Roundsounds
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Everything posted by Roundsounds
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Assuming you’d been monitoring the CTAF after engine start you’d have heard ABC make their inbound call. It would have taken more than 6 mins to start, taxi, complete pre-takeoff checks and get airborne. Why would you turn crosswind before sighting ABC? Situational awareness in the aviation context by definition is about gathering information, comprehending the information and projecting forward to avoid surprises like the one you’ve given as an example. CASA guidance on SA -
This discussion is about Class G airports. Legislation only allows 6 aircraft in the circuit at a class d airport.
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No offence taken, BTW I hold both GA and RAA quals. I doubt your Sonex would be any more difficult to operate whilst jotting down basic traffic details than a Tiger Moth or Pitts S1? I’m not suggesting anyone write an essay, it is easy to jot down call sign, type, position and time on a kneepad, it’s about being prepared. Develop your own shorthand, the process of jotting down the details helps with memory. Most things happen in 6 min blocks - a circuit typically takes 6 mins, the average bug smasher takes 6 mins to fly 10NM. This helps develop / maintain the mental picture, which in turn aids in anticipating any potential conflicts - a key aspect of SA. The blind reliance on PEDs for flight planning and navigation has resulted in basic SA skills being lost. I have witnessed this happen over the past 25 years, which coincides with an increase in midair collisions in Class G airspace.
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No wonder the rate of airprox events and collisions are on the increase. If a person cannot jot down basic traffic information, form and maintain a mental picture of traffic whilst flying they need to hand in their licence or certificate. I would not let a student pilot go solo until they could demonstrate these basic skills. These skills aren’t being taught by the many half baked instructors currently operating in the industry.
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Sounds like you need some training in Situational Awareness. A big part of SA is projecting what threats you may encounter.
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That’s not how you maintain SA, no wonder you need constant broadcasts. You cannot maintain a mental picture without the aid of a list of traffic and their details.
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ARO, have you read the latest guidance material from CASA on non-towered airport ops? Do you jot down traffic to help form / maintain SA or rely totally on continuous broadcasts? Link to AC 91-10
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One person cannot annoy or upset another person, it’s their choice whether that are annoyed or upset by your words. That is a fact.
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In this wonderful country we all free to express our opinions.
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I managed to see the whole show, your assumptions are spot on.
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Aside from ramblings by a range of self promoting keyboard experts there is no evidence of AI-171 being linked to mental health issues (or aircraft system faults).
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Air Nippon beat Virgin to it and managed over 130 degrees angle of bank. link to JTSB report
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Have been twice, both times camped on-site near the Red Shed and can highly recommend it. Went to WalMart to pick up basic camping gear, left it with some locals for their grandkids to use.
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I’m pretty sure this aircraft was used as a training airframe at Padstow TAFE for many years. A guy from Camden bought it and restored it to flying condition late 1990s.
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Let’s focus on the AAIB report and not speculate. So you’re speculating the AAIB, FAA, BOEING and GE are all covering up both Left and Right FADECs failed within 1 second of each other, then around 10 seconds later they recovered? Speaking of cowboys, if the 737 MAX crew had followed SOPs neither of those aircraft would have crashed.
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Not to shut down both engines. The systems architecture ensures this cannot occur.
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The ignorant people who dream up this sort of rubbish obviously don’t understand the certification requirements for these types of airplane.
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Maybe you should review what you’ve written against what you’ve quoted from the report. The report doesn’t say a signal to the fuel firewall shutoff valves caused them to close, it says the fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF. There’s no suggestion of a software or system logic failure. Facts are both FCS weren’t moved from RUN to CUTOFF causing a loss of thrust. What is not know is how or why this occurred. To suggest a software fault caused the loss of thrust; - ignores the report findings - displays a lack of understanding of Air Transport Category aircraft design criteria.
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What makes this a great write up? It makes statements contrary to the AAIB report.
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Cycling the FCS is a part of the dual eng failure memory items. The FCS weren’t cycled CUTOFF, then RUN, they were both moved to CUTOFF, then 10 plus secs later back to RUN. This not IAW the published memory items.
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In the event of a dual engine failure the B787 starts the APU without crew action, which the report says it had commenced. There must have been sufficient RPM for the start sequence as the Left engine had relit and was starting to spoil up again.
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It can be done, just not a procedure. If both places to CUTOFF in sequence the delay of 1 sec is reasonable.
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The only way to start a B787 is via the EEC Autostart function, you cannot complete a manual start in a B787. There is no doubt the FCS were moved to CUTOFF and subsequently returned to RUN. The only questions to be answered is who and why?
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What the “experts” on this site are missing is the fact engine systems operate independently. There is no way a software fault could cause both engines to fail within 1 second of each other. There is no doubt both fuel control switches were moved to cutoff, then 10 seconds or so later back to run. What hasn’t been established is who did it and why.
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I don’t know what you watched, but I can guarantee you there are no indications of fuel valve positions in a B787 displayed during takeoff.
