Jump to content

Happyflyer

Members
  • Posts

    1,052
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    7

Posts posted by Happyflyer

  1. If you go only half way and institute Oz style Espace from 1200 feet you will require transponders from 1200 feet. Is this what Dick wants or does he want transponder less Espace. (I don't think CASA, AirServices or RPT would like that). Dick Smith does not make policy for aviation in Australia. The cautionary approach would cast the worst case scenario!!!

    Of course Dick doesn’t make aviation policy for Australia (unless he goes back CASA again). He is entitled to put his view out there as are we all. I don’t think CASA and ASA are doing such a wonderful job that we should not discuss change, and copying a successful system is one avenue of discussion. The most cautionary approach of course would be to kill GA by over regulation, which many believe is happening.

     

     

  2. Still don't believe we'll see a viable EP aircraft anytime soon. $30k for a spare battery with a 1000 charge capability for 1.5 hrs per charge, nah not yet! Nothing matches the output of a modern infernal combustion engine for power per pound of fuel. Battery weight, battery cost, very poor endurance risks associated with fast charging Lithium batteries, ability to charge them away from convenient locations as well as the distances that Australia has which aircraft often need to transverse will make EP aircraft for now not practicable, might be alright in the circuit for training and in Europe. Lots of organisations will be hesitant to invest in these at present. Remember when aircraft manufacturers got excited about diesel power planes & Porsche engines? Failed miserably. Still that's just my take on it, a personal opinion, see you back in here in 20 years to see how it's all going

    I don’t think you’ll have to wait 20yrs! I’m surprised that we now have an electric training aircraft in use so soon.

    1903: “The horse is here to stay but the automobile is only a novelty – a fad.” — President of the Michigan Savings Bank advising Henry Ford’s lawyer, Horace Rackham, not to invest in the Ford Motor Company.

     

     

    • Like 1
    • Haha 1
  3. Yes, I should have said until the VFR reporting points. Sorry.But the fact remains that, under Dick's proposals (as best as anyone can pin him down to detail) a move to E would not impact on controlled tower operations in C.

     

    What you might see is E coming down to a lower level than 1200 beneath the C rather than the current G.

     

    One of the problems is pinning him down to provide detail rather than self-serving statements derogatory of anyone with a contrary opinion. Another is that all aircraft will need to be fitted with Tx for the system to have a chance of working and my bet is that this would be ADSB. That's an expense I would not want to face.

     

    Kaz

    Kaz, you keep on saying, as fact, that all aircraft would be required to have a transponder in E under Dick’s proposal. Is this a scare tactic to put people off it?

    As I understand his proposal, it is US class E and that has no requirement for transponders. This has been pointed out to you before. Where do you get your information about making transponders mandatory from?

     

     

  4. I am advised that the Accident RV7 had been covered in a shrink wrap type coating instead of being painted. I had not heard of this technique but is supposed to be popular??Appears this shrink wrap may have lifted and caused a control surface flutter leading to the inflight breakup?

    That's interesting. Can you tell us who came to that conclusion please?

     

     

    • Like 1
  5. Dick has made no mention of any variation of E limits from the 1200' level and transponders (ADSB?) will be mandatory. A lot of gliders, antique aeroplanes and ultralights don't have the power source to run a Tx so they will have not much sky to fly in as best as I can figure it.Kaz

    Somehow they manage that in the US so I'm sure we could find a way.

     

     

  6. Going back to the topic. It is becoming clear that Dick's agenda is a substantial reduction In G and major increase in E emulating his favoured FAA scenario.I wonder what RAPAC and RAAus think about that?

     

    Mandatory radio and transponders of course.

     

    And perhaps he believes in reincarnation?

     

    Kaz

    Of course if we adopt part of the FAA system we may also go to US class E which has no radio or transponder requirement.

    https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/17_phak_ch15.pdf

     

     

  7. On the subject of Beaver flying characteristics you may be interested in this from the PPRuN forum on this subject. Sea Plane down in Hawksbury - Page 4 - PPRuNe Forums

     

    Aviation Investigation Report A15Q0120 - Transportation Safety Board of Canada

     

    Quote:

     

    In the controlled conditions of certification, the stalling of the DHC-2 was described as gentle. However, as is the case for many other aircraft, a stall in a steep turn under power triggers an Incipient spin with few or no signs of an impending stall, and the flight path changes from horizontal to vertical. In low-altitude flight, stalling followed by incipient spin, no matter how brief, prevents the pilot from regaining control of the aircraft before impact with the ground.

     

    Quote:

     

    In 2014, Transport Canada and the manufacturer, Viking Air Limited, recommended that stall warning systems be installed, but only 4 have been installed on Canadian‑registered DHC-2s. There are currently 382 DHC-2s registered in Canada, 223 of which are used in commercial operations.

     

    Level of risk is determined by the probability and severity of adverse consequences. Given the number of DHC-2s without a stall warning system in commercial operations, combined with the fact that low-altitude manoeuvres are an integral part of bush flying, it is reasonable to conclude that a stall at low altitude is likely to occur again. Because stalls at low altitude lead to catastrophic consequences, this type of accident carries a high level of risk.

     

    Until, at a minimum, commercially operated DHC-2s registered in Canada are required to be equipped with a stall warning system, pilots and passengers who travel on these aircraft will remain exposed to an elevated risk of injury or death as a result of a stall at low altitude.

     

    Therefore, the Board recommends that

     

    the Department of Transport require all commercially operated DHC‑2 aircraft in Canada to be equipped with a stall warning system.

     

    TSB Recommendation A17-01

     

    Appendix C – TSB aviation investigation reports on accidents involving aircraft that stalled and were not equipped with stall warning system

     

    Quote:

     

    Accident Type Fatalities Summary

     

    A14O0105 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The float-equipped DHC-2 Beaver aircraft (registration C‑FHVT, serial number 284) rolled to the left prior to the flare. The pilot attempted to regain control of the aircraft by applying full right rudder and right aileron. The attempt was unsuccessful, and the aircraft struck rising tree‑covered terrain above the shoreline. The aircraft came to a stop on its right side and on a slope. Two of the 3 people on board received minor injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A12O0071 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FGBR, serial number 168) stalled and crashed during a go-around while attempting to land. Two of the 3 people on board drowned. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A11C0100 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GUJX, serial number 1132) stalled and crashed during takeoff. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A10Q0117 DHC-2 Beaver 2 The DHC-2 amphibious floatplane (registration C–FGYK, serial number 123) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Two of the 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A09P0397 DHC-2 Beaver 6 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GTMC, serial number 1171) stalled and crashed during takeoff. Six of the 8 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft was equipped with a stall warning system, but it was not functioning, and the TSB identified this as a cause or contributing factor.

     

    A08A0095 DHC-2 Beaver 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FPQC, serial number 873) stalled and crashed while the crew was attempting a forced landing. Five of the 7 people on board sustained serious injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A05Q0157 DHC-2 Beaver 1 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) stalled and crashed during takeoff. The pilot, who was the sole person on board, received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A04C0098 DHC-2 Beaver 4 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GQHT, serial number 682) stalled and crashed on approach. The 4 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A01Q0166 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GPUO, serial number 810) stalled and crashed on approach. Three of the 7 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the TSB found this to be a risk factor.

     

    A01P0194 DHC-2 Beaver 5 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GVHT, serial number 257) stalled and crashed on approach. All 5 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system; the TSB noted this fact under "Other findings."

     

    A00Q0006 DHC-2 Beaver 3 The DHC-2 (registration C-FIVA, serial number 515) stalled and crashed while climbing. Three of the 6 people on board received fatal injuries. The aircraft had no stall warning system.

     

    A98P0194 DHC-2 Beaver

     

    (modified: maximum weight increased) 0 The DHC-2 floatplane (registration C-GCZA, serial number 1667) stalled and crashed following a missed approach. None of the people on board were injured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The aircraft had no stall warning system, and the fact that the pilot had no warning of the impending stall was identified by the TSB as a cause or contributing factor in this occurrence.

     

     

    • Like 3
    • Informative 1
  8. As this is an Aviation forum it may have had serious personal aviation consequences. As Depp's party came and went in chartered aircraft the PiC has responsibility for the Flight, Aircraft and all on it. His signature was on the documentation that certified that those particular flights met ALL Australian entry conditions. As such it could have been the PiC' License in jeopardy thus his career.

    A Qantas captain is not responsible for a false declaration by one of his passengers. When I fly a charter flight I don't search my passengers luggage for illegal substances. In this case I would suggest the pilot was entitled to believe his employers would fill out their entry declaration cards in relation to the dogs correctly. Amber Heard did not, that's why she was charged. The pilot did nothing wrong otherwise he old have been charged.

     

     

    • Agree 1
  9. No doubt Geoff you are aiming at me that is OK I can handle that, only a small time swipe at me. When one stands up to be counted that is the normal treatment but we will move on to all those things which are at play and not too many get to have them highlighted.However have you looked into the truth behind the Jabiru issue? When you have time go and get your angle on the manoeuvring.

     

    The big one ---- the lobbying to get enough votes to change the structure of RAAus to a company from what we knew. Delve about and get that information you will be shocked.

     

    What about the China flying schools? RAAus had the opportunity to have some of that business but egos got in the way.

     

    There are three for you to contemplate, Geoff. Just a disgrace more members are not told.

     

    I try and get people thinking about what is going on but most look at the situation for holes and reply. Not to many look to understand what is happening.

     

    KP.

    Keith, can you, in plain English, with no riddles, winks or nudges tell us what RAAus did that was so bad in relation to Jabiru, tell us what we should be shocked about in relation to the RAAus restructure and tell us how RAAUs should have been involve in training Chinese airline pilots?

    If you've got no facts or are not prepared to present them perhaps silence would be a smarter option.

     

     

    • Like 1
    • Agree 1
  10. Well obviously you have not bothered to taken any notice at all.Part149 and Part103 have had their implementation dates postponed, so we have had to re write everything. Then to add some fun the goal posts had some wheels engineered into the design of them.

    KP

    So why have you had to re write everything just because the implementation date has changed?

     

     

  11. Just saw this on the RAA website under Accident and Defect Summaries:5/12/2017 Ballina Airport QLD Eurofox 3K Rotax 912 ULS A pilot conducted flight, YBAF to YBNA, which is security controlled with RPT operations, without va...

     

    A pilot conducted flight, YBAF to YBNA, which is security controlled with RPT operations, without valid ASIC card.

    I wonder who the poor bugger was? Plenty of self congratulation going on at Ballina security central I'm sure. Another major terrorist plot foiled by the ASIC scheme!

     

     

    • Like 1
×
×
  • Create New...