired, it could in time be extended to all RAAus aircraft, which would allow the introduction of a GFA-style maintenance system, which involves the issue of a maintenance release.

So, there ARE pathways in the regulations - the problem is that RAAus people have traditionally tried to ignore the regulations, on the basis that they are largely exempt from them (which is not actually correct - the exemptions are far from complete) and therefore have never learned how to read them. I admit, they are a pretty good cure for insomnia, but it's not actually all that difficult . . .

Will have a look.

This all seems to me to be awaste of time and jousting at windmills. we have several people here who know what to do, but they are not board members. If they are so expert, why do they sit on the sidelines sniping and not get themselves proposed for the board. Are they going to stand at the next elections?

I wonder if something like that could be negotiated for the current board member duties? Then the model starts to work.

Further to my last post - here is a copy of a typical Instrument of Appointment. I had something similar whilst I was employed by CSIRO; and professional engineers employed by the likes of QANTAS etc have similar Is of A. This means that, in performing the functions specified in the I of A, I was responsible solely to CASA, not to my employer - i.e. my employer could not direct me to approve something against my judgement. The RAA Tech Manager needs to have a form of authority, in relation to his duties under the Regulations, equivalent to this. The Board needs to consult with him if it wants to do something that impinges on his area of responsibility.

DRAFTNotice of Motion

 

RAAus Annual General Meeting

 

“That the Board/Committee of RAAus immediately restructures and adopts a contemporary Corporate Governance model to oversee the operation of the organisation.

 

In doing so, the Board/Committee of RAAus will accept that:

 

• The elected Board, via its appointed Chairperson, governs the organisation;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• The Board appointed CEO/General Manager, reporting to the Board, manages staff and administers all aspects of the RAAus operation;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• The RAAus Board, in consultation with its operational staff/team and regional membership, publishes a three year strategic plan for presentation to its membership and strategic partners;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• The Constitution is reviewed and adjustments made to the Rules so as to accommodate any structural change;
   
   
  

 

 

 

 

• Professional support is engaged to carry out specialist aspects of the restructure.”
   
   
  

 

 

Any comments folks?

 

Pete

The Board of RAAus has never, so far as I can see, exhibited much in the way of professionalism in regard to such matters; what is there in this proposed motion to correct that? Merely electing the members will not do it; it produces a board based on popularity, not excellence; the two things are not necessarily related. Aviation is a highly technical business; and I do not see that a selection process based simply on election will result in any improvement whatsoever. Any improvement will come as a result of the quality of the candidates, which may or may not be correctly reflected by their popularity. There has been no real evidence that I can see, that any RAA Board in the last decade was competent to deal with matters more complex than the location of the next Natfly. Therefore, such a Board should be confined to broad desiderata only; it needs something like the WW2 Joint Chiefs of Staff that played such a part in keeping Churchill within bounds of reality. I do not see where your proposal brings in people having the necessary expertise to provide guidance and advice to the Board.

This is the fundamental weakness of all the recreational aviation bodies; and it has been the undoing of RAAus. As I pointed out previously, RAAus will not be able to attract the calibre of professional staff it so desperately needs, under this form of structure, because such people will not tolerate those working conditions.

There has to be an appropriate balance of power between the professional staff and the elected Board, or it will not work. In "real" aviation, that is achieved by the fact that the professional staff hold real authority from CASA, and cannot be coerced in the exercise of that authority. Unless you set up something that has such a genuine balance of authority, it won't work. Sorry, but thems is the facts. Go look at Qantas etc, and you will find that this is how it is set up.

Dafydd all good points and they relate to how things should be organised and run. The governance problem is quite distinct, it is about having properly experienced directors who understand their responsibilities and have the time available to carry them out. I have posted elsewhere about good governance, meeting frequency and so on, but these observations seem to sink like a stone. They are not my opinion, there is a wealth of information available on board governance and there are good examples to follow. The people who post here with contrary views are simply out of their depth.

Pete, I'd not attempt to enter into issues such as meeting intervals and board governance; my experience of running things has been confined to something I could run myself, i.e. a "the buck stops here" situation, with a small group of specialists to whom I could delegate the technical issues that fell within their speciality. It had an annual budget about half that of RAAus, but it involved operating a transport-category aircraft (as a flying laboratory) to provide a service for CSIRO. This only works if the person running the show has real expertise, and it is not applicable to something like RAAus. In other words, I'm not into herding cats. You can have that, for all of me.

Dafydd all good points and they relate to how things should be organised and run. The governance problem is quite distinct, it is about having properly experienced directors who understand their responsibilities and have the time available to carry them out. I have posted elsewhere about good governance, meeting frequency and so on, but these observations seem to sink like a stone. They are not my opinion, there is a wealth of information available on board governance and there are good examples to follow. The people who post here with contrary views are simply out of their depth.

Totally agree with your summation of the cause Dafydd but got a bit lost in what you are proposing as a solution. Going back to your analogy of the crook spar.....the choice is to get in an expert to fix it or do it yourself, if you have the skill. As you rightly infer RAAus has been deficient in its capacity to mend itself and now requires the attention of some external expertise. I am confident that once the decision to seek out that expertise is made, RAAus will move on. The new board will need the support of its membership if this is to be achieved.Pete

(a) There needs to be a means of communication between members that is NOT under the control of the RAAus heirarchy, but of the members. This website is a good start, thank you Ian Baker, but what % of RAAus members read it? Unfortunately, the quality of debate in many blogs is abysmal - tho this one is not; and the contributors seem a very small clique. So the RAAus magazine needs to be independent of the Board and not under its thumb; and it needs to serve as a members' forum rather than as chewing-gum for the eyes.

(b) There needs to be a more effective means of effecting reform, possibly by a members' plebiscite mechanism, that cannot be gagged at Board level. What you have at the moment is not functioning as a democratic system; it needs better checks and balances.

© There needs to be a mechanism that looks critically at the executive / board policy and blows a whistle if it gets off the rails. That MIGHT be the SMS if its terms of reference include that function.

(d) There needs to be a much more explicit statement of policy priorities, with compliance with CASA's requirements at the top of the list. The sort of situation that caused the invalid registration of overweight aircraft for the past decade must be prevented; this means some study of what allowed that to occur is necessary.

Some specific suggestions:

(i) RAA aircraft should have certificates of airworthiness under CASR 21.175 thru 21.186 as appropriate. This is a one-time thing, but it will stop the unscrupulous importers cold.

(ii) The standard of maintenance recording is abominable - and that's praising it up. I would recommend the introduction of a formal, signed-off annual inspection, along the lines of the GFA Form 2. Note that this involves the issue of a maintenance release (for which the C of A is a prerequisite). This is also part of the GFA system. In principle, L2s should be able to do these things, just as GFA glider inspectors do. That may need some upgrading of the L2 system; however if GFA can manage it, I do not see any reason why RAAus cannot. RAAus would have to propose a generic system of maintenance and get CASA's acceptance of it; this comes under CAR 42M. GFA have achieved this for gliders and motor-gliders, so it's entirely possible.

(iii) The workload of the RAAus tech Manager seems to me to include far too much make-work that is primarily revenue-collection; he needs to be relieved of that so he can do a better job of initial registrations, Cs of A, etc.

(iv) RAA training organisation should be allowed to issue RPLs.

All of this, naturally, costs something. It is largely duplicating certain elements of CASA; and so must raise the question as to whether it is all worth-while, or whether it would be better to fold it into CASR Part 91, Part 61, etc - even if this is done gradually and progressively.

Anything like Rafferty's rules Dafydd?

Perhaps you are right Dafydd.....most structural problems have a design fault. A crook spar requires remedial work in the same way the RAAus board needs revision. Not necessarily a total rebuild just tending to the bits that need it.Pete

Stone the bluddy crows! Have you people ever read "Parkinson's Law" on the subject of Committees? You surely need to!

Keith if Aerosafe were ex Casa potentially no conflict. However if Aerosafe resigned from CASA yesterday and formed to accept a contact tomorrow that would be a conflict of interest of the highest level. Very similar to what you have been vigorously defending in this thread.Jim Tatlock.

Keith, I'm not sure what you've heard but there seems to be a misunderstanding here -The CAOs are exemptions. They allow non-compliance with certain CARs. i.e the CARs are Regulations (1988) and you must comply with them ... unless a CAO, which is an Order, or exemption, says you don't have to comply with a Regulation.

 

These are quite different from dispensations. Some overweight/over wing loaded 95.10 and 95.25 aircraft did, for a time, fly under dispensation, which allowed them some time to be modified to fit into a/the relevant CAO. Those dispensations all expired quite some years ago unless new ones were granted that I don't know about.

 

CAO 95.25, as an exemption, has already been 'removed' (in 2011) and the aircraft that were operating under that exemption are now grouped with eLSAs, LSAs and some former GA homebuilt (CAO 101.31?) aircraft, among others, and operate under a different CAO - it's now CAO 95.55.

 

CAO 95.10 remains in place and has been unchanged for the last few years.

 

Note that all CAOs are being removed progressively, so this is nothing to be alarmed about, it is just part of the progression from CARs (1988) to CASRs (1998) which will bring our Regulations, and the numbering of them, into line with the FARs of USA.

 

Here is a link to the current effective CAOs, note 95.25 doesn't exist anymore, 95.10 does and 95.55 is your product of choice for Rec 2 seaters for now ...

All CAOs are not exemptions - but all the 95-series ones are. Every CAO has in its heading, the regulation that gives it a head of power. If you look at CAO 95.55, its head of power is CAR 308(1). There are a considerable number of CAOs, from the 20 series thru to the 108 series; most of them are NOT exemptions. If you look up CAO 108.56, its head of power is CAR 38.

Now, if you look up CAR 308(3), you will see that exemptions issued under CAR 308(1) may be subject to conditions. This is the head of power for the conditions set by CASA for the application of the exemptions listed in CAO 95.55

Hope this helps clarify the subject.

I said nothing about compulsion, I said "need" and what happens if we don't. And for it to happen, a couple of " musts".

If you don't find the root cause of RAA's current woes, you will not be fixing the problem, you will be painting over it.

I believe that the root cause is to be found in the reason for Washbrook's dismissal - as I recall, it was because he "acted too much like CASA". Surely this is on record? It is a matter of record that Washbrook, in his AUF capacity, wrote to the importer of the Sting on 28/10/2002 and required him to correct the documents that incorrectly showed the MTOW to be 540 Kg, to the correct weight of 450 Kg; my question is, was this the reason for his dismissal? If so, he was dismissed for doing his job correctly.

"Those who fail to study history, are doomed to repeat it."

The "new" board will need to develop a strategic plan covering the next 12 months. This will need to be done as a face to face exercise, typically it will take two days for a "new" board with operational issues to consider. All board membuers must be prepared to commit this time as soon as possible after the AGM and the membership must be prepared to support the cost of travel and accommodation for this to occur. If we don't get board buy-in through such a process then the old woes will continue.Time to stop looking backward and to start thinking about the practicalities of reform.

I have formed the view that our present troubles date back to a time when the Board did something wise. Lee Ungermann gave the Board a great deal of notice that he would be moving on. The Board of the time set up an excellent process to find a new CEO. The process was well run and a unanimous selection made by the Selection Panel. Within as little as two weeks of the new CEO taking up office, the Board realised that they had made a huge mistake - they had in fact hired somebody who knew how to manage a not-for-profit organisation and, worse than that, had the audacity to start managing it!

Within two weeks the new CEO was effectively dismissed and the then President, Eugene Reid, quietly slipped his mate Steve Tizzard into the CEO position without first consulting the Board. Eventually, the Exec went to the Board and obtained a retrospective ratification of the appointment.

I think you need to look a long way further back than that. I believe you need to discover exactly why John Washbrook ceased to be the RAA Technical Manager. You may find a clue in the evidence file for the Carol Smith case.