gandalph

Hello Pot, Have you met Kettle?

That's why its called a COMPARISON FT . If it just listed one aircraft type or brand, or type or one engine type or brand it wouldn't be a comparison it would be a data point. C'mon FT lift your game, who's dredging the bottom of the barrel now?

Oh Oscar! Someone must've told you by now. Size isn't important!

True KA. I was responding to Nev's mention of the "windmill" at Old Bar. That's what happens when I don't include the quote from the post I was responding to - laziness on my part!

The windmill was actually a ferris wheel. Makes no difference - it still shouldn't have been there

Could be a typo or it could be a mod to the aircraft. Is it critical to the preliminary incident report? Would we prefer to have waited a few more days to make sure the engine model was reported correctly? What do the rest of the armchair experts who weren't at the scene think????? FFS!

Is there any reason to think otherwise?

Just received in my email inbox. Recreational Avaiation Australia RAA Facebook RAA Twitter Advice to members regarding recent fatalities RAAus is saddened to advise members of two recent fatal accidents. Our thoughts are with all concerned at this very difficult time. Dubbo, NSW A man died in an accident south of Dubbo near his property on 10 March 2016 while looking to land his Rotax 912ULS powered Savannah aircraft. Preliminary evidence observed at the accident site in addition to witness statements indicate the engine appeared to be operating at impact. To fully examine the engine NSW Police are conducting a supervised engine tear down. The post impact fire consumed much of the aircraft, including the instrumentation, flight control systems and surfaces. Initial investigations however suggest there is unlikely to be any mechanical or maintenance related issues associated with this accident. Our preliminary assessment of the evidence appears to support a possible loss of control at low level with the cause as yet undetermined. RAAus will continue to work with authorities on the investigation and advise members again once we have more information. *Name of the pilot yet to be formally released. Yarrawonga, VIC Mr Ian Cook and Mr Vu Quoc died while flying a Rotax 912ULS powered weightshift microlight Airborne XT912 on Sunday 13 March 2016. RAAus attended the scene and are working with police as this investigation is still in the very early stages. Preliminary investigations indicate no mechanical or maintenance related issues are associated with the accident. RAAus will continue to work with the police and witnesses to fully explore the circumstances surrounding this accident. These two recent accidents serve as devastating reminders of how unforgiving our sport can be. RAAus remains committed to keeping our sport safe and fun and we ask that all members continue to adhere to our core safety messages. You can find more information about our safety programs on our website under the heading safety. Michael CEO CEO [email protected] General Enquiries [email protected] Pilot and Student Enquiries [email protected] Aircraft Enquiries [email protected] ASIC Enquiries [email protected] Hero Image Recreational Aviation Australia Unit 3/1 Pirie Street PO Box 1265, Fyshwick ACT 2609 T: +61 2 6280 4700 | F: 02 6280 4775 E: [email protected] | W: www.raa.asn.au This email was sent by Recreational Aviation Australia Inc., Recreational Aviation Australia, 3/1 Pirie Street, Fyshwick, ACT 2904, Australia to [email protected] Unsubscribe

I don't think that's correct Merv. There's been no brief so far on the Millard incident so I'm not sure we can say what triggers a brief.

Thanks MM.

Thanks Nong and Nev. Good points to ponder there.

I'm about to start work redesigning the panel on our plane. The existing Turn & Bank instrument has expired and is beyond economical repair. This raised some questions in my mindabout suitable replacement instruments, so I thought I would search the collected wisdom of the group. So my questions are: 1. Should I fit a T&B or a turn coordinator? Your opinions as to which you would choose and why, would be appreciated. 2. Vacuum or electronic powered? Again, which and why would you choose? The panel will have an MGL Enigma EMS which can also be configured to act as an EFIS but we want "steam gauges" as our primary flight instruments with the MGL in EFIS MODE acting as backup. I would welcome your thoughts and opinions your preferred type of gauge as well as any feedback on the MGL Enigma.

I think you've probably answered your own question. Perhaps if the fuel that you say was leaking so copiously had been able to get to the engine there might have been no need for the forced landing. Waddya reckon?

Geez Nev! You're a tough audience!

Oscar asked: "If there was an outbreak of lead fouling across the airfield, was there any action taken to investigate the fuel batch?" Well I'll beat FT to the gun and ask: IF there was an outbreak of dud avgas at the field, why didn't Jabiru damn well do something about it? To have not taken immediate action is clearly another indication of their contempt for the Australian flying community and their appalling lack of something or other....

Not if the contract is accepted......

As if they don't have enough trouble already.......

Sorry Mate - No plans to rebuild you.

Russ, If you search YouTube for "Flight Chops" you'll find a heap of videos and lots of shots of how and where Steve mounts his go-pro's. I'm pretty sure all of his exterior cameras are mounted using clamps to wing struts; gear legs; and tail lift handles while most of his inside cameras are suction mounted. I wouldn't be comfortable trusting my $300 GoPro to a suction mount at altitude and speed.

$50k to make FT go way..... Bargain!

Interesting FT. What is the "community standard" you say Jabiru should meet? Is that enunciated somewhere in the CASA lexicon? Perhaps the FAA has such a beast? What abut the Europeans, they must surely have one we could adopt??? Would I be right to I assume that you mean that ALL engines used in aircraft need to meet your "community standard" not just Jabiru?

Oh FT! The moon will be up soon. Shouldn't you be taking your medications and closing the lid?

Here it is Nobody, and anybody else for that matter.... Hello Jabiru Fleet, We believe that the ATSB are today releasing their report on “Engine Failures and Malfunctions in Light Aeroplanes” It would appear that CASA may have been waiting on this report to be released before they are prepared to make changes to the limitations imposed on Jabiru powered aircraft. We were provided with a copy of this final report prior to release (on 02/03/2016) for comment. We provided feedback highlighting the inaccuracies of data used by the ATSB to form their conclusions however it appears the report may have been already printed and will be released. With a view to providing you, our owners and operators, updates and communication on the scope of works being done around the lifting of the limitations, below are extracts from the correspondence sent highlighting inaccuracies and the ATSB responses. We are as always, determined and committed to the advancement of safe, affordable recreational aviation in Australia and to the health of the Jabiru fleet. Despite the many setbacks faced, Jabiru, and the spirit on which it was founded lives on! Happy Landings From the Team at Jabiru We have received the latest version of the report AO-2013-107 and letter of the 2/3/2016 and raise the following points in response. It is very important that these are reviewed prior to release of the Final report. 6. Higher risk engine failures 1 Jabiru comments: An engine failure in a single-engine aeroplane can have a variety of safety consequences depending on the extent of the failure, phase of flight, pilot response and availability of suitable landing areas and the inherent safety features of the aircraft structure and performance at stall speed. (Structural safety features provide defences that stand between the occurrence and the outcome (ARMS) eg. Jabiru flight controls are positioned so as not to contact the torso in an accident, there is also head clearance, sacrificial undercarriage and above ASTM standard reserve factors for the composite structure.) ATSB response: Noted ATSB action: Change to report ATSB comments: The ATSB applies the event risk classification (ERC) to all 7,000 occurrences entered into the database each year. This is achieved through detailed rule-based process that depends on the circumstances to the occurrence and size and type of aircraft. However, it is impractical to consider the safety features of the airframe for every make and model of aircraft involved in occurrences reported to the ATSB beyond protection provided by an aeroplane compared to aircraft such as microlight trikes. In addition, the application of such rules would require referencing empirical crash worthiness findings for all aircraft makes and models. Similarly, it is impractical to establish the aircraft performance at stall speed for every make and model of aircraft involved in occurrences reported to the ATSB. Text has been added to the report as a footnote to note that the ATSB ERC ratings do not take these two things into account. Jabiru comments: By not including crashworthiness in the risk assessment, ATSB is biasing the report against Jabiru and not including a crucial part of the ARMS methodology upon which it is relying for the safety argument. (Stall speeds and MTOW are not difficult to find for the aircraft makes and models and fatality statistics are readily obtained from the ATSB database search facility.) Also it should be noted that Jabiru aircraft have been certified to BCARS Section S airworthiness standard which requires at S 143 a) The aeroplane must be safely controllable and manoeuvrable during; 6) sudden engine failure. Jabiru suggests, if it is too difficult to include quantitative crash-worthiness data for the aircraft, then, at the very least, an additional note be included in the report which gives the fatality statistics, indicating that in the 18 serious incidents listed, there were three fatal accidents, none of which involved JABIRU aircraft, even though JABIRU did have three occurrences. 5. Comparable engines Jabiru comments: The use of the words “comparable engines” is very misleading. Jabiru, Rotax, Lycoming, Continental etc. are very different in weight, size, cost, performance and certification levels. The LSA category allows engine certification levels with significant endurance differences as an example. A note to this effect should be added. ATSB response: Not accepted ATSB action: No action required ATSB comments: The Jabiru 2200 is 2.2lt capacity, 62.8kg and produces 80hp and the 3300 is 3.3lt, 83.5kg and 120hp. The most common Continental engine in the study is the O-200 which is 3.29lt, 77.2kg and produces 90 - Page 6 of 13 100hp. The most common Lycoming engine is the O-235 which is 3.823lt, 108.9kg and produces 100 – 135hp. Whereas the most common Rotax, the 912, is 1.21lt, 60lt and 80hp. Comparing these engines puts the Jabiru engines in the middle for capacity, weight and power output. Additionally, all these engines are internal combustion piston engines, four stoke, and air cooled (except the liquid cooled cylinder heads on the 912) with horizontally opposed cylinders. The ATSB therefore disagree with the statement that our comparison is ‘very misleading’ and that these engines are ‘very different’. The comment about the endurance applies to all engines in the LSA category and does not bias Jabiru any more than Rotax. Jabiru comments: It should be noted that comparing the reliability of engines that have been designed to the higher FAR33 (CAR13) airworthiness standard (used in Normal Category aircraft) to engines that has been designed to JAR-22H is extremely biased. These 2 standards are significantly different in requirements for endurance and to be fair, this fact should be noted in the Final report. (The different design standards specify varying compliance requirements, and rigor to which compliance must be demonstrated. The different designs standards are one method the NAA uses to identify and manage differing levels of safety between different classes of aircraft. A FAR 33 (CAR13) engine, for instance, is eligible to be fitted to a transport category aircraft where as a JAR 22H engine is only eligible to be fitted to a two seat recreational aircraft.) Furthermore, to make a comparison between the reliability of different engine manufacturers and then use this information to draw safety recommendations, even if these are "comparable engines", is inappropriate as there is no grounding of the results against the design standard requirements. JABIRU notes an EASA comment, made in 2011 "Annual Safety Recommendations Review" which reads "Certification Specifications ( standards) CS 23 for normal, Utility, Aerobatic and Commuter Aeroplanes, and CS-E for Engines, do not take a probabilistic approach to piston engine failure. Reference to minor or major severity classifications to piston engine failures are therefore inappropriate for this class of aircraft. ( Remember that this is a higher class of aircraft than the sport and recreational aircraft that have been considered in the ASTB report) For piston engines, CS-E-210 requires that a failure analysis be performed to establish that no single fault could lead to unsafe engine conditions beyond the normal control of the flight crew. While no specific reliability target is given, state-of-art engines typically achieve loss of power rates of between 10-3 and 10-5/flight hour. Aircraft are certificated on the basis of assured continued safe flight or landing following engine failure. in effect CS-23 mitigates the consequence of engine failure, for instance by controlling stall speed, and structural crashworthiness for single engine aircraft, or by requiring investigation of handling qualities and performance of multiple engine aeroplanes with a failure engine. However, it cannot be excluded that, under some conditions, the effect of engine partial or complete loss of power at aircraft level remain more severe than minor or even major, but the overall safety objective can still be met considering the reduced exposure time to such conditions. While the Agency will continue to monitor accident/incident trends, and related causal factors, there is currently no safety/economic data to support changing airworthiness standard in order to increase piston engine reliability." Now given that engine failures are occurring, an evaluation of the types of aircraft level incidents/accidents which follow these loss of power events, draws questions on respect to whether the aircraft design does meet the aircraft design standards for "continued safe flight and landing following a power loss", and on the airman-ship which is involved, i.e. loss of control on approach, being an indication of aircraft handling problems, to name just a few. Is the ATSB proposing to address this with a follow investigation into the causal factors relating to fatal accidents? The two reported failures of studs (data not shown in Figure 10) were reported at 1,183 and 438 hours in service. Jabiru overhaul manuals currently require a top end overhaul after 1,000 hours and a full overhaul after 2,000 hours, with the engine through-bolts and studs being replaced at both overhauls. It can be seen from Figure 10, however, that most of the failed through-bolts (19 of 21) did not make it to the 1,000-hour mark.12 Furthermore, seven throughbolts (and one stud) failed before 500 hours. Jabiru Comment: Jabiru Engine Life Limitations are based on "engine time", which is the time between engine start and engine shut down, not "Flight Time". JABIRU is aware that it has been common practice to schedule engine maintenance against "flight time" this is particularly the case for the 2009-2014 period where most flight training operations were recording flight time instead of engine time. With this in mind, those failures between 800 - 1000 hrs are likely to be at least equal to but more probably greater that 1000 hour engines. Refer JSL010-1 Nov 2014. This needs to be noted in the Final report. In the set of 21 through-bolt failures reported to the ASTB between 2009 and 2014 the following operation types were represented: • Flight training – 10 occurrences • Private – 5 occurrences • Unknown – 6 occurrences. Not including the unknown operation types, five of the through-bolt failures occurred in aircraft not involved in flight training. Engine hours data is known for four of the five. For these four aircraft the total engine hours before the through-bolt failures were 675.8, 1,600, 390.8 and 782.5. Jabiru Comment : Factually INCORRECT There are NO through bolt occurrences listed for 2009 -2014 that were aircraft engines that had not been used in a flight training facility. These eleven references below involved aircraft used for flight training and have not been recorded/reported as flight training occurrences in the ATSB supplied spreadsheet. ATSB reference 201000248 ATSB reference 201004434 ATSB reference 201004666 ATSB reference 201004699 ATSB reference 201008980 ATSB reference 201106841 ATSB reference 201107115 ATSB reference 201300563 ATSB reference 201403744 ATSB reference 201403769 ATSB reference 201403775 20. Through-bolt fracture analyses Jabiru comments: The drawing of conclusions based purely of statistical analysis without an in-depth knowledge of the timing of the application of the Jabiru Through bolt Service Bulletins by the individual operators is dangerous. This is a very complex analysis and requires consideration of the many factors including the experience of the installer of the through bolts and the variability of the application of Loctite for the earlier Service Bulletins. Without study of log books and a depth of knowledge of the through bolt configurations that evolved, incorrect conclusions have been drawn in these 2 pages. These 2 pages need to either be deleted or rewritten after consultation with Jabiru. Jabiru has thorough research into Page 11 of 13 through bolt failures which must be understood by technical persons in ASTB before this document is made publicly available. ATSB response: Partially accepted ATSB action: Change to report ATSB comments: The scope of this ATSB research investigation was to determine whether there were any issues related to the reliability of light aircraft engines. The investigation report has achieved this aim, establishing that through-bolt fractures and valve train failures have been occurring at a disproportionate rate on Jabiru engines relative to other engine manufacturers. The information on pages 19 and 20 is factually correct. The Jabiru response does not offer any evidence or reason as to why it is not factually correct. As part of their Draft Report response Jabiru have supplied an engineering report (dated 19 November 2015, after the ATSB draft report was received) which examines the cause of through bolt failures. The results of report have now been documented in the Final ATSB report. Jabiru comments: See above list of flight training school aircraft misreported/misclassified. 25. Occurrence check Jabiru comments: Jabiru is now in the process of checking the list of 134 engine related occurrences. Please note that only since June 2012, has the ATSB supplied Jabiru with ICAO Annex 13 Chapter 4 Accident and Serious Incident Notifications. 45 notifications from the earlier period covered by the report, starting at 2009, have recently been requested by Jabiru to assist with the verification of the occurrences. These have been received. To date Jabiru has not been given any notification from ASTB of the 58 occurrences categorised as incidents. Any assistance with details of these occurrences that can assist with tractability, will aid the verification of the statistics presented in AR-2013-107. These are 12 occurrences that should be checked and the statistics adjusted accordingly ATSB response: Partially accepted ATSB action: Change to report ATSB comments: The ATSB reviewed all of Jabiru comments in the Excel spreadsheet of data provided by the ATSB. Adjustments were made where appropriate. In particular, some duplicate occurrences were removed. However, some suggested duplicates were confirmed to be separate occurrences. Anything that resulted in an inflight engine failure or malfunction (apart from fuel exhaustion or starvation) remains coded as an engine failure or malfunction as per the ATSB coding practices. The reasons why the engine failures were (if they were not already) coded as safety factors in the ATSB database. Other safety factor information provided by Jabiru were used to updates some records where appropriate. In addition, Jabiru supplied further amendments to the data in the Excel spreadsheet on 17 February 2016. The ATSB has assessed these additional changes in the same way as above and made changes where appropriate. All of the data presented in the Final report has been updated following a repeated data analysis after the ATSB database records were updated. Jabiru comments: The ATSB figures still include a fuel exhaustion occurrence for Jabiru. At Page 1 · a rough running engine (coughing, spluttering, etc) Jabiru Comment: Should be expanded to include - which may be caused by an internal engine problem or alternatively caused either by external influences like carburettor icing, bird strike, all propeller issues, fuel contamination, dirty spark plugs, insects in the carburettor intake, or by unapproved methods of operation, part modifications and poor maintenance which is outside of the control of the Engine manufacturer. These factors which the public do not associate with engine malfunction have been mainly disguised in the report with no mention until page 13. Maintenance issues contribute significantly to many of the occurrences yet have largely been obscured by the classification and reporting system that bases the report.

Yes Nev, that's the most sensible idea. I presume that function is within the power of the moderators? Is there a procedure for making that suggestion to the Mods or do we wait for them to notice and act?

So there can be twice the opinions with half the undertanding?