Let’s focus on the AAIB report and not speculate. So you’re speculating the AAIB, FAA, BOEING and GE are all covering up both Left and Right FADECs failed within 1 second of each other, then around 10 seconds later they recovered?
Speaking of cowboys, if the 737 MAX crew had followed SOPs neither of those aircraft would have crashed.
Maybe you should review what you’ve written against what you’ve quoted from the report. The report doesn’t say a signal to the fuel firewall shutoff valves caused them to close, it says the fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF. There’s no suggestion of a software or system logic failure.
Facts are both FCS weren’t moved from RUN to CUTOFF causing a loss of thrust. What is not know is how or why this occurred.
To suggest a software fault caused the loss of thrust;
- ignores the report findings
- displays a lack of understanding of Air Transport Category aircraft design criteria.
Cycling the FCS is a part of the dual eng failure memory items. The FCS weren’t cycled CUTOFF, then RUN, they were both moved to CUTOFF, then 10 plus secs later back to RUN. This not IAW the published memory items.
In the event of a dual engine failure the B787 starts the APU without crew action, which the report says it had commenced. There must have been sufficient RPM for the start sequence as the Left engine had relit and was starting to spoil up again.
The only way to start a B787 is via the EEC Autostart function, you cannot complete a manual start in a B787.
There is no doubt the FCS were moved to CUTOFF and subsequently returned to RUN. The only questions to be answered is who and why?
What the “experts” on this site are missing is the fact engine systems operate independently. There is no way a software fault could cause both engines to fail within 1 second of each other. There is no doubt both fuel control switches were moved to cutoff, then 10 seconds or so later back to run.
What hasn’t been established is who did it and why.
The only way the person querying the FCS position would know they were in the Cutoff position would be to observe the switch position. There are no indications of fuel valve positions.
Again, I point out these systems are in no way connected to each other. The chances of both systems experiencing the same fault within 1 second of each other are too remote.
The AAIB report states one of the crew observed the Fuel Control Switches in the Cutoff position and questioned the other crew member. The switch position is tracked by the EAFR.
Cannot happen to both engines at the same time (or within 1 sec as per the report).
All systems associated with the engines are completely independent. It’s like suggesting a couple of PC21s flying in close formation both flame out at the same time due to a system fault in one aircraft.