dutchroll

I don't think CASA had any choice. It was mandated by the Federal Government after about 5 seconds of thought went into it.

Well, we all (or most of us anyway) know that it has been policy-by-decree from the Government to address "adverse public perception". However when you get an untrained jumpseater saying that if the plane starts descending and they don't think the pilot is responding, that they should reach over and pull back on the stick at high altitude, well that has serious safety implications. You'd be more likely to survive if they did nothing, at least initially! The Germanwings disaster was effectively a "quadruple failure", which are generally highly improbable. 1. History of mental illness wasn't correctly acted on or monitored 2. Ended up extremely suicidal 3. Ended up murderously suicidal towards innocent strangers (this is very unusual even for someone who is suicidal) 4. Managed to get other pilot to leave & lock him out without giving away any hints through unusual behaviour etc They really need to address failure #1 at the root of everything. At some point they really should address failure #4 too, through "smarter" cockpit access systems for flight crew but I suspect that will be expensive. A system needs to allow goodies (authorised people) in, but keep others out.

Today at 40,000 ft I went for a loo break. When the young male hostie came in & sat on the jumpseat he was asked "What would you do if the plane nosed over and the remaining pilot doesn't do anything?" Answer: "Errrrrm.........reach over, grab the stick, and pull back on it?" Minute or 2 explaining that this really wasn't a good idea at 40,000 ft, and what's wrong with verbalising your concern first, or tapping the guy and saying "hey are you ok?" Then he was asked: "What if alarms went off and the pilot still wouldn't respond to it?" Answer: "Ummm I'd probably scream a lot." I made it a really quick toilet break.

My opinion on Jabirus is not worth a pinch of salt. The opinion of the blokes I speak to who have professionally serviced, recovered, and torn down for accident investigations a number of Jab engines actually is worth a pinch of salt....or two....or even three. My opinion on the Jab overall (which again, is not worth a pinch of salt), is that if it was coupled with a robust, hardy, tolerant engine, it has the potential to be a wonderful and highly reputable LSA. Alas..........

All posturing on the wonderful survivability and general "likability" of the Jabiru airframe aside, based on first-hand discussions with professionals who have maintained and recovered a number of Jabiru engines, I can confidently say that if you gave me one, I would on-sell it to a metal recycler. Harsh I know, but that's the way it is. I might be able to tolerate the ongoing issues if I had an aircraft with two of them. But when you only have one, it gets a bit more critical.

It's more than a little bit sad when people spruik the demonstrated crash-worthiness of a particular aircraft as one of its defining features.

Yeah it is the nature of the beast to an extent. But some blokes take it several steps too far. That gets tiring after a few hours.

Pretty much all the female pilots I've flown with are a hell of a lot nicer to work with than a number of the male ones. They certainly don't overwhelm you with arrogance and loud opinionated obnoxiousness like a number of my male colleagues do!

Most autopilots will disconnect when the servos are overridden by a manual input and the effort required to do this varies between aircraft (it's usually not much). The rationale is that if the pilot is fighting the autopilot hard enough, it's probably stuck on and it's doing something he doesn't want it to do. The aircraft which crashed in the Everglades only descended very gradually - not surprising even if it was trimmed pretty closely. It could just've easily climbed very gradually, or stayed pretty much level, but alas it wasn't to be. These days when the autopilot disconnects for any reason at all, lights flash, klaxons sound, and the plane screams at you until you physically push the quick-disconnect button to shut it up. A re-design consequence of that accident. A normal disconnection of the autopilot is two quick button pushes - "click click" - the second one to stop the cacophony before it gets going.

They've got quick disconnect buttons for autopilots for a reason.

We had a girl the other week bringing us a cuppa who couldn't open the cockpit door of an Airbus from the inside to let herself back out. "These doors are all so different! How do I open this?" She asked. After giving her instructions I turned to my colleague and said "I'm not often lost for words, but this is one of those occasions". But anyway. The problem is now fixed. Warren Truss said so.

You can bet your bottom dollar they won't. On autopilot, conducting an automatic landing. This is a sequential button-pressing exercise, plus extending the flaps and gear when instructed. You don't even need to select reverse thrust after touchdown. Just wait til the plane stops.

Oh well, the knee has been jerked.........until next time. There are certain flight attendants out there who will absolutely not be allowed in under the "two in the cockpit" rule if I'm flying. I've met several who are bloody certifiable as it is.

Numerous eyewitnesses stated that the Avenger did not s-turn on the taxiway, though the Avenger pilot (understandably I suppose) denied this. When you're in a radial taildragger, you have to make your s-turns worthwhile. I still s-turn even when I'm 99.999% sure there's absolutely no-one on the taxiway at all! And if the taxiway is too narrow, go onto the bloody grass! Yes the RV passenger was killed.

Perhaps not, but it's becoming apparent that the signs were all there with this guy. Then he slipped through the holes in the swiss cheese.

At dinner with a bunch of non-flying friends last night I was (as I expected!) asked about this accident. They were rather shocked to hear me guarantee that if I really truly wanted to, and in the absence of another pilot actually sitting strapped into the other pilot's seat at the controls, I could have the aircraft in a terminal dive from which recovery would be impossible within about 30 seconds, and certainly within 60 seconds. It was just an expression of how relatively ineffective the "policy" of having another crew member will be in practice. As has already been stated on this thread, even the built-in extreme attitude protections of the Airbus can be totally overridden with two pushbutton selections. What really concerns me is that this "band-aid, zero cost fix" will allow airlines to say "hey we've addressed this and it's no longer a safety issue", while the serious underlying problems of mental health assessment and treatment concerning this accident which are now being exposed day by day, fester without any attention at all - until the next similar occurrence.

Issued to them. http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/federal-flight-deck-officers

(calls cabin) "Gidday this is Capt Bob. I need to take a dump. Send someone up to make sure Dutchy doesn't kill us all, will you?" (cabin response) "No worries skipper - Effie is coming up to mind him" Capt Bob goes out, Effie comes in. Effie comes in. Looks a little tense. Sits on jumpseat, stares at Dutchy intently. (Effie) "WOAH!! What are you reaching up to that panel for??" (Dutchy) "I'm changing the range scale on the nav display. Is that ok?" (Effie) "Oh....ok.....yeah sure." Another minute passes. Nervous silence from Effie. (Effie) "HEY!!!! What are you moving that switch for?" (Dutchy) "I just turned my foot heater on. Is that ok?" (Effie) "Oh.....yeah it is a bit chilly isn't it?" I mean, I just can't friggin' wait. Alternate scenario: Effie has just come into the cockpit. Capt Bob is taking his dump. (Dutchy) "Effie, what are you doing?" (Effie) "I'm taking this crash axe off the wall. I'm going to end it all." (Dutchy) "Ok Effie, hang on a minute, let's talk this thr............. (shouting on CVR, Dutchy never finishes his sentence) And again for a 3rd scenario I hark back to the complete absurdity of the American "two in the cockpit" rules. The remaining pilot has a friggin' gun!! What the HELL is his flight attendant "minder" going to do if he's suicidal and wants to take the whole planeload out with him?

Was for a colleague of mine once. A violent and sudden bout of severe food poisoning hit him. He only just remembers telling the Captain he needed to get out of the seat now. Next thing he remembers is lying on the floor of the crew rest being tended to by flight attendants and a doctor passenger, covered in vomit and crap, surrounded by aircraft blankets.

I'm seriously doubting that report. On every commercial airline I've flown (B747, B767 and A330), the only location of a crash axe is in the cockpit itself. There is a reason that they don't have one in the cabin - well a couple of reasons actually. Firstly of course it can be used as a dangerous weapon. Secondly it is to allow the pilots to break out of the cockpit if trapped, due to the restricted means of egressing compared to the cabin, where there are exits everywhere. On the "two in the cockpit" knee-jerk reaction where people are using the US airline regulations as an example, let's not forget that in the USA, some airlines also issue their pilots with guns. This leads to a rather absurd situation if you're talking of having someone else in the cockpit to protect against a suicidal pilot!

Looks like on the news reports that the F/O in question had a medical certificate excusing him from work that day & his psych problems were known about. This is gonna cause a sh*t-stink.

This is seriously true. Walking through a major Australian airport domestic security screening several years ago. I'm in full uniform, hat, ASIC, and everything, flying kangaroos adorning various bits of uniform accoutrement as always. Security guy at the other side of the xray machine says "sir we need you to open your bag". I say "sure, but may I ask what for?" "Yes sir, it looks like you have an umbrella-like object in there". "Yeah that would be my umbrella. It has resided in the same compartment in my bag for over 10 years now" "Well we need you to take it out so we can inspect it sir" (Rolling my eyes) "No problem - what are you looking for?" "Well sir, it could be used to hide something which might allow you access to the cockpit." "Seriously?" "Yes sir. I'll just open it up and make sure there's nothing there which could be used to get into the cockpit." "Right.....we wouldn't want that now would we?" "No sir, we wouldn't. OK, you're all clear now." "Thanks mate I'll be off then.......oh and just one more question" "Yes sir?" "Where exactly is it that you think I'm going now, and do you think I'm in fancy dress?" Blank look followed. I just left, shaking my head. Similar scenarios have been repeated numerous times, yet not once, ever, has anyone in an Australian airport ever checked my ASIC card/ID to see that I am actually who I say I am. They'll delay us at security to check our umbrellas, and shampoo bottles, and toothpaste tubes, but never our ID.

Yes. Each.....and......every.....flight.......every.......working.......day. Don't get me started.

Apologies......you're right! Calloway was a former Navy pilot but was employed as a flight engineer by Fedex.

Very famous and absolutely true incident involving a Fedex DC-10 freighter (Fedex 705) in 1994 which is pretty much required study for airline pilots doing security training. The guy who tried to hijack it was another Fedex pilot, Auburn Calloway, who had been scheduled for a disciplinary hearing regarding embellishing his CV and planned to destroy the aircraft by flying it into Fedex headquarters but making it look as though he was not to blame so that his wife would inherit a payout (unbeknownst to her). He arranged to get a jump-seat as a passenger, then violently attacked the crew with a hammer. Captain David Sanders, First Officer Jim Tucker, and Flight Engineer Andy Peterson suffered serious penetrating head wounds but despite their injuries, two of them fought Calloway off while First Officer Tucker, totally paralysed down one side, threw the DC-10 into a barrel roll to keep Calloway off balance, severely exceeding Vne in the process. Later Captain Sanders ended up landing the plane while the other two subdued and seriously injured Calloway (who was still fighting up to that point). The aircraft suffered $800,000 structural damage due to the violent manoeuvring. All three crew survived but were permanently medically grounded due to their injuries. Captain Sanders had head injuries, deep wounds, and had to have his right ear stitched back into place. First Officer Tucker had a fractured skull, a dislocated jaw, and bad wounds where Calloway attempted to gouge out one of his eyes. Flight Engineer Peterson had a fractured skull, and a severed temporal artery from a hammer blow. Calloway was imprisoned for life.