Mriya

I've just re-read your original Q and realise I meant to address a couple of mistakes in your original assumption... If a J160 has a MTOW of 540kg, this means that the empty weight of the aircraft will be significantly less. Here are some J160 figures from a quick google search Empty Weight 649 lbs (295 kg) Useable Load 539 lbs (245kg) Gross Weight (MTOW) 1188 lbs (540 kg) So in this case the aircraft weighs 295kg and has a useful load of 245kg. Useful load includes pilot, pax, payload & fuel. The sum of these two figures equals MTOW. The 614kg figure you quote has no relevance and I'm not sure where this figure came from.

From the answers given so far, I guess NEV25 is still wondering exactly what to think. So lets try to pull it all together... As Gentraeu states correctly MTOW is the limit to which the aircraft was tested during certification (All up weight including everything), taking into account the structural integrity and aerodynamic capabilities of the design. Exceeding MTOW is venturing into a dangerous (and illegal) realm as the aircraft has not been tested or certified for operations above this weight. Each aircraft will have a MTOW which may or may not match the various weight limits imposed by the regulator (ie CASA / RAAus in our case) for particular categories of aircraft. For example there are plenty of RAAus aircraft with a MTOW well below the RAAus category limit. If the aircraft has a MTOW of 450kg, then this is its weight limit, regardless of the fact that RAAus aircraft weights are capped at 600kg (lets not complicate the description with waterborne differences). This means that for many aircraft, when you do the weight sums, once you carry a passenger it is likely that you will need to restrict your fuel uplift / cargo in order to stay under the aircraft MTOW. As mentioned above RAAus has a 'category' weight limit of 600kg. This figure aligns with the LSA category rules, which is why when many designers build an aircraft they pick 600kg as their MTOW. If however an aircraft designer used a higher MTOW (lets say 750kg), for the aircraft to be registered RAAus, the category weight limit is the limiting factor. So in this case for the aircraft to operate legally under RAAus, it would not be allowed to be loaded above 600kg regardless of the fact that the aircraft has been tested to a higher figure. At one stage a couple of C152's /RV7's slipped into RAAus, with restrictions limting them to 1 POB and fuel uplift restrictions, which kept their TOW below the RAAus weight limits (544/600kg). In recent times it has been recognised that allowing aircraft like these on to the RAAus register was not 'in the spirit' of the regulations, and so now unless an aircraft clearly fits into the 600kg weight limit, including pax & reasonable fuel, RAAus will no longer allow these types to join their register (result is that C152's / RV7's / etc, stay VH registered now). Hope this all paints a picture regarding MTOW & RAAus weight limits and how they are derived. In short a RAAus registered aircraft must be operated at or below aircraft MTOW or the RAAus category weight limit, WHICHEVER IS THE LOWER FIGURE.

Great to hear that you have it flying now. All the best as you 'tweek' it to make it even better :-)

One big difference between LSA's and aircraft that are issued with a regular Type Certificate is that due to the factory certification process the Airworthiness Authorities do not issue AD's for LSA aircraft anyway. The ongoing airworthiness is the responsibility of the factory, with any mandatory instructions issued by them being gospel.

It would seem timely to remind everyone that the aircraft log book has a section which should be kept up to date regarding weight and balance changes. The data from the original weighing in order to gain a CofA becomes the benchmark. Every time you make a modification the weight increase or decrease + datum should be recorded in the logbook giving you a clear understanding of the current CofG. If you do not understand this, then make it a priority to sit down with someone who does, in order to accurately record weight and balance changes as they occur. I also can only assume that the 'try it!' comment was a joke, as mistakingly allowing your CofG to move outside of the approved limits is a sure way to invite disaster. Accurate records and calculations plus an understanding of the terms (ie. datum, moment, etc) are the fundamental to success regarding getting weight and balance figures correct. Invest the time, sit down with your logbook, experiment with adding and subtracting theoretical weight from the aircraft at various locations and observe how it changes the CofG location.

Finally a good outcome given the circumstances. I just had a read of the Airworthiness Bulletin and CASA Instrument. I applaud the action taken, but note the 'convoluted' mechanism which they have used to enforce the mod. My guess is that as they aren't the Airworthiness Authority that approved the original Type Certificate, they don't want to issue an AD. Going back a number of years, CASA use to issue AD's themselves (often copies of the AD issued by the Airworthiness Authority in the country of manufacture), however these days they simply say that if the Airworthiness Authority in the country of manufacture issues an AD, then it applies here also. So in this case, one more question I have is whether the FAA will issue anything to compel R44 operators to comply with the SB. Anyway, credit where it is due, and I am very glad to see that CASA have now acted. Unfortunately, in this case it seems that it took a rising body count to get their attention.

Having a proper tool will save lots of grief. Also due to the small size of the jabiru (ryco) oil filter some aircraft cutters which are really designed for larger diameters may not work. And, yes by the time you have finished with a saw or angle grinder it is going to be a challenge to say whether the engine is making metal, or whether you are just looking at the remnants of the filter you just cut open.

Skygazer, I second motz's call to avoid pointing the finger at the pilot. He has rightly pointed out any number of things that could have gone wrong other than specific pilot error. Our focus is on the regulators response (or lack of) to a known hazard. One of the regulators primary tasks is to protect the general public from unacceptable risk. An aircraft with a tendency to burst into flames even in a minor accident IMHO needs the intervention of the regulator to protect the general public who have no way of making the assessments that even you have made regarding your personal safety once you realise the implications of the design flaw. Also I think you have misinterpreted what MAJ was trying to say. We all acknowledge that something went wrong which set of the chain of events in this specific accident. MAJ was not trying to discount this, but he was highlighting that the thrust of our conversation does not focus on such speculation. We reluctantly recognise that minor accidents continue to happen but (without discounting efforts to reduce their occurence) our questions focus on why the regulator has not made this mod mandatory. In response to your comments on parts availability, I would suggest that if an AD had been issued with a deadline, then Robinson would pull out all stops to ensure their machines are not grounded due to delays in obtaining parts. It would be a PR nightmare for any company to have their product grounded for an extended period and they would ensure parts were made available to meet the need. However without the AD, less demand for parts exists and therefore Robinson will only match supply to demand.

If my Ford had a habit of incinerating its passengers when involved in a minor accident, then yes I would expect it to be taken off the road and fixed to save lives too. You are right in pointing out that pilot error may have been a significant factor also and indeed the pilot may have taken an informed risk when choosing to fly this helicopter, however were the pax aware of the issues surrounding crashworthiness of this design. It is an unfortunate reality that when humans are involved accidents will occur due to misjudgement of the situation or other failures. However this design has developed a particularly bad history of incinerating its occupants in minor accidents. The manufacturer knows it and has redesigned the fuel tank to make it safer. The ATSB knows it from previous R44 accident investigations and recommendations. So why then has the regulator stopped short of making it a mandatory mod? This is the basic question we are asking.

Hi Motz, An event like this makes us all ask the 'what if' questions. Don't be too harsh on yourself though, as in my view the regulator (whether that be CASA or the FAA) seems to have approached the issue too casually. I just had a look at the FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin that DJP referred to (which incidentally also clearly shows that the FAA have not made the mod mandatory) and couldn't help but think their decisions on this one have cost lives. I had gathered that this one is a bit personal, given the Jaspers Brush accident last year, however I could just as easily have asked the same questions that you are now wondering. As I mentioned earlier in this thread, I had already personally decided that unmodded R44's present more risk than I am willing to take for myself or my family. Given that personal assessment, should have I been more proactive in pushing the authorities myself. However the simple fact is that the regulator already have just as much (and more) information than any of us and ultimately the responsibility will rest with them. Sometime when I'm up visiting my parents at Wollongong, I'll need to try and drop in at JB and say hi. Given communication in threads such as this + FB posts on JBAAG it feels like we should have met. Anyway, all the best and remember responsibility for this one rests fairly and squarely with the regulator. They had more info than us and yet have not made the mod mandatory. regards, Justin

SB's (Service Bulletins) are issued by the manufacturer. Although much debate has occured over the years, the bottom line is that an owner/operator can apply SB's at their own discretion. This even includes so called 'Mandatory Service Bulletins' where the word 'mandatory' is included by the manufacturer as part of a CYA exercise. (Having said this I'm not suggesting anyone decides to ignore SB's) AD's (Airworthiness Directives) are issued by the regulator (FAA, CASA, etc). The owner/opterator is legally obliged to complete any AD's or observed any limitations that they contain. To simplify their job CASA does not normally issue AD's for aircraft which are operating on an overseas Type Certificate, but rather says that AD's issued by the NAA (National Airworthiness Authority) who issued the type certificate will apply to Australian aircraft. Therefore in the R44's case, as an American aircraft when the FAA issues an AD, it automatically applies to Aussie aircraft too. What often happens is that once a Service Bulletin is issued by the manufacturer, if the NAA determines that the SB should be mandatory they will issue an AD which states that a SB must be carried out. So given the legal status of AD's, SB's and the various responsibilities of the FAA & CASA in regards to R44's, it may be the case that CASA have simply washed their hands of all responsibility and say the FAA are primarily responsible for issuing AD's for this aircraft. However the accident history and previous ATSB recommendations would suggest to me that some regulator should have issued an AD making this mod mandatory. Even if CASA did not want to issue the AD themselves, one would think they would have ensured that the FAA respond to a design flaw that is killing people.

I didn't go to the FAA website earlier but just did a google search for Robinson AD's. To satisfy my ongoing curiosity I have just tried the FAA website now and still don't see the fuel tank mod mentioned as an AD. Therefore unless someone can produce an AD, as far as the FAA (and therefore CASA) are concerned this SB is not mandatory. My original statement regarding choosing not to fly in an unmodified R44 stands. I had already decided this before the Bulli accident, however this tragedy confirms my suspicions on this matter. No-one gets in an aircraft intending to have an accident, however I'd like to think that in the event of a minor bingle my chances of walking away remain high. The evidence for survivability in a minor R44 accident is not good. As I mentioned earlier in this thread for those of us in the industry, we have the opportunity to make an informed choice regarding risks we are willing to take, but the general public don't have the same knowledge, thus they rely on CASA to maintain a level of safety. Based on the history of R44 crashes in Australia alone, I'd have thought enough evidence exists to ground this type until the mod was done. As others have pointed out CASA does use this grounding option in the name of safety (including diverse ops such as RAAus, Barrier Air Charter, Ansett). Many have questioned the politics behind some of these past 'groundings'. I too have questions about the legitimacy of some of these actions, although I don't know the full facts behind any of these historic events. However I am somewhat confused at the lack of regulatory action mandating a clearly needed safety modification.

In response check my other post just now, however in short SB's are not legally required to be done unless an AD tells you to do it. On that basis R44's could be still flying around with this design flaw in 10 years time unless the regulator requires that the mod be done. As I stated in my other post, I didn't find an AD when I searched. If one exists I'm happy to be corrected, but without an AD it is hard to blame the operator as they have complied with the minimum standard required by the regulator.

I went searching and am happy for anyone to correct me if I'm wrong, but I couldn't find an AD which related to the Robinson SB mentioned above. This means that the 30th April date set by Robinson is meaningless as owner/operators are under not complusion to carry out SB's unless mandated by an AD. How the regulator (either the FAA or CASA) could ignore this safety issue is beyond me, based on lives lost even prior to last week at Bulli. I totally agree with calls to ground this aircraft until the mods are done. The general public are relying on the regulator to address real safety issues and I agree with Motz that this one is about clear cut as any safety issue in aircraft design. The ATSB has already provided an alert to this deisgn flaw after the last R44 crash. Why did CASA not act to potentially save these 4 lives?

A statement from the ATSB website regarding this accident: The ATSB can confirm that the R44 helicopter involved in the accident had all-aluminium fuel tanks. Through its SafetyWatch initiative, the ATSB has highlighted how all-aluminium fuel tanks have proven susceptible to post-accident fuel leaks, increasing the risk of a potentially fatal post-impact fire when colliding with the ground. In line with the manufacturer’s service bulletin, the ATSB has been encouraging all operators and owners of R44 helicopters to retrofit their aircraft with bladder-type tanks as soon as practical.

Can't say I have ever really been a fan of the rotary wing concept either, but at least all that 'spinning crap' once it decides to depart has a level of inertia which will carry it away for the cabin. I agree with motz that it is not unreasonable to expect this type of accident to be survivable. It would be if the integrity of the fuel tank was such that you don't end up with a bonfire the moment a R44 ends up on its side (and lets face it, with all the wonderful forces that can get out of balance, it is not that hard for a helicopter to end up 'falling over').

Good points raised by others here. Personally, even prior to todays accident I had decided not to fly in a R44 without 1st enquiring whether the fuel tank mod had been done based on the poor accident history this type has. Today's tragedy just reinforces that personal decision I had made. Having said that, we obviously don't have the details of the mod status of this machine yet. The question for CASA (assuming that the mod has not yet been incorporated on this machine) is how many more people have to die before they act in the interests of safety concerning R44's. The average person who chooses to do 'something special' and arrive at a venue in style has no real way of making an informed decision like those of us who work in the industry. They are relying on CASA to ensure risks are kept to an acceptable level. This event will raise lots of questions and may expose some serious failures in guarding public safety.

I should have added to my previous comment that doing a 'one-off' oil sample is of limited value as you have no 'baseline' for your engine to compare it with.

One of the chief benefits of regular oil analysis is the ability to monitor trends in your engine. Our FTC elects to do regular oil analysis on their training fleet (including a Flight Design-MC/Rotax 912). Over time a normal contaminant level is established, and by monitoring this you will detect trends once parts start to wear at higher rates. All in all a sensible monitoring option which allows you to detect faults and act prior to the 'big fan' stopping by surprise one day.

Duh! What a weekend to visit Albion Pk. Glad they did their best to make it up to you. The Connie was looking magnificent during its evening flight at Avalon which I observed on Friday. Love the exhausts all 'lit up' as it flies past in the dark. Sounds like a plane was meant to as well.

It would appear that this thread has split into at least two different discussions. One relating to aircraft certification and another relating to pilot certificate endorsements. With regards to pilot certificates, I see very little wrong with the current structure. Starting with a basic pilot certificate and adding on endorsements with regards to LP/HP/TW/NAV/etc. With regards to aircraft CofA options, we need to remember that the LSA category was created to allow designers to 'innovate' without the complication of seeking a full type certificated design, endorsed and controlled by the national regulator (ie CASA). Of course given that this was the original purpose of the LSA category, you should expect restrictions regarding how continuing airworthiness is controlled. Thus the situation where as soon as you step away from the 'factory approved' design or repair, you need to recognise that the aircraft now rightly fits into an experimental category, with all the extra restrictions that come with that status.

Not sure if I am interpreting this comment right, but just to clarify a RAAus Pilot Certificate holder (with pax endorsement) is required to meet the 3 take-off/landing in last 90 days rule before carrying pax + have completed a BFR (or gained a new endorsement) within the last 2 years to go flying at all, which is pretty much the standard everywhere.

'Income producing' Where does that fit into the bigger scheme of things with CASA?

From my understanding regarding LSA's, the question should be did the factory provide an approval for a particular prop to be fitted with their airframe/engine combination? If not, then the aircraft should be operating in an experimental category. Over the years we have actually had a number of very good articles written by various RAAus Technical Managers who go to pains to highlight the pitfalls associated with modifications to LSA aircraft. I know my propeller example used earlier will 'get the attention' of people, and many would consider it 'over the top', however I was just trying to use an example which many people can relate to (because that type of thing happens all the time). Yes a CofA does get issued to an aircraft. In the case of a factory built LSA CofA, it confirms conformance with the original Type Design. Use of non-approved parts (should always be documented) require conversion to an experimental category. Additionally, once non approved items have been used, in order to then restore an aircraft to factory type design conformity requires full consideration of any 'knock-on' effects that the use of 'un-approved' may have had, thus in the case of props, the potential for harmonic imbalance and stress needs to be considered. Aircraft manufacturers go to a lot of trouble to prove that particular airframe/engine/propeller combinations are compatible (thus the reason why Jabiru for many years have not approved other props for their aircraft (although this seems close to changing)). Bottom line is anyone considering making ANY changes to a factory built LSA (or other Type Certificated factory built aircraft for that matter) needs to very carefully consider the possible implications including the difficulty in restoring factory Cof A status. Having said all this I know that what happens in reality is often quite different to what I have described, which may well explain some of why CASA is showing much more interest in how RAAus is administering its 'patch'.

I have seen a dual ignition failure on a 912 engine. In that case it was due to the engine not being kept up to date with SB's. Early engines had the 'p' leads routed in a common harness where the l & r leads could chafe together and ultimately take out both systems. Current harness design maintains separation of the 'p' leads and eliminates the possibility of dual ignition failure from this older design flaw. Owners of older rotax engines should ensure that they have addressed this issue, otherwise a dual ignition failure is a possibility. As always, owners need to understand and keep up to date with all SB's if they are to ensure serviceability of their aircraft / engine. PS. The owner of this aircraft described, had made some efforts to ensure serviceability via a third party, but it seems this SB had still been missed. Fortunately this failure occured on the ground during testing (new airframe with an old engine fitted) before the final inspection was complete.