It's not like you to be so dismissive of Human Factors.
I am not, at all, and remain wary of the human I'm responsible for up there. (Some would say for good reason ;- )
Heck, once, not so long ago, I started going for flaps down when I wanted flaps up.
So I'm a bit interested. Anyway, the article above is, I'd say, a fair summary of the official AAIB Bulletin, which is linked here:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/681b144c386c17c856f17359/Boeing_777-236_G-VIIT_05-25.pdf
And, for anyone who thinks it might be relevant to them, a few key excerpts:
"At the time of the incident, the co-pilot had 6,156 hours total flying time, with 2,700 hours on type, and 44 hours in the last 28 days"
"The report ... discusses the industry-wide challenge of preventing action slips."
"An action slip occurs when an action is not performed as intended, arising in routine or highly learned motor action sequences . The operator ... found that absence of cognitive thought and speed of execution commonly featured during action slips, such as flap and landing gear mis-selections."
"The operator described taking a cautious approach to publicising specific incidents to its crew, given industry experience suggests the act of discussing mis-selections might actually prime crew towards, rather than against, making them. It has included ‘mis-selections’ in a new ‘Safety topic’ section of its pre-flight briefing material for crew, and promoted the human factors topic of ‘Focus’ in its recurrent simulator training package."