dutchroll

I know the investigators had to look at the possibility that he could've made it to a nearby airport but Sullenberger was the one in the hot-seat, and trying to glide a powerless aircraft across the city in the "chance" that you could make it there would've been a very hard decision. The consequences of not quite getting it right are extreme. Especially as the aircraft doesn't really give you many clues as to how far it'll actually go (or how that will change with flap selection to get your speed back, etc) and while you do train for temporary dual engine flameouts from higher altitudes, you don't train for glide approaches in big jets because they're so extremely improbable. The best he could do was hit "green dot" speed (min drag for an Airbus) and stay there while looking for somewhere without buildings, even if it was the water. I haven't seen the movie but I have seen the CVR transcript. They did well with very little time available!

Passengers who travel a lot are pretty resilient, especially if they're already strapped in. The newbies are the problem! Also it was very brief - probably over in a minute or less at our rate of climb. It's usually prolonged turbulence which makes people sick.

An Airbus A330! Nope. No rudder. You do not use rudder on a swept-wing jet unless 1) an engine has failed, or 2) for directional control while on the runway In a small plane like the one I fly for fun, I would use rudder for yaw control, not roll control. That is what it is for (turn coordination is essentially the same thing - you are preventing adverse yaw). Wing drop is a roll, and you would primarily use the things which control roll to fix it - ailerons. Stalling is a separate issue which requires a whole different discussion. They're my thoughts anyway.

Spot on. Taking off to the south with possibly up to a 15 knot westerly on the ground, then we turn left (east) into a known 20 knot easterly, then a few seconds later hit a 45 knot easterly. Up to 35 knots of wind change in the first thousand feet, then a definite (as these were recently pilot reported winds) 25 knot change in the next thousand feet. That's a whopping shear rate. A recipe for getting thrown around, especially with local orographic effects of easterly winds at Perth added into it, so discussed in the briefing were windshear aspects, a warning to the hosties that it might be pretty rough soon after takeoff, and turbulence speeds. .....and get thrown around we did! Almost full left sidestick at one point to pickup a wing drop at about 700 ft, then large speed fluctuations before we finally got to turbulence speed (240 kts) and eventually climbed out of it. I would describe it as moderate turbulence, moderate windshear. Just glad we were leaving, not arriving!

While we're learning about turbulence, at work today we had this airfield info for departure. Any guesses which 2 particular lines perked our interest and caused a pre-departure discussion? Ignore the handwritten stuff. That's just takeoff performance planning adjustments.

Ideally, don't turn unless you really have to. If severe turbulence or a gust is enough to cause a significant wing drop, when you already have bank on and it hits you, things might get complicated. But if you do, certainly don't chase the rudder. The skid ball will be slip-sliding from one side to the other anyway! Really you should be just setting a suitable power for your turbulence penetration speed, holding an appropriate attitude (whether level, climbing or descending), and accepting the momentary speed and vertical speed excursions. Get out of it by changing altitude, if you can. In answer to your original question - worst turbulence I've had? 1) Across the Tasman, severe turbulence encounter. Urgent descent, full speedbrake. Took several attempts to press the "flight level change" button to start descent. Had no idea what speed we were doing because I couldn't read the instruments. 2) Early on approach into Sydney. B767. Went through brief layer of moderate to severe turbulence. Full aileron deflection to prevent plane from banking any further. Only lasted a few seconds. 3) 25,000 ft on climbout. Severe windshear and turbulence in B767. VSI went off-scale high, airspeed went through VNE even with speedbrake extended, and overspeed warning started going off (and it can't be silenced until you get the speed back under control). And this is what it sounded like for about 20 seconds......but add in getting thrown around too.

No probs. And certainly you were absolutely right to take an experienced instructor. I've been in true severe turbulence I think only a couple of times in my entire career. It's not a pleasant experience and by definition it can sit right on the borderline of loss of controlled flight (I can vouch for that). I've been in moderate turbulence on many occasions and people often mistake this for severe turbulence because it does throw you around a lot. Whenever severe turbulence is on a forecast, it grabs my attention and I say "ok, now what do I need to do to avoid this?" Another point I might throw into the mix when considering how far to push your boundaries (it's just food for thought, that's all): it is pretty well demonstrated that if you end up in a scenario such that you become completely task saturated trying to cope, you actually don't learn anything from it at all. In fact you start mentally load-shedding and even recalling later exactly what happened for the safety investigation or report is very difficult. So the trick is expanding your horizons far enough to learn, but not so far that you dump it all in a fit of "Holy cr@p!! What the heck just happened?" I'm glad you felt you achieved this.

From my own personal perspective that's not the sort of TAF I'd choose to takeoff in a little plane with - at least not without a PIREP from someone confirming the absence of severe turbulence. Some salient points: Be wary of crossing the line between "looking for experience" and "looking for trouble". Remember the definition of "severe turbulence" in AIP GEN 3.4. Don't forget that it could fall into a routine ATSB reporting category if you get caught in severe turbulence (ie, mandatory reporting by law).

I'm glad you got my point that there's no nepotism or conflicts at all in middle eastern politics! Yes that's a fair comment so far, however when it comes later in the investigation to questioning the Emirates' training system, or their pilot fatigue levels, you might see a different perspective emerge. I know for a fact that they fly their pilots right to the limit and you do not call the company and say "I'm too fatigued and don't think I'm fit to fly this next sector/trip, I just need a bit of a break". Well, not if you want to keep your job.

You realise the Chairman of the Emirates Civil Aviation Authority who are doing the investigation, and the CEO of Emirates Group & the airline are one and the same person? He is also the uncle of the current ruler of Dubai. Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum.

Yes. But this is the United Arab Emirates, and the Captain was, I believe, an Emirati. The First Officer was a westerner. Things work differently in the Middle East when locals (especially locals in "esteemed" positions) and westerners are concerned. It's a fact of life. Not one I like, but a fact of life all the same. So I'll be interested to see how it pans out.

Yeah you got me there.

I can't talk either. I own a Pitts which burns about 150 litres/hour at full power. But then I do live off the grid (completely) so I consume zero electricity from non-renewable sources, have my own (natural) water supply, and process my own sewerage with the off-grid power. So I figure I break even and don't concede too much moral high ground. Sorry for the extreme thread drift.

What's the other digital data you do for Skyview, Bevan? I've subscribed to ozrunways for quite some time but have downloaded the trial version of your product and am checking it out. Taking me a little while to get used to the interface change but I'm slowly getting there.

Yes I reckon that's about right. He had the autothrust engaged on the approach. Nothing particularly wrong with that. Boeing use "TOGA" (Takeoff/Go Around) switches on the thrust levers to initiate go-arounds. Pressing these engages the servo motors on the thrust levers to automatically drive them full forward (on the Airbus you actually have to physically push them full forward - there are no servo motors on Airbus thrust levers which are designed differently), however those switches are inhibited after touchdown (based on radar altitude). But go arounds are almost always initiated from some reasonable height above the runway, so through all your training and even 99% of the time in real life you'd be used to pressing the TOGA switches and getting full thrust, not nothing. In that 1% case of having already touched down, that's not what happens. Therefore the B777 procedure in the books if you go-around after touching down is to make sure the thrust levers get pushed fully up. But had they ever practiced this? I wonder....... It appears they were caught out in the heat of the moment by how the system behaves in that rare scenario. All they had to do was physically push them up.

It's ultimately just a plane. Disconnect all the automatics and it still flies in accordance with all the basic principles. The big issues coming out in recent years in Airbus as well as Boeing are automation mishandling (especially autothrust modes), automation surprise, and related topics. Both Asiana and Emirates were perfectly 100% serviceable B777 aircraft which are now total hull losses.

My take on it so far based on the presented facts: - the approach speed was pretty good throughout. - going through 700ft the wind changed from slight headwind to a tailwind of 16 knots. The reported ground wind was a tailwind of several knots. This would perk our interest because that indicates a probability of overshoot shear. - that's not a "severe" shear, but it is significant and does require a bit of care to handle. - "overshoot shear" (increasing headwind or reducing tailwind) is actually fraught with complications when it's close to the runway because it results in the aircraft picking up excessive energy, having the thrust at idle to prevent the speed increasing (not desirable to have idle thrust late in the approach), and can result in a long float. Bad overshoot shear can often result in a go-round close to the ground as it becomes obvious the plane just won't touch down. - he started the flare at 35 ft and that seems about right to me but it took 10 seconds from there to touchdown. That's a significant float. - so re-reading it I realised the touchdown was at 1100m (not feet!) which is way too long. A touchdown at 1000-1500 feet from the threshold would've been right on the money for that size aircraft. You don't want it shorter than 1000 ft and not longer than 2000ft. He touched down at 3200ft. - this explains the aircraft barking the "long landing" message at him. - he has then attempted a go-round, as he should. - he pulled the nose up for the go-round and the aircraft climbed because it still had some energy. They went into the standard Boeing procedure of flaps 20, positive climb, gear up. - he never advanced the thrust for the go-round and the F/O didn't pick him up on it either and by the time they worked it out, it was too late. There are a lot of automation complacency issues to come out of this.

Sorry.....mistook metres for feet. The touchdown was waaaay long!

I imagine so. It's a little hard to tell precisely from this report. The initial touchdown at 1100m from the threshold is fine. That's well within what you'd call acceptable. But he had a fair bit of tailwind until just before touchdown. To us, this would be a red flag to go around because if it swings around to headwind just before touchdown you are now in overshoot shear and can find yourself floating uncomfortably down the runway trying to touchdown. The interim report is sparse on the fine detail here but I'm sure the full report with full flight data and CVR matching will clarify it. But the bottom line is what I said back at the beginning. Once you decide to go around just do it. Full power, set the go-round attitude for your plane. Worry about what happened when you get on the ground. Works in a Drifter, Cessna, or B777. They missed one crucial step. They had no thrust on!

It has been released on the GCAA (Emirates Civil Aviation Authority) website. https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/90/2016-2016%20-%20Preliminary%20Report,%20AAIS%20Case%20AIFN-0008-2016%20-%20A6-EMW.pdf As expected....monumental stuffup.

Yeah that's amazing that someone would think that. Especially if you're going to use big words like "legal requirement". However there is a time and place to argue about it, and with your instructor in the other seat, it's not that time & place!

Not really. Then again I don't generally do that in the day job either though I will happily return a greeting if I get one! This whole thing with ever-increasing readbacks and the arguments used to support them is interesting. They've only ever had one purpose in life, and a very important one: to confirm to ATC that the aircraft has correctly understood the clearance or instruction it was issued. Readbacks have never been for other purposes. That might be called a "broadcast" or something similar. Of course there's nothing to stop you from gaining SA from a clearance issued by ATC to someone else. We do that all time (when the brainspace and capacity is available) and it's good airmanship when you can. The other interesting thing is the Airservices conflation and confusion of their own principles recently. Going back to the "lineup and wait", for example, it has been said (in the process of admonishing an aircraft as personally relayed to me) that the "....and wait" is a conditional clearance and therefore needs to be read back. That's just bollocks someone plucked out of their backside. Sure conditional clearances do have to be read back but in this case, what exactly is the condition? What else can you do? It has the same effect as the other commonly used "XYZ lineup". It has no additional conditions and means exactly what it says, and has precisely the same effect as the previous one. You can't actually do anything else after being cleared to lineup until you receive another clearance or instruction. It's like saying "XYZ descend to 5000 and then stop descent". Really? No I figured I'd just keep on going! Now if they say "Behind the Chieftain on final, lineup behind" yes now they've put a condition on the lineup of only doing it behind the Chieftain, so that bit has to be read back. And no you don't have to repeat "behind" at the end - you've already said it at the beginning so the compliance is quite clear. That's not strictly true, but sure, I'll read-back whatever they want. If they give me an updated ATIS on approach to Melbourne and want me to readback the entire ATIS to them I'll do that. If they want me to read back "when ready" even though it's not a conditional clearance for descent, I'll do that too, but there's no requirement. AIP GEN 4.4.1 "For other than item a), only key elements of the following clearances, instructions , or information must be read-back ensuring sufficient detail is included to indicate compliance." then it goes on to list those clearances/instructions for which only key elements need to be read back. Which goes back to what I said above, about the entire reason for having readbacks. But someone in ASA is going beserk at the moment. If they want every single word to be read back verbatim then they need to change GEN 4.4.1 because it quite clearly states otherwise and it's their own publication. Sure the key elements are usually somewhere in the readback, but they're becoming too often interspersed with garbage, and now garbage on demand!

The clearance "lineup" constitutes a clearance to lineup and nothing else. The clearance "lineup and wait" constitutes a clearance to lineup and nothing else. If ATC really wanted to they could add a clearance to "lineup, wait, and don't do anything else" and it would still constitute a clearance to lineup and nothing else. Happens fairly regularly. We'll often not pickup the specifics of instructions to other callsigns during critical or busy phases of flight because, well, we're busy! We all have to abide by the same rules. But in the Pitts I've got precisely nothing to do between lining up, and advancing the throttle for takeoff. In an Airbus I have 9 procedural items and a checklist to complete in the same time period!

I have to admit I often hear RPT fail to readback the runway number for takeoff and landing clearances and am guilty of not doing it myself. We generally get a simple "cleared to land" or "cleared for takeoff" and the habit is formed to readback the landing or takeoff clearance without a runway number. So when they do append a runway number to it, you tend to forget even though AIP does show that it's a requirement. ATC haven't cracked down on that yet, but I know they're cracking down on the "lineup and wait" readback which always used to be simply "lineup" (you didn't have to readback the "wait" according to the phraseology in AIP) but has changed, probably because someone took off without a clearance. A colleague of mine recently got roundly castigated on the airwaves by the tower controller at Melbourne one day for not reading back the ".......and wait" and I heard another RPT aircraft cop a serve for it just a couple of days ago in Perth. Some comments (not transmitted of course!) I often hear in the cockpit include "well what other runway are we going to takeoff on?" and "well off course we're going to wait - you haven't cleared us for takeoff yet so what else are we going to do?" however I suppose there must've been some incidents which have prompted the phraseology people to go on the warpath. Compared to most other countries in the world, we are quite anal with our R/T phraseology. Like our airport security! There is a specific exemption in AIP at Class D aerodromes with runway operations on discrete frequencies (at least that's how it reads to me).

I remember 20 years ago being shocked by the price of an inter-city train from London. The tube seems ok, but try heading out past the tube limits and your wallet will be substantially lighter! I'm guessing it has only got worse.