Garfly

3 hours ago, johnm said:

if you have time to look at Utube ............. you probably have time to read / scan some comments. Who knows if the poster was an instructor (at face value they are)

But even in the unlikely event of this Commenter not being what or who he claims, that "hands off the yoke" method has been around for a long time and is worth re-visiting in any case.

We could try addressing a Comment with a Comment; this one was posted on a Pilot Workshops article (below) a few years back (And yes, this could be an imposter too, but we have to use our heads a bit.  And, in any case, accept that, as in any field, expert opinions differ.

• • • • flyboy1423g 7 years ago
        • Jim, because your brain doesn’t work like an autopilot. A properly trimmed airplane doesn’t go out of control when it enters clouds, but your head will. The hands in lap/rudder only technique goes back about 50 years or more and it works. You should try it sometime, the day your AP and GPS systems go flooey it could save your life. Also remember that the DG is as important as the attitude indicator in instrument flying since the airplane won’t turn when wings are level. Use the rudder to initiate the turn or to stop a turn and you don’t upset the wings natural stability unlike the ailerons which do. How can you tell which way its banked/turning from the DG only? Bigger numbers to the right, smaller numbers to the left always works and easy to remember. PRACTICE this technique it is a life saver.

•  

VFR into IMC - PilotWorkshops

PILOTWORKSHOP.COM

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Bob: “As with any emergency, remember the big three; maintain aircraft control, analyze the situation, and take proper action. Obviously maintaining aircraft control is the most important element. I...

The issue has been tossed around on here, too, for a long time:

1 hour ago, turboplanner said:

and now we finally get to the crux of the matter, the middle ear; I think you might be talking about this: https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2018/01/dont-believe-your-ears-2/ which, hopefully all Instructors will have taught their students about.

 

It may be "the crux" of the matter but it's also an obvious assumption behind this entire conversation. 

It's the only reason Mr. Cessna would ever have suggested so radical a solution as "hands off the yoke".

51 minutes ago, skippydiesel said:

The problems are:

• VFR pilots are not trained to fly in IMC/ fully utilised flight instruments.
• Humans tend to respond to very strong physiological signals that may not represent the actual orientation of the aircraft.
• IFR pilots are trained to ignore the above and also to have an appropriate response to what the flight instruments are telling them.
• It's not just the pilot - the aircraft must also have the required complement of IFR instruments, maintained to the appropriate standard.
• Most aviators accept that intensive IFR training/recency is required to safely fly in IMC.

IF a VFR pilot, finding themselves in a difficult situaton (entry to IMC) it would be down right stupid/likly suicidal to the attempt to fly as an IFR pilot. Far better to allow the aircraft (ultra stable one like a C172)  to depart, using power, from a well trimmed straight & level - no hands,  no feet,  Do NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE AIRCRAFT it will make a stable descent/climb, as you have decided, without any further input.

 

NOTE: I am not advocating a VFR pilot fly into IMC far better they take every precaution/action/alternative  to avoid such satiations.😈

Of course, your bullet list regarding the problem is perfectly well accepted by everyone.  All those points are the background assumptions for the main issue of the thread, which is something like:  Given inadvertent IMC penetration by the untrained, is the old "hands-off the yoke" advice still - and in all cases - considered good by those who know.

(Those who don't know might do well to ask questions and listen up.  After all, it's all about us.)

Anyway, Skippy, as to your own proposed method which takes "hands-off" even further (feet-off too), well, I for one, don't buy it.  But what would I know?

In any case, regarding what you reckon to be "downright stupid" I urge you to read again kgwilson's account (above) of his own unintended encounter with IMC as a VFR pilot. One of my take-aways from it is that once you're in it you ARE an "IFR pilot" and you'd best start acting like one (though if panic's taken over, all bets are off). Another take-away is that panic is not called for and not inevitable. Another is that under-the-hood refresher work is good insurance against accidental penetration of cloud.

2 hours ago, skippydiesel said:

I speculate that a VFR pilot, trying to use instruments to fly in IMC, is just asking for a problem to manifest, that you won't be able to correct.😈

But this is about suddenly, inadvertently entering IMC, barely trained, unprepared.

I'd say NOT "trying to use instruments" (calmly, methodically as in kgwilson's tale) would certainly be asking for a problem.

56 minutes ago, kgwilson said:

 encountering it for the first time can cause panic and all the knowledge goes out the window & you have the classic 178 seconds to live.

Yeah, and I'm guessing that was the thinking behind the Cessna POH (as per OP).

So, short of panic, a better idea than hands-off the yoke seems to be what you did.

And yes, some refresher hood-time sounds good - especially if it happens to includes some supervised real IMC.

Here is the follow-up film:  touring around: Oz

Fair enough, and I'm all for thread drift but this was the OP's question in respect of that YT  Comment about the Cessna method.

 "recent Dan Gryder Utube video; A post / comment by an instructor;

interesting technique when in IMC by mistake / error or terror - no hands on yoke - just use your rudder for turns

........... for anyone to comment"

It's just that your rhetorical question suggests that the rest of us might have totally missed the point that not all aircraft are equal.

Of course not.  But we ARE talking about Cessnas and Cessna POHs in this thread.

10 hours ago, turboplanner said:

In Australia we are taught the secondary effect of controls.

The secondary effect of rudder is roll.

Well they must be taught the same in the US, given it's the whole point of the YT Comment in the OP:

've always taught  ...  the technique described by all Cessna operating handbooks for an emergency entry into the clouds ...

maintain your heading (and wings level) with your feet/rudders only

10 hours ago, turboplanner said:

You're in the cloud, there's no horizon, you're in a slight turn so the G force has shifted off vertical - it now feels like you're straight and level, but then a wind gust lifts the inside wing.............

Okay, a more fullsome exposition of the thread title. 

10 hours ago, turboplanner said:

Also in Australia we have the Visual Flight Rules Guide which reminds us we don't follow the superseded rules any more - we must be clear of cloud and have 5000 metres forward view.

What superseded rules are you talking about?  In any case, you ought to know we must still stay 1000' feet from cloud vertically and 1500m. horizontally between 3,000' and 10,000' when above 1000' AGL.  

But yes, you're right.  In Australia, inadvertent entry into IMC by VFR pilots remains illegal. And the liability is strict.

2 hours ago, Area-51 said:

"Which part of the idea is BS?", ok, will spell it all out for basic clarification...

 

- reduce power, retrim, hands off the yoke, use rudder only for turns...

 

Ok, we are flying straight and level at reduced speed; we do not know what that speed should be reduced to or even why, but the nose has pitched down and the trim will need to be adjusted to a more nose up attitude; i think we are flying straight and level again; great...

 

Now we will turn with just the rudder; great... we are turning, and what is the secondary affect of turning with our rudder? Roll... we are rolling and our hands are off the yoke... What is the primary affect of rolling? Gravity... we are gravitating towards the ground... What is the secondary affect of roll? Yaw... we are yawing into the turn... Our bum is telling us "we are climbing, good, we are saved"... now we are climbing faster, "something does not add up here"... we keep climbing faster, "this is weird, now i am uncomfortable, we are still climbing, my hands are off the yoke, and the power is now at idle, but we are climbing..."... "why is my altimeter dial moving backwards so fast when i am in a climb!".

 

Again, unless the pilot has basic ppl instrument training practical knowledge, no mars bars for dinner.

 

It is rare but widespread blanket cloud can form pretty instantly under certain conditions; VFR you have margins to follow to mitigate the chances of being engulfed in cloud without warning. The margins are there partly for this, and partly so VFR remain visible to other aircraft.

 

The safest thing to do is wings level, straight ahead, cruise climb attitude, check your fuel reserve, mark your current position fix, squawk 66, contact ground for assistance, check for surrounding terrain/obstructions if able.

 

There are additional things like monitoring engine speed or if flying a csu, manifold pressure to assist in determining transitional climb descend pitch rate changes.

 

Things go more wrong when turns are brought into the imc scenario.

Thanks, A-51 for taking the effort to engage with the ideas.  I can well imagine the scene of confusion and disorientation you describe.  I totally believe it without needing to experience it.  But it leaves me to guess that that classic 'hands-off' strategy was invented after they figured that no more chaos would likely ensue compared to "hands-on" methods; and that, with a bit of luck, you'd have a better shot at a happy outcome.

Anyway, the idea still seems to persist, for example, as the takeaway from the "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!!!  I'm gonna crash!!!" story. [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fnb4qCfp0mo ]

Of course, the secondary effect of rudder being roll was the whole point of the "Cessna" method as outlined in the OP YT Comment.  The hope seems to have been that a panicked VFR pilot is more likely to be able to stay wings level using rudder alone - inputs just sufficient to prevent turning in the first place.  They must have concluded that 'hands-off the yoke' was the only way to prevent the panic pull that'd end in a stall/spin.  Game over even quicker, even surer.  Still no Mars Bars.

But anyway, my own sense of the safest thing to do for VFR pilots caught out is, pretty much as you say "wings level, straight ahead, cruise climb attitude, etc".  Which is why I've never felt comfortable with the often suggested immediate 180 turnback.   Indeed "Things go more wrong when turns are brought into the imc scenario."

4 hours ago, Area-51 said:

Quickest way to get into a death spiral; this idea is BS. If you have no turn coordinator altimeter vsi or appropriate training there's a fantastic chance nobody in the aircraft will be arriving home for mars bars; go try it on Xplane and see what happens. At least that way you can pick and choose the arrival scenery and season for the crash site...

But which idea, exactly, are you saying is BS?  Nobody on here - or even the benighted YT Commenter - suggests anything to contradict "If you have no turn coordinator altimeter vsi or appropriate training there's a fantastic chance nobody in the aircraft will be arriving home"  Almost everyone in aviation holds to that idea; a truism.

That being the case, no one really needs to be marched off to an X-Plane sim to "see what happens"  (even absent panic and spatial disorientation).

The instructor quoted in the YouTube comment (in the OP) said this:

've always taught all of my students how to maintain control of the aircraft in IMC by performing the technique described by all Cessna operating handbooks for an emergency entry into the clouds. First, lower your power setting and re-trim. Next, and most important, keep your right hand on the throttle and LET GO OF THE YOKE and put your left hand in you lap. Until you're VMC again and can see, maintain your heading (and wings level) with your feet/rudders only. Any turns required are done with your feet only. If you require a climb or descent, it can be done by adding / reducing power only. You'll never lose control of the airplane like this. Get on the radio and declare an emergency and get help to find VFR weather.

So I for one (zero actual IMC/IFR) would be very open to hearing from those who know, about the problems with this long taught technique (for Cessna trainers, at least).  But, to be useful, it would have to offer an alternate method working from the same scenario.  That is: sudden inadvertent IMC; pilot with little/no experience in cloud; typical (Cessna) six-pack still working (IMC only just entered) and predictable Human Factors (like the urge to pull to save oneself) likely taking hold.  

Under those conditions what might a non-BS idea look like; a better long-shot on a sticky wicket than the one Cessna proposed for years.

BTW, was it not ATC's "hands-off" advice to the pilot in the famous "Mayday! Mayday! Mayday! I'm gonna crash!!!" affair, that was credited with saving his life.

FWIW there's an interesting review of that incident (and VFR>>IMC generally) in this video by airline pilot "74 Gear"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fnb4qCfp0mo

But for those with no time to waste gazing at the GoogTube (Red!!! I'm lookin' at you!  ; -)

you'll get the gist in less than a minute here:  20:23 >> 21:00

10 minutes ago, Red said:

You read the comments on youtube videos?

Yes, I do ... with the same amount of discernment that I read comments on internet forums.

To dismiss all is as foolish as to accept all.

I think the technique described (in the OP) implies having a working AH and DG.

Partial panel would take the crisis to another level.

But yes, worth testing oneself out on, under qualified supervision.

IMHO, the method does have the benefit of simplicity - which may be key when panic threatens.

It was super generous of this young pilot to share the excruciating experience of his first flight with a pax. Things didn't go as planned.

But a great lesson for aviators all.  Who hasn't, at some point, found themselves confused by unexpected panel layouts (even in familiar types)?

Anyway, our brand new PIC solves a sticky situation by aviating, navigating and ... well, wing-wiggling to a green-light landing into Bankstown.

In his later vids we see that he's gone on to grow in confidence and competence and to nail his commercial ticket.  (And we see that he's a true believer in the joy of flight.)

Apart from anything else, the GoPro video is an enthralling little human drama. Who couldn't identify with and feel for these characters?

https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-11/AO-2023-042 Final.pdf

"In-flight upset involving Boeing 737-8FE, VH-YQR

143 km west of Ballina/Byron Gateway Airport, New South Wales

on 6 September 2023"

ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Occurrence Investigation

(Short) AO-2023-042 Final – 29 November 2024

EXCERPT:

"On the initial application of the rudder trim, both pilots felt the aircraft’s immediate yaw/roll response, but were unable to identify the likely cause. Over the following 5 seconds, while the captain maintained activation of the switch and waited for the door to open, the rudder trim progressively increased to the left, causing the rudder to correspondingly move to the left. The autopilot was initially able to compensate for the increasing left yaw input and induced left roll through application of increasing right wing down roll input. This right wing down input was replicated on the pilots’ control wheel.

After 5 seconds of trim input and increasing induced left roll, the autopilot reached its authority limit – that is, the autopilot had reached the maximum roll control input it could apply and maintain. Up to this point, the autopilot had managed to limit the induced roll to a bank angle of less than 5° to the left. However, on reaching the roll authority limit, the increasing rudder trim resulted in the aircraft’s bank angle to the left increasing. As the trim input continued for a further 3 seconds, the aircraft responded with a rapidly increasing rate of roll to the left.

The unexpected and increasing bank angle alerted both pilots to the developing aircraft upset. The PF initially responded by attempting to control the increasing left roll through the use of the mode control panel heading selections and the autopilot. As this had no apparent effect, and with the bank angle continuing to increase, the PF applied a large right wing down control input while almost simultaneously disengaged the autopilot and autothrottle. At about the same time the bank angle alert triggered. The PM responded with an ‘upset’ call, and the PF responded by executing the upset recovery procedure. The aircraft was quickly recovered to about straight and level flight.

Having recovered the aircraft to an approximate wings level attitude, the PF was required to hold about 35° of right wing down control wheel displacement to maintain that attitude. While this large roll input required to maintain a wings level attitude strongly indicated a yaw-related issue, the crew continued to investigate the cause of the inflight upset unsuccessfully for a further minute. About 70 seconds after the initial misapplication of rudder trim, the PF requested the PM check the rudder trim. Shortly after, the rudder trim was returned to a neutral position. While large right wing down aileron input required to maintain a wings level attitude provided a strong indicator that the upset was linked to a yaw related issue, a combination of the very small displacement of the rudder pedals at the point of maximum trim application, and the PF’s limited experience on the aircraft, probably contributed to some of the delay in identifying the unintended rudder trim."

A handy reminder to pay heed to the switches we flick till they're well and truly flicked.

Juan's update:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9mAUks0krI

A new dead-stick, failed forced landing analysis from Scott Perdue:

Some good insights here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKJklQRyKxo

3 hours ago, w3stie said:

What are you basing that opinion on. Gut feeling or facts?

A fair question,  although those aren't the only two reasons folks have for saying stuff. 

Anyway, I'd say my opinion is based on long familiarity with the format of the piece; a well worn (but still effective) template in the misinformation industry.

(Not all those brothers-in-law are likely legit. And the oddly inserted theory about this bro's demise 45 years ago, sort of lets the cat out of the bag: "He was killed in a military C-12 plane crash when escaping Iran. I believe his transport was shot down. If so, it was covered up by the Carter Administration to avoid fanning the flames of war, but that is another issue."  Another issue!!  If so!! )

But meanwhile, back at now; in fact, the identity of the third crew member is, at this time, still being withheld by the family and the US Army.

And for good reason:

'Illinois Democrat Sen. Tammy Duckworth, herself a decorated former Black Hawk pilot, told NPR she understood why the family declined to make their loved-one's name public. " We should be respecting the family's wishes at a time when they have suffered an unbelievable loss," Duckworth said. "I think it is a perfectly legitimate request the family would make. And I'm glad that the Army is honoring that request." Duckworth condemned the online speculation about the third member of the crew and especially President Trump's musings that the Army crew was to blame or was affected by diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) hiring. "Every one of those troops that was in that aircraft earned their place there, and they are the most highly trained military aviators in the world," Duckworth said. "And I am just sick to my stomach that we would have a president who would say such things about the heroic men and women who serve every single day." '

                  Source:

Army withholds name of Black Hawk helicopter crew in D.C. crash, 2 others identified

WWW.NPR.ORG

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At the request of the family, the Army is not going to release the name of the female member of the Black Hawk crew killed in Wednesday's crash. The withholding of the name is a highly unusual move.

By the way, this site Unreported Truths seems to be one of the sources of the chain email above

A military and civilian aviation veteran explains Wednesday night's crash

ALEXBERENSON.SUBSTACK.COM

---

Several pilots wrote in - I thank you all. I found this explanation both admirably complete and largely apolitical, and I think you will too.

If you scroll to the bottom of the page you'll see what else exercises them right now:

5 hours ago, w3stie said:

This rather long commentary showed up in one of my feeds:

 

The author’s name is J.R. Rudy. He raises several issues I haven’t heard before, including the crosswinds that were swirling Wednesday night and the lack of a safety observer on the Black Hawk’s training mission. Beyond that - I’d rather let him speak for himself, unedited.

 

I am responding to your recent note about input from pilots regarding the DCA crash.

I could go on for hours about this but will condense it the best I can without too much unsupported speculation.

 

I am a retired aviation professional with nearly 40 years of flying experience. The first 8 years I served as a Fighter Pilot flying the F-14 in the US Navy from aircraft carriers. Collateral duties included service as a Landing Signals Officer (the tower for the carrier) a Standardization Officer. 

 

I was one of the primary investigators into the mid-air collision of a TopGun F-16 and one of my squadron's F-14s. No jets or lives were lost.

After leaving the Navy, I flew domestically and internationally for Delta Air Lines for over 30 years, the last 20 out of JFK.

 

I have flown into DCA [Reagan National] countless times as a pilot, though not recently. I did land there about a week ago at 1130p, as a passenger, landing to the south flying the River Visual 19 approach. Challenging but fun, hand flown approach with a great view of DC from the port window seat.

 

I have ridden in but never piloted a helo, nor have I flown in one anywhere in the DCA helo corridor. Like other pilots and boaters on the Potomac, I have often seen helocopters there.

It is readily evident that the Army Blackhawk was flying visually, headed south on Helo Route 1, then transitioning to Route 4 abeam DCA. On the chart, there is a max altitude restriction of 200' from the Key Bridge to the Wilson Bridge on these two routes, inclusive of the area of the crash.

 

UH-60A and subsequent Black Hawks have VHF radios, just like commercial jets so separate UHF communication should not have been an issue.

 

Below there is a link to the Helo chart for the DC area below, showing the VFR helo corridor paths and altitude restrictions.

 

The accident appears to be a classic CRM "swiss cheese" multiple failure event, as are most aircraft accidents.

 

Any one of the following interventions could have prevented this accident:

-More timely, accurate and positive confirmation of traffic by an overtasked ATC [air-traffic control] controller.

-Adequate staffing in ATC tower.

-Black Hawk copilot/evaluator/instructor taking command of the aircraft or issuing timely instructions to correct altitude deviation.

-Observation/safety observer pilot aboard who is not wearing NVGs.

-Not doing military training missions in busy airport approach corridor when a much safer less congested one is available to the south of DCA

-Use of collusion avoidance technology by the Black Hawk. Airliners have this and can visualize on screen potential threats, although this is low altitude inhibited.

-and most importantly, adherence to published altitudes.

-If the American commuter pilots had not accepted the side-step on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach from RW1 to RW 33 there would be no collision.

-If a single pilot was not wearing NVGs, the plane might have been visible.

-If the helo was on altitude, they may have been able to discern the aircraft lights unobscured in the night sky looking up rather than looking level into lights on the west shoreline.

 

From the limited info available I am able to draw a few conclusions.

1. The helo was flying higher than the max permitted 200'. Had they adhered to this altitude restriction the accident would not have happened.

2. The ATC controller apparently did not provide timely, accurate, complete advise to the helo of the commercial airline traffic on approach to DCA.

3. The ATC controller apparently was task-saturated, performing dual roles, perhaps at the end of a long shift when attentiveness wanes.

4. The American jet may have been belly up to the helo in the final part of his turn or in subsequent corrections to centerline due to #5.

5. Strong, gusty crosswinds winds of 25 knots may have necessitated to a steep turn of the American jet to prevent overshoot of centerline and also affected helo altitude control.

6. NVG use by both pilots may have rendered the American jet invisible due to oversaturation of background lighting emanating from the west side of the Potomac.

7. The helo exhibited an erratic flight path, executing two near 90 degree turns, turning west off course, crossing Haines Point and heading directly to the north end of DCA airport before turning back south along the river. Given the airspace, this is indicative of inexperience, unfamiliarity and possibly even incompetence.

8. The inability of the pilot to maintain altitude, especially on a clear night is highly indicative of aircraft unfamiliarity, lack of recent flying, and gross incompetence, likely exacerbated by the unpracticed use of NVGs.

9. Military pilots love to do low level flying, especially in cool places like up the Potomac River by DCA and the Capital at night and take risks.

10. The Warrant Officer instructor pilot may have had a possible hesitancy to correct a (new?) female Captain of unknown qualifications and experience and higher rank.

11. There appears to be zero accountability of the American commuter pilots in the accident. They were exactly where they should have been on the MV 01 approach and sidestep to the RW 33 visual approach.

 

The DCA Potomac corridor is not one to be used in training new and inexperienced pilots, who are not current and highly experienced with NVGs.

 

It is my sincere hope that the female pilot flying the helo earned her place in this unit, based on merit, and there are no DEI factors involved. 

 

This unit is a highly competitive, desired assignment that has traditionally been awarded to the best of the best for a non-combat tour.

 

I know this because my Army helo pilot brother-in-law was going to be assigned to this unit as a bonus tour following the completion of his helo instructor tour in Iran in 1979. This deployment ended poorly, given the revolution. He was killed in a military C-12 plane crash when escaping Iran. I believe his transport was shot down. If so, it was covered up by the Carter Administration to avoid fanning the flames of war, but that is another issue.

 

Disclaimer: I have used night vision scopes and a monocular, but have never worn military or civilian NVGs either when flying or on the ground 

All the hallmarks of a professional misinfo job - the kind that tends to "show up" in feeds and forums all over.

Typically, a collection of true facts and reasoned opinions (from open sources) lends credibility to the actual punch-line, in this case involving "sincere hope". 

And then the clincher ... the "I know this because" part (which, weirdly, often involves a brother-in-law in the know).