Oscar

Lone Eagle at Clifton has a Drifter.

And here was me, thinking that EMUs have an insoluble weight/wing area problem.

Roscoe's 170 is so schmick as to cause drool on the lips of older Jab owners (aka, me).

This is a first trial of a new panel arrangement I've been working on for our LSA55, to incorporate a full iPad (though it'll probably be an iPad Air by the time we get to install it!) Obviously, all the instruments, switches etc. are cardboard cut-outs with faces printed on them... and we've decided to cut back the 'step' around the iPad to give more shin room. We put the iPad in portrait so a track-up provides best view of the track ahead. It's a drop-in to the standard LSA55 panel mount fittings; the iron primaries and the MGL 'extreme' mini efis plus the radio and transponder sit in a reaward projecting 'shelf' that provides about 50mm of shade for the iPad. ( and yes, it's shape is asymetric so the PIC has good vision out of the rh bottom corner of the windscreen). We intend to have cut-outs in the panel behind the iPad and some air tubes pointed at the general direction of the footwell air vents for ventilation to the iPad in hot weather. There's a spot large enough for an iPad mini in front of the pax. by mounting the Hobbes on the side of the binnacle and moving the iron Oil temp. down into its location. As an old fart who needs bi-focals, I prefer analogue instruments as far as possible, so a sweep of the panel can check the needles.. but we might replace the vacuum A/H with an XAvion display. And the panel-mount dual throttles may well be not installed; I have a few ideas, but might just stick with the standard crotch-grabber set-up. Would appreciate comments from regular users of Ozrunways / Avplan.

The Libelle is certainly tight, even for medium-sized guys - you put it on rather than get in....

Phil - you ride a Viffer? Mine is an '86, the Rocket Ron Haslam blue one... love it.

Did about 296k of a 300K attempt out of Leeton in a CS ( not CS77); didn't like it much, I preferred the Boomerang!. The CS just didn't have penetration; it climbed well but you lost gobs of height chasing the next cloud. The Is28 was really not much to get excited about, a Blanik is generally nicer. The IS29D2 was SWEET. A Libelle H201b even nicer, other than for the lack of reflex cruise flap. A race-prepared Hornet, Christmas on a twig. We were taught to keep our fingers on the release knob for winch launch and our elbow on the cockpit side to keep from having the bumps joggle the arm; a properly adjusted TOST release requires a firm pull. I haven't winch-launched in other than Blaniks, but for a Blanik, the minimum modified circuit decision parameters are 400 feet AND 50 kts established. Blanik brakes are strong, and I've landed from cable breaks straight ahead from 400 with a split-Rse S-turn and full brakes down to the deck, and a modified circuit from 600(ish), very comfortably. Headwind component makes a significant difference to a decision to go the modified circuit.

For a bit of an eye-opener on just how different the level of performance between a good glider and an average LSA with no power is, have a look at this cable-break video: Skip to 2.30 and kill the music.. Given the lengthy discussions of other threads re EFATO and turn-backs, (a cable break is the glider equivalent of an instantaneous EFATO in a very steep climb-out) a few things are worth noting. The young pilot should have had his hand on the release knob (this was a practice cable-break initiated by the instructor, as you can see when the yellow cable-release handle pulls back sharply twice), and just by happenstance, at just above 400 feet which is generally accepted as the minimum decision height for a turn-back - if you have 400 feet and 50 kts. with flight stabilised in positive G, for a decent glider you can execute a turn-back in calm conditions. BUT you MUST get rid of the cable instantly. That these were ideal conditions: note the wind turbines NOT turning Other than that, this is copybook: stick instantly full forward, hold until well nose-down, ease back (pause at 3:14 and note just how much nose-down attitude as he starts to pull back on the stick - and he has his hand on the brake lever in case of too much speed gain) and regain full positive G BEFORE any attempt is made to turn. You can see that this is the sequence from the shoulder-strap loose end, that floats up under negative G on the push-over, then settles back down as the nose is gently lifted to hold the speed. Then fairly gentle and well co-ordinated turns but a tight circuit that ends up with more than adequate height for final - he's pulling the brakes before the threshold. Damn nice job by the young pilot - note he even taps the altimeter to ensure it is registering correctly on downwind, and has already set trim for circuit speed before that ( 3:21).. And - for the STOL devotees - eat you hearts out if the acceleration you get when releasing the brakes doesn't flick the loose end of your shoulder strap back over your shoulder (check out from about 2:56) and you are at 400 feet 14 seconds later....

DJP - with respect, I believe the ATSB report stated that the cockpit buckling meant that 'the occupants were no longer adequately restrained.' The comment you have quoted is: 'together with the effect of the impact forces' etc. the accident was considered not survivable. I read this as: 'due to the cockpit sides buckling, the occupants were not restrained from impacting the deformed structure.' I guess we won't know until the coronial report, whether the cause of death was fatal crushing of organs etc. due to deceleration forces fed through the restraint harnesses, or blunt force trauma of impact of (usually) the cranium into a structural component. Let's both hold judgement on that. On the aerodynamic contention: the ATSB report suggests that it was right on the thin edge of uncontrollability - but on the correct side of that edge. You know that the POH figures are derived with a margin for safety - but they are derived in 'normal' conditions. The RV6 has a well-known problem with elevator authority in an engine-out situation.

Yet another RV6 kills its occupants by structural failure of the cockpit. Let's get this straight: the INCIDENT was initiated (probably) by carburettor icing causing an engine stoppage. The ACCIDENT was caused by aerodynamic problems related to weight and airspeed leading to loss of control. (The ATSB report is deficient in not recognising the typical RV6 loss of elevator authority at lower speeds in the case of no prop wash, though that is more pronounced as an inability to round-out rather than any inability to lower the nose to prevent a stall occurring). The FATAL INJURIES to the occupants resulted from deformation of the cockpit structure.

HA! - actually, Nev, you're wrong for trikes - for the about 0.05% of humans who have the skills. I watched the Bates twins, Neil and Rick, fanging around their backyard track when they were about 8 - 10 years old, on trikes. ( Neil was Australian Rallye champion something like four times, I think; Rick was a journeyman driver for companies like Porsche, and maybe still leads the Holden Driver stunt team if it still exists). They used to flick the things into the turns, lift the inside wheel, and power-slide around the corner markers with the inside wheel hanging maybe two feet in the air. Maybe there are genetics involved - some people have the ability to manage the man-machine interface without any apparent formal understanding of the physics. Both their parents, Dick and Carol, were and remain superb drivers. Some people can do things in airplanes that seem to defy the physics involved - but it is impossible to defy the physics, they are just micro-managing the changing situation at a rate of reaction the rest of us cannot manage. Just because most of us cannot do the same level of micro-management, doesn't mean it is a false premise. Witness Sidney Cotton, experiencing an engine-out in his Lockheed 12A at something like 600 feet above the deck on climb-out: pulled it vertical, used the offset thrust of the working engine to execute the turn, leaving him with only an exaggerated round-out for a successful reciprocal-heading landing.. all the physics involved is completely explicable, but only a very, very few people can get the dots all joined up.

Perhaps we should close the debate on counter-steering. There are quite a number of experienced motorcyclists who contribute to this forum, and 100% of them will endorse the fact that counter-steering is how you turn a motorcycle at anything more than walking speed. I seriously don't think there is value in non-motorcyclists telling us that we are wrong.

There was also controversy regarding a tail flutter condition caused by fuselage twisting for the 'large-tail' 32X Lancairs that went on for quite some time ( see: http://www.lancair.net/flutter.html ) and became fairly acrimonious, with the designer, I think, starting to threaten legal action in the end (though I am not sure about that). I never had the interest to follow up what eventual action(s), if any, that produced.

With respect, 'out-turning' is not connected to gyroscopic precession. Yenn is completely wrong about it being a load of rubbish - it is THE way you ride fast on a motorcycle. In balanced conditions, (straight line or cornering) for a motorcycle, it has the c.g mass of the vehicle ( bike plus rider in the position he or she is using) passing through the line between the contact patches - which are the centres of lateral resistance - between the front and rear wheels. In cornering, one balances the angle of lean against the speed and radius of the turn - exactly as in an aircraft. The effect of 'out-turning', is to make the line of resistance between the front wheel contact patch and the rear wheel contact patch move to the opposite side to the turn desired - thus the c/g of the bike is now 'inside' the line of resistance between the front and rear wheels and the bike 'falls' into the turn - literally. That is NOT due to gyroscopic effect, it is quite simply the action of gravity between the c.g of the bike mass and the line of resistance. Once you have the bike leaned, the contact patches of both the front and rear tyre roll around the circumference of both tyres - tending to cause the bike to actually sit up vertical. You use out-turning to get the bike to START the turn and throttle to balance the lean vs. the effect of a c.g. moving in an arc vs. the resistance of the tyre contact patches. MotoGp and dirt-bike stunt riders DO use gyroscopic precession in their riding - for bike control when there is NO line of resistance because the front wheel ( at least) is off the deck: for corner exit wioth the front wheel in the air or directional change when doing aerial stunts. But - for fast normal riding - out-turning is simply the ONLY way we use to change direction at any speed. And yes, Yenn, I believe in out-turning because I've used it for more than 40 years of riding.

I drove past the strip a couple of hours ago, and the air frame is still highly visible from the road. It ended up, adjacent to the dam on the northern side of the strip about 660 metres from the east end of the strip where the take-off should have commenced and with roughly 200 metres of strip still available by my best guess from Google Earth. I cannot hazard a guess at what caused the crash but I suspect that thing would not have gotten more than maybe 10 metres off the ground. I did not have the opportunity to take a photo, but - and allowing for the serious damage that the fire would have caused to the airframe post the crash - the extent of damage is such that even from a quick glance at 110 kph passing by - if I had been the pilot I think I might well also decide all my luck for future flying would be used up... It is no more than a bent skeleton, burnt to hell. The port wing is relatively intact, but everything else is charred pasta.

Merv - I completely agree. Not even the most rabid Jab. 'fan' would seriously argue that they are near as good as we would like them to be, but the causes of failures have not, realistically been properly investigated, almost ever. I believe that I am correctly regarded as a strong 'supporter' of Jab. engines in general BUT I have also, I think, been pretty consistent in stating that I consider Rotax 912X series as being considerably more tolerant of hard use. That is, I am sure, partly a factor of the design approach (water-cooled heads in particular) and also of the very, very considerable resources that Rotax has to throw at problems and get them sorted by comparison with Jabiru. Those who personally know both Rod Stiff and Ian Bent will have opinions regarding the 'development' approach of each party - though in part one has to allow for the seriously expensive cost of changing anything on a certified / certificated engine. There are NO 'silver bullet'-type answers. Something that is common to ALL aircraft engines, is the necessity for 'proper' installation: fuel supply, cooling, engine management information reporting. A bad installation - one that does not meet the engine manufacturer's use parameters - will kill any engine - just some may survive longer than others. Lycoming will not guarantee its engines unless the installation has been approved by them. It's the same old song from me: we rarely have a report on the causes of an engine failure in RAA-class aircraft. What we get, mostly, is a summary of the result of a sequence of conditions that ended in a failure. While Jabiru engines are, statistically, more represented per whatever baseline is established than Rotax 912x engines, that statistic is not hugely valuable for establishing the actual causes of the failures. Rather than stoke the 'pro' and 'anti' group for any particular engine debate, I believe that what we truly need to seek is reliable information.

Good Grief - talk about timing! : says it all way better than me: http://www.canberratimes.com.au/victoria/hero-firefighters-speaks-volumes-about-society-rather-than-the-firefighters-themselves-20160110-gm2s3e.html

Yep, I believe that is correct. In fact, I think it was in the same general area ( or maybe a similar geographical area with similar weather characteristics) that that Pipistrel had the wings sheared off short and landed safely under the BRS fairly recently? And in both cases, I think, VFR-rated pilots caught in IMC, so the potential for exceeding VNE, fairly high. Absolutely extreme weather can overtask practically anything bar mountains. VNE isn't just something figured by holding a wetted finger up into the wind.. Possibly more instructive for potential owners of small aircraft in Australia, is their max-rough airspeed AND the appropriate gust speed applied to the certification/ certifying standard. Australian max. gust speeds are somewhat higher than (at least) the older JAR/EASA standards, I believe.

Not sure that was in his official test report! Keith is a bloody fine test pilot, possibly the best we have ever had after Randy Green.

OME - not in ANY way suggesting you were criticising RFS, SES etc. people. When we first came to live at Hill Top in 1965, a fire in the Burragorang was 'all hands to the McLeod tools and backpacks, down the hill, go for it' The lady who ran the local phone exchange ( yes, we had wind-up phones here in 1965, through to about 1970) was the de-facto 'incident controller', the locals got instantly onto baking scones and cakes and making infinite depth urns of hot tea... In the 1968 fires, we nearly lost the place here: it came to within about 500 metres when the wind reversed and bought rain. I have some stories about that fire - but not germaine to this thread. The point I am trying to make is: - yes, there is serious attention paid to risk assessment before emergency crews are sent in - normally, at least. It isn't always 'perfect', but it's vastly better than it was even 30 years ago.

The original Lancair 2XX series could not get accepted in Australia until there was a serious modification to the tailfeathers. Even AFTER that, in the CASA evaluation report, Keith Englsman found they went to a wing-drop of 70 degrees in a stall.

Dave: That quote from Rod Stiff needs a little bit of additional information. I believe that he is correct in his statement insofar as it goes with regard to proven circumstances. Of the - AFAIK - 5 deaths in Australia in Jabiru powered Jabiru airframes, three are definitely CFIT. I believe there is one - not all that long ago - that has yet to be explained, and one that was a Jabiru airframe with a Lycoming (??) transplant ( out-of -fuel?). Again, AFAIK, there have been zero deaths or even serious injuries from airframe failure nor from the result of a crash-landing after engine failure. People have walked/ hopped / limped away from Jabirus that have been amazingly demolished following the engine ceasing to turn the propellor. In 2014, the actual incidence of 'engine failure' for Jabiru engines was less than 2% - not 5% - according to the 'actual' data used by CASA to justify its action. I've seen the CASA data sheet, and I reckon 17 failures are 'a reasonable conclusion' from the fairly scant report data. Rod claims 12, RAA hasn't stated a number but has come out strongly that 'CASA has not undertaken rigorous analysis' of the data. The CASA data compilation is a disgrace, and it would come under serious criticism - along the lines of the Pel-Air Senate investigation - if our senior regulators could be ar$ed to follow it up.. I've seen the results of the crash of a 'high-performance' carbon-fibre ultralight - the Sting crash at Goulburn. (co-incidentally following the catastrophic failure of the Rotax engine). Two fatalities, in an airframe that could have hardly been worse-damaged by an RPG. This was NOT a high-speed CFIT, but a forced landing in inhospitable terrain; I have not the slightest doubt that anybody who could have viewed that wreckage would step into, or to allow their loved ones to take-off in one. Jabs bounce through the countryside absorbing energy and shedding bits. But the occupants get out alive and generally with very little harm. If you are happy to bet your life ( which is what you do) on the absolute reliability of a Rotax engine - good luck to you, I hope it works out. However, if you are a bit of a 'two-bob each way' person, then having a Jab airframe around you is the statistically best chance you could have if the noisy thing up the front stops being noisy.

OME: I can only state what I know as a member of the RFS, but yes, there are several points for RFS members before they start squirting water ( and, since these are humans doing it, it is NOT infallible). The first - for any major bushfire situation - is the briefing session at the assembly point before 'the wagons roll': latest weather forecast, current flame conditions, fuel load information, comms. information, general strategy and disposition of resources. Recording of information about every crew member going out: what unit etc. If that's undertaken by RFS crews exclusively, it takes maybe 30 minutes; if the incident is under the control of Sparks and Wildfires, then it can take an hour or more, but let's not go there.. Then there is the 'at the scene' assessment undertaken by the incident controller / senior Captain plus each unit chief. The 'line to defend' is established according to the terrain, wind, fuel load and most especially, the availability of a line of retreat. Specific roles assigned to each unit, lines of retreat, local water resource locations. You don't start unrolling hoses until the truck is set for 'evacuation'. Generally, units operate in loose pairs, so that an equipment failure on one unit can be covered by another unit ( though I will admit, that that is not 100% when one tanker has to leave to re-fill while another is still operational - but local conditions are generally closely observed: If it's dicey, both units pull back.). Incident controller evaluates when to rest individual units according to the conditions. At the end of a 'shift' - which is supposed to be no more than eight hours but I've been on the ground for 12 and more, for several days on end - the 'shift' returns to the assembly point for a de-brief. Those photos you see of RFS/CFA etc. crews asleep in their grimy gear beside the trucks: that is at the end of a 'shift', and while they are resting, the incident controllers are assessing the de-briefing information, updating the weather, refining the ongoing strategy. I belong to a unit at the bottom edge of the Blue Mountains National Park: 'Paling Yards' - which is on the Taralga - Oberon road. As it happens, we are the unit most frequently tasked with protecting Bindook, and I've been there at least four times (plus one going past to attend a fire near Yerranderie!) - once as part of a 10-plus tankers shift - the 2001 'Black Christmas' fires, three times as a solo unit - but we KNOW Bindook... (and we damn well know some bastard was deliberately lighting fires there.) Shortly after the 2001 fires, our unit conducted a risk assessment for every property in our area of responsibility - where the owners (some of whom were absolutely negative to hazard reduction work) were advised that if they did NOT co-operate with both the risk assessment AND agree to undertake at least minimum hazard reduction to ensure we could get to and protect their house etc., we WOULD NOT enter their property. You might think that Draconian: some of the properties have drives only passable in a serious - not faux - 4wd, and we needed to know things like combustible/explosive fuels stored on site etc. I don't believe RFS personnel are 'pussies'; try being on a Category 1 tanker with 3-4,000 litres of water, being dragged up a hill by a heavy dozer because the hill is too steep for tyre traction even on a 6 x 4, having to spray the edge of the track as you go to keep the fire front from blistering the paint on the Cat. 1. Forget the wankers with six spotlights on the roof of their Hilux with the lifted suspension, tanker bush driving is bloody serious business and we had to pass rigorous tests to get a 'bush driver' endorsement. We have anywhere from one other to six other people in the vehicle to consider and our FIRST responsibility is to ensure their safety. The 'cowboys' - which includes drivers of either gender - don't get allowed control. I could probably spend another hour typing on the risk assessment undertaken for structural, vehicle etc. fire situations, including dealing with air-bag-equipped vehicles, HAZMAT notified vehicles, electric-power vehicles, propane and other explosive tanked fuel response strategy, live high-voltage wires etc. The thing is: with proper training, much of this assessment is done extremely quickly, and most people might not notice. EVERYBODY is trained to at least some degree before they are let out on a fire ground, so communication can be very fast indeed. One person shouting 'power line' and pointing, is enough to alert the rest of the team to a danger. If we in aviation operate safely, it's not much different. We expect - for instance - that calling 'Clear Prop' alerts anybody who ought to be allowed onto the apron, to get the f$$k clear. It is 'risk assessment' before starting the engine. But humans are humans... About my second lesson in power flying with Trevor Bange, I did the pre-start checks, called 'Clear Prop', and was reaching for the starter button when he said: 'STOP'. He required me to unlock the door, open the door, lean out, call 'Clear Prop' in a very loud voice, then close and lock the door before going anywhere near the starter. He explained that several years previously, a student had called 'Clear prop' and hit the starter - and a very surprised head appeared over the top of the cowl, very damn close to the prop as it fired into life. The NUMPTY had been squatting down and looking at the noseleg tyre ( for why, I do not know). Risk Assessment does not eliminate risk per se. What it does do, is provide information on which humans can base decisions to undertake lesser (or greater) exposure to risk. Some humans apparently don't get their synapses working even WITH useful information: for them., the Darwin Awards beckon.

Robbo: with respect: do you have a real need for the A-B performance the Cirrus delivers? (with A and B normally being larger, sealed airfields). As a side comment: if you have a good business case for owning one, where the costs can be written off as expenses, then all that follows is merely chaff in the wind. It's a serious question; the Cirrus is very much over-represented in the crash statistics by comparison with other aircraft that have fairly decent PTP performance with far more 'usual' reactions to extreme flight situations.. If one follows the history of popular aircraft with seriously negative crash statistics, one would go from the A35 Bonanza ( the "forked-tail doctor killer" ) through the early Lancairs - a truly terrible aircraft - to the Cirrus. As a CAR 35 engineer, a member of my family had a fair bit to do with repairs to early Cirrus 22's. He will not fly in one - and he is a CASA-endorsed Test Pilot who had a release from DoT ( the predecessor to CASA) to fly its A35 for use as his transport when RTOA for the NSW GFA. Apart from the persistent Dutch Roll of the A35, he found it quite nice and safe to fly; you may make your own judgement of his thoughts on the Cirrus from that.. He did take a flight or two in an early Lancair ( 320 or 360, from memory) and refused to fly any more than a circuit. They are that bad; the Cirrus is NOT that bad but it still has more than its fair share of issues. The Cirrus does NOT meet the FAA basic requirements for spin recovery - hence the CAPS and instructions to 'pull the big red handle' if things get a wee bit pear-shaped. The subtext there is: 'this will (probably) save your life' [but the aircraft will be a write-off]. You might want to investigate the hull insurance implications of that. It seems to me that you have Hobson's choice if things get sticky: follow the manufacturer's POH - and end up paying the excess plus increased premiums in the future for a complete new aircraft - or trying to fly out of the situation and risking having the insurance company refusing to meet a minor claim because your did NOT follow the POH instructions. Personally, if I had a compelling business case for a small, fast aircraft for commuting between A-B where A was more than about 300 k from B and both were adjacent to good, sealed airports - I'd seriously consider a Cirrus. For just general touring in Australia, a Cirrus would be at a negative on my personal list: for the money, I'd have Barry Manktelow build me a Wittman W10 Tailwind with a big-ar$e Lycoming in it.... and give the finger to Cirrus pilots as I went past.

Coop - have you looked at the world's records for gliders? Among the current FAI records are: free distance of 2256.9 km; absolute altitude: 15,460m ( or 15.46 km...), speed over and 'out and return' flight of 2000km: 152.5 km/h; duration: 56 hours, 15 minutes. Seriously - RAA-class aircraft, by comparison with a high-performance glider on a good weather day, are tinnies by comparison with Comanche, or Wild Oats... ( and like tinnies, they will get you from A to B even when the wind ISN'T blowing - let's not forget that). Our RAA-class aircraft are for getting us there; gliders are for flying... The Twin Astirs are generally regarded as a bit of a barge, in glider terms; if you really enjoyed one, then you'd be blown away by a flying a high-performance single-seater. Anything with much more than about 1:44 glide ratio is, in practical terms, an 'over the horizon' machine - in still air, you can set out on the final glide for home for a site you simply cannot see. Pretty much my favorite time in a glider was the 'last flight of the day' - when the air has gone to dead still, the ground is in lengthening shadows, you are meandering for the airfield at a gentle pace and even the wind noise around the canopy is almost dead quiet and the atmosphere after a stinking hot, bumpy day feels like golden syrup. You are just 'up there', gliding along.. It would be hard to feel more at peace with the universe than if one were in a warm bath, with a decent Armagnac and a Romeo et Juiletta after a fine meal of Duc a L'orange and a potted stilton in port for afters... having had a hard day racing the Huskies..