John Brandon

The US FAA's NPRM for ADSB-OUT was released October 1. There is a copy on the RA-Aus server at www.raa.asn.au/navigation/ADSB_FAA_nprm.pdf It's 300 KB and 100 pages but makes very interesting reading. There is no thought of subsidies to GA but the use of ADS-B OUT is only mandatory for VFR above 10 000 feet in Class E and in all other CTA. John Brandon

Sain wrote: "Any chance RA-Aus can make life easier for us by putting up a page on their site with their official view, and an opportunity for us to agree with it (perhaps using our Membership No to verify who we are) so a nice big response can go to CASA?" There has been a notice on the bulletin board since August 24 regarding the ADS-B JCP, which by the way is an DOTRS/Airservices project not a CASA project. See www.raa.asn.au/notices.html That notice makes a very simple statement: "The RA-Aus view is that aircraft operating in Class G, no matter what the altitude or the location [i.e. even in the vicinity of a CTAF®], should not be required to be equipped with ADS-B OUT." The inference is that the association is OK with ADS-B in Class E and other CTA. You know that over practically all Australia Class G extends from the surface to FL18 except in those generally east coast corridors where it only extends to 8500 feet and FL125 i.e. to the Class E lower level. So even though an aircraft flying in Class G at or above 10 000 feet must use a mode A/C transponder your association is saying no ADS-B. The USA NPRM for ADS-B OUT does not require ADS-B in Class G; but of course their airspace structures differ from ours. It is best if the responses to DOTRS are individual rather than standardised. John Brandon

Matt wrote: "I'm confused by Mike's comments regarding the 'burden on the user' - as per most of the press regarding impact on non-commercial aircraft operators, the savings Airservices will make from not having to continue to operate and maintain the current (ageing) radar system will be used to fund the ADS-B out equipment (proposed at $10,000) for non-commercial operators. I don't see this as any greater burden than any of the other mandated safety equipment required for flight operations." The funding option that the ADS-B project team are pushing is that the cost savings Airservices makes by not upgrading existing radars and ground navaids not be passed on to their paying customers [local and international airlines, small aviation businesses etc] but instead be used by Airservices to fund installation of transmitters in private VFR aircraft. I don't believe there is much chance of those paying users foregoing a fee reduction just to support the purses of private pilots. They have businesses to run and shareholders requiring them to conserve costs; if Airservices is making savings they will quite rightly want reduced fees. I also don't believe the Commonwealth Government is going to hand out millions of dollars to ultralight aviation just so we can fly above 5000 feet if we choose to do so. Unless Class G is removed from the ADS-B environment I think many RA-Aus owners should be prepared to shell out some big biccies in 2014 earlier if you want to fly in Class E or above 10 000 feet. Better send in your responses now! John Brandon

This is a very important issue for existing and future aircraft owners. There has been a notice on the RA-Aus notice board since August 24 informing members of the JCP issued by DOTARS with a response date of October 31. The short summary is that if you wish to fly your recreational aircraft in Class E or Class G above 5000 feet or at a CTAF® after 2012/2014 then it may cost you somewhere between $5000 to $10000 for the privilege. Read the notice and make your response by 31/10. I mentioned this in another thread a few weeks ago. The RA-Aus view is that aircraft operating in Class G at any altitude should not be required to install ADS-B transmitters. There is a document I wrote in 2004 which is relevant, see www.raa.asn.au/navigation/adsb.html John Brandon

Decca wrote: "Time to get back to basics Guys. A stopped, fixed pitch prop will create the MOST drag. (Flat plate principle). A wind-milling prop will create less drag than the above." Not so. Read www.raa.asn.au/groundschool/propeller.html#windmilling John Brandon

The best glide [Vbg] quoted in the POH is with the engine shut down and with the prop stopped which is the minimum drag situation. If the engine is shut down but the prop is windmilling then the prop is generating "reverse thrust" and thus considerable drag in which case the rate of descent at Vbg is greater than you would expect with the quoted L/D. A similar situation exists in a simulated engine failure situation with the throttle closed and engine idling. The prop's rotational speed will be low but the forward speed at Vbg still quite high thus the resultant blade angle of attack for a fixed pitch prop may be very low and possibly negative. The result is an air brake effect similar to windmilling and an unfavourable L/D. [The prop status is opposite to that existing when starting take-off where high rotational speed is combined with low forward speed to produce an initial high aoa] Thus the quoted Vbg only achieves the optimum L/D when the engine is shut down and the prop is stopped so you can't check it unless you do likewise. My suggestion - unless you want to try shutting down the engine and slowing the aircraft until you can get the prop to stop - accept the speed quoted in the POH or manual as realistic Of course the quoted Vbg is a nil wind speed, for instance it must be increased if bucking a headwind; adding perhaps half the estimated wind speed. Also it is usually quite unwise to attempt to stop a windmilling prop following a real engine failure so the rate of sink at Vbg will be greater than expected. John Brandon

Exactly. You must calculate TODR and TODA for the weight and density altitude and use all the runway - backtrack if necessary. You can see by the wing rocking [a classic symptom of incipient stall] that the aircraft lifted off too early and never had a chance of reaching a safe flying speed. John Brandon

Before getting too carried away with the 5000 feet ceiling consider this: There is a Joint Consultation Paper which proposes that from June 2012, ADS-B OUT avionics will be required for all VFR operations that currently require carriage and use of a transponder; which includes operations in Class E airspace. And from June 2014, ADS-B OUT avionics will also be required for all VFR operations that currently require carriage and use of a VHF radio; which includes operations in Class G airspace above 5000 feet and in CTAF ®. The same general exemptions that currently apply for carriage and use of transponders/VHF transceivers would also apply to carriage of ADS-B transmitters. The cost of purchase and installation of the TSO'd ADS-B OUT avionics for each of 11,000 light VFR aircraft [including ultralights] is expected to be less than $10,000. It is proposed that "this could be managed as a cross-industry funding transfer via Airservices, whereby enroute charges are maintained at today’s levels for a set period, and the additional funds that are not required to maintain or replace the existing ground radars, NDBs and VORs can be passed on to light aircraft owners in the form of cross-industry funding." The question is whether those fee paying sectors of Australian aviation, mainly the airlines, would willingly donate perhaps $10,000 to each of perhaps 2000 ultralight owners [i.e.$20,000,000 in total] out of their own pockets to enable ultralights to fly above 5000 feet or in Class E should you choose to do so. I would think their quite reasonable response would be "in your dreams sport!" So in my opinion it is quite likely that in a few years if you want to fly above 5000 feet or in Class E or operate at a CTAF ® you may have to ante up ten grand for the privilege. The JCP and response form are on the CASA website. cheers John Brandon I forgot to mention that after 2012/2014 the owners of all new registrations will have to pay for the avionics anyway.

G'day Mike, Consider this paragraph from http://www.raa.asn.au/students/airmanship.html ; it demonstrates a relationship between pilot competency, airmanship and pilot error. "Airmanship is the cornerstone of pilot competency. Competency has been defined as the combination of knowledge, skills and attitude required to perform a task well – or to operate an aircraft safely and in all foreseeable situations. A flight operation, even in the most basic low momentum ultralight, is a complex interaction of pilot, machine, practical physics, airspace structures, traffic, weather, planning and risk; and when each and every flight is undertaken it is not only the aircraft which should be airworthy, the total environment – airframe, engine, pilot, atmospheric conditions and flight planning – should allow for the safe, successful conclusion of each operation. It is the perception – founded on the acquired underpinning knowledge – of the state of that total environment and its potential risks that provides the basis for good airmanship and safe, efficient, ERROR free flight. Insufficient perception and insufficient self-discipline create a pilot at risk." However no one is sufficiently competent to undertake any flight that starts to stretch them nor are they as competent in their normal flight environment as they perhaps believe, and every pilot makes errors in flight, most of which are completely inconsequential. All aircraft accidents, from just damaging the wingtip on the hangar door to rolling it up in a fiery ball, are generally the result of a sequence of small errors and/or events and/or judgements each perhaps inconsequential in themselves but when if combined lead to an outcome seemingly grossly out of proportion to the input. Generally we tend to select the most visible decision and classify the accident according to that. Thus if we have an EFATO incident and the pilot decides to turn back and makes it then, if there is any investigation, it will be into the actions/events that caused the engine failure. If the pilot doesn't make it back an investigation verdict will be "pilot error" even though perhaps the pilot only contributed one unwise decision in the sequence of events. The pilot error bucket is very commodious, which is why all aircraft accidents tend to be conveniently tipped into it unless there is enough overweighing evidence to pin it on Air Traffic Control, the aircraft manufacturer, the maintenance personnel or, in desperation, the Bureau of Meteorology. As a consequence the mere classification as 'pilot error' tells you nothing about the root causes of a fatal accident. However you can be pretty sure that then the causes will be found among the perennials — pre-flight preparation and planning, decision making, perception, judgement, fuel management and handling skills. Regarding the recent event in Italy, no one yet knows whether the aircraft exceeded the design diving speed Vd or Vdf [ about 10% greater than Vne and the speed a person with test pilot experience in that type might go to, see http://www.raa.asn.au/groundschool/flutter.html#limiting_airspeeds] and how much g was pulled and what atmospheric turbulence was like, but if speed is thought to be excessive then there will probably be a "pilot error' verdict even though there may be many other contributing factors and persons. At the other extreme you have the criminal actions [i wouldn't downgrade them to "pilot error"] where a pilot decides to do something particularly ill-disciplined [ the beat-up, touching wheels on water, low level aerobatics without the authority of an air display endorsement] where hopefully he [always a male] only kills himself and no-one else. As you noted the pilot errors that are both puzzling and extremely worrying are those where the pilot makes a conscious decision to 'press on' even though he [rarely she] knows it is most unwise to do so. The decision might be associated with deteriorating visibility, a sick engine, lost over inhospitable terrain etc. I am no psychologist so I really have no idea why they do it, perhaps it is just that compunction to go a little bit further or perhaps they believe "it can't happen to me". Who knows? Of course if a design shortcoming, corrosion/aging or maintenance problem is identified as a result of an air safety investigation then the Airworthiness Directive or similar systems come into operation to protect aviators. cheers John

That's not the point. If you extrapolate the figures you might surmise that there will be 6 fatal accidents in 2007 and perhaps the same in 2008. If you guess that a passenger will also die or suffer crippling injury in 50% of accidents then total casualties during the two years could be perhaps 20 persons. Such a casualty figure is horrific and particularly so when probably all due to pilot error resulting from a lack of pilot competency. What are you pilots, the members of this forum, doing to improve your competency? John Brandon

G'day Andy, Yes as stated on the notice the statistics follow the aviation convention; number of accidents involving a fatality not the number of fatalities; and of course the number of accidents where any POB received crippling injuries is not included. For information on the publication referred to see the thread titled 'Proposed safety publication' in the 'training and student pilots' forum, probably about March 2007. You ask whether the proposed publication will discuss systemic problems. My view is that a major systemic problem exists and it is the following: Most RA-Aus recreational pilots, as with most general aviation recreational pilots, accumulate only a few hours each year. About two thirds of recreational pilots fly less than 50 or 60 hours; perhaps such annual hours is enough to maintain physical flying skills learned at the flight school – if the pilot has established a program for self maintenance of that level of proficiency – but maybe not enough to maintain a high level of cognitive skills, for example situational awareness, judgement and action formulation. In addition, once having completed flight theory studies sufficient to pass the basic aeronautical knowledge test and achieve the Pilot Certificate, it seems that many, perhaps most, pilots leave it at that, failing to expand their knowledge by further in-depth studies of flight dynamics because it involves sometimes difficult detail rather than the broad brush approach of the flight school and perhaps assuming that such knowledge will be expanded through consequent flight experience. Assuming, I guess, that they will survive each experience. However many pilots are just continually repeating the same flight experience — each year is the same as the last — so all they accumulate is a repetition of one year's experience. They have no program of deliberately accumulating advanced skills nor have they really absorbed the safety basics which should have been drummed into them over the years — never turn back following EFATO; always maintain a safe airspeed; if the engine has been misbehaving never take-off until the problem is identified and fixed; if the engine goes sick in flight don't try to make it back to base, land it ASAP; don't continue into marginal conditions - turn back, and so on. Those causal factors mentioned were evident in the latest series of fatal accidents. So the systemic problem exists with the pilots; many are just not ensuring that they accumulate adequate post-Certificate knowledge and skills. In short they never really learn much about flight dynamics [and some of their accumulated beliefs are dangerously false] and they lack other pertinent knowledge and worse, they are just not listening or hearing. And of course at the other extreme we have the 10 000 hour pilot with all the experience in the world who destroys himself and his passenger near the top of the Great Dividing Range because he thought "I can make it!" John Brandon

One death or serious injury is one too many and particularly disheartening when so many are just repetitions of the same old pilot errors that have plagued GA and ultralight aviation for so many years. I hoped to get more interest from this forum a couple of months ago when I signalled my intention of producing a publication dealing with these ongoing fatal accident causes. Be that as it may the RA-Aus accident rate should also be compared with membership levels and with number of aircraft on the register. I have published the stats for 1985 - 2006 on the website notice board in the form of a bar chart supplied by the office. John Brandon

Many years ago when flying piston engined naval aircraft we had the concept of VITAL CHECKS to be performed prior to take-off and landing. The premise was that full cockpit checks, perhaps 100 items [plus operational items checks] would be performed prior to and post engine start. After the vital take-off checks the routine in-flight cockpit scanning, systems management and piloting would cope with everything until time to perform the half-dozen vital landing checks. This way the omissions that are likely to kill you are identified and separated from the normal pre-flight and in-flight routines. If you remove the purely naval items plus the constant speed prop checks then you are left with a pretty small list. Here of course I am only referring to the in-cockpit checks, environment and traffic checks come under the heading of piloting. These vital actions were a standard common to most aircraft types. VITAL TAKE-OFF CHECKS: SEA FURY, FIREFLY, SEA HORNET Wings: spread and locked Trim: all neutral [but full left rudder for Sea Fury] Pitch: fully fine Fuel: on main tank, contents, booster pump on Flaps: Sea Fury: up [airfield], take-off [free carrier], max lift [catapult carrier] Firefly: take-off position [all locations] Sea Hornet: max lift position [all locations] Tail wheel: locked VITAL LANDING CHECKS: SEA FURY, FIREFLY, SEA HORNET Brakes: off, pressures OK Undercarriage: down and locked [3 greens] Pitch: set approach rpm Fuel: main tank, contents, booster pump on Flaps: landing position Hook: down for carrier Tail wheel: unlocked [carrier], locked [airfield] John Brandon

I've added this to save Tony from a possible apoplectic fit — All CAOs take the form of delegated legislation subordinate to the Civil Aviation Act 1988. They are drafted by CASA’s Office of Legal Counsel, checked by the Attorney General's department and then tabled in both houses of Parliament where, unless there is a motion for disallowance, the CAO is automatically enabled after 15 sitting days. Thus though not an act of Parliament in itself, parliamentary involvement is constitutionally required in the promulgation of a CAO. I don't think this particular path [i.e. Parliamentary acts] is very rewarding so perhaps it could be discontinued? John Brandon

The short explanation: basically the version of the proposed Part 103 accompanying the NPRM preserves everything that RA-Aus has fought for and which the members currently enjoy [i.e. nothing really changes] but it still leaves room open for future needs. Read the following http://www.raa.asn.au/operations/regulations.html#part_103 Take note of my notes 3 and 4 and apply a little lateral thinking to give you just a couple of instances of why you need the NPRM to go through as is. John Brandon

If carrying younger children in a light aircraft you must ascertain the suitability of the restraint system, I doubt that harness systems lacking a crotch strap [i.e. a five harness system] are suitable. Read this document from my 'coping with emergencies guide' and take full note of the extremely dangerous submarining possibility: http://www.raa.asn.au/emergencies/deceleration.html/restraint My thoughts: don't carry young children in a small aircraft, there is always the chance that even a minor accident will cause life altering injury to a child. John Brandon

Thanks for the comments Bruce, and yes I did obtain a copy of the Aeroplane's Seafire F17 issue thank you. It was quite heartwarming to read about the aircraft's restoration and to see such a good aircraft type again flying in the UK after a 45 year gap since the last flight. There is still life in the old piston engined Naval fighters! cheers John

Tony wrote "You are doing more than well John, but may I enquire where your co-author’s contribution is that we may also have a preview of?" Well currently there is no co-author thus no contribution to preview. RA-Aus needs to find one I guess. cheers John

Thank you to those who provided feedback. I must say the extremely small response [ about 1% of forum membership] and the number of people who viewed this safety thread is disappointing. I hope I am not wasting my currently available [but potentially diminishing] productive time with this safety project. The level of safety consciousness within both the RA-Aus membership and recreational aviation generally really does need to be heightened. About 12 sports aviation people [plus 3 parachutists] die each year together with 40 GA people. On top of that there are many life-changing injuries and we also have to consider all those lucky 'could've beens' who escaped crippling injury though their aircraft was a write-off. Anyhow the opinion of the respondents seems to be that the material I indicated to you is not really suitable for the proposed print publication because - in a nutshell: - the style is that of a manual rather than something with harder impact, - and though the extent of coverage is OK - the depth of detail goes too far. Which is not surprising because I have been a little bit naughty - the two documents for which I provided links are not documents intended for a print publication but are slightly modified copies of modules 13 and 14 of the web Flight Theory Guide [see http://www.raa.asn.au/groundschool/flutter.html and http://www.raa.asn.au/groundschool/turn_speed.html . Which is no doubt why Tony was scratching his head but I did want to check with the RA-Aus membership concerning the format and felt this was the best way to go about it. As Tony said, my skills are in technical rather than inspirational writing so my current intent with the proposed print publication is that I will provide a manual style chapter document from which some other specialist, with presentation skills and imaging and print experience, will produce the condensed print document . The latter is expected to be along the lines indicated in your responses. Whether my documents are included as appendices to the print publication or just referenced to a web location is up to RA-Aus, who will no doubt consider the costs involved. The material on which the other 8 chapters of the proposed print publication would be based are currently also contained within the various web service guides. Most of them are linked within the "airmanship and safety tour' but all require additional detail added. By the way the British Civil Aviation Authority have requested permission to include my definition of airmanship in a forthcoming safety publication of theirs relating to violation of controlled airspace which is an indication of international approval of the material published by RA-Aus. Maybe we can go further if more members got involved particularly with this proposed safety document. What about starting with the layout of the "Stall and spin from a low-level turn" document? cheers John

Would all RA-Aus pilot certificate holders and others who are interested in flight safety please read the opening post in the 'proposed safety publication' thread of the 'student pilot and training' forum. Your opinions and suggestions are requested regarding: The breadth and depth of the content material? The style of presentation and its readability? Its understandability [for an experienced aviator rather than a student]? And does it get the message across to the old and bold? Please note that the expense of the proposed publication would indicate that it should be something to be retained by the member for future reference i.e. it is not intended to provide a one time shock and then be discarded and forgotten. cheers John Brandon

Paul Middleton and I want to produce a print publication for distribution to all RA-Aus members. If I tell you we have a tongue-in-cheek title of "The top ten ways to top yourself in an aeroplane" you will get some idea of its purpose, the proposed content and the emphasis. The chapters may be: 1. Fly real fast 2. Stall and spin from a low-level turn 3. Disregard inertia, wind gradients and shear [may be combined with 2] 4. Turn back following efato [may include departure / go-around stall] 5. Ignore w&b limitations 6. Don't calculate todr, ldr, obstacle/terrain clearance and forget powerlines 7. Demonstrate to the landborne what a hot-shot pilot can do 8. Poor preflight planning = piss-poor performance 9. Don't check the fuel 10. Press on in deteriorating conditions I have drafted the first two chapters and placed them on the RA-Aus server at: http://www.raa.asn.au/nonlinked/excess_speed.html http://www.raa.asn.au/nonlinked/stall_spin.html The second chapter has yet to have relevant accident investigation reports added.The prime target of the proposed publication will be experienced pilots rather than students - the former seem more at risk. I am requesting RA_Aus members [and others who are willing] to read through the two documents and perhaps discuss your opinions and suggestions regarding: The breadth and depth of the content material? The style of presentation and its readability? Its understandability [for an experienced aviator rather than a student]? And does it get the message across to the old and bold? John Brandon

Sorry to be pedantic but 'acrobatic' IS the legal category for aircraft not aerobatic. Acrobatic is the term usually seen in US and Australian legislation, see Far23, AC21.4 etc etc