Dafydd Llewellyn

Well, if they don't have the data, then the CEO shouldn't open his mouth, n'est-ce pas?

Why not? When an engine stops in flight, but runs sweetly when subsequently tested, induction icing is a prime suspect, as is fuel starvation.

Agree completely. Has RAA done any statistical analysis of the accident rate due to airworthiness causes, for RAA aircraft by type and number in the fleet? Or am I making the mistake of expecting logical behaviour, again? Does RAA even know how many aircraft of each type there actually are in the fleet? Or would revealing this be too embarrassing, in view of the inflated claims about the size of the fleet? I do not imagine that the current Board would consider it in anybody's interest to be other than honest about these things, but are the answers actually available? And if not, why not?

Pat, what do you think RAA could reasonably do? How the H can they investigate the cause of engine failures? To do that properly requires resources that RAA simply does not have; RAA has Darren Barnfield, and who else? (Don't all speak at once!). Darren is more than flat out trying to catch up on decades of "old boy" stuff and ignorance and neglect. Yes, RAA could engage the services of suitable industry experts, if it wanted to spend members' money on that - but first, it needs to get its hands on the engine before anybody can tamper with it. It has no legal power to do that (ATSB does). It also needs to get a real history of the engine, and again it has no statutory power to impound that, assuming it existed. Apart from trying to make it run on air, which is pretty obvious, the causes of an engine failure usually involve a complex chain of events, and some of them are very subtle. When I worked for DCA in the '70s, I had a broken crankshaft from a Continental IO-520 for a footrest. The failure was attributed to a propeller strike about 500 hours earlier, that had de-tuned the pendulum counterweights with which that shaft was fitted. In those days, DCA had its own metallurgical laboratory. Nowadays CASA does not have any such resources. How the H could there be a suppression of knowledge, when the RAA does not have any real knowledge apart from what the accident investigation can discover - which is very lightweight when it comes to anything subtle in an engine. Discovering that a through-bolt (to use a topical example) failed does not tell you anything about WHY it failed; and that is what is needed. You ain't gonna get it from RAA; they do not have what it takes.

They specify the same requirement as CAR 3 (the U.S. standard that was superseded in 1965 by FAR 23), i.e. 9 G forward, 3 G upward, 1.5 G sideways.) Was that Jab an LSA version? It looked like an ST3 model to me, and that's not an LSA aircraft.

Well, if you go digging on CASA's website, there does not seem to be a hard rule as to size - but a recommendation that the extinguisher should be rated 5E (in the Australian rating system) or 5C (in the American rating system). That means, as far as I can work out, that it's capable of dealing with a fire of 5 square feet area, and suitable for an electrical fire. The Halotron extinguisher for that rating is 2.25 Kg, again so far as I can discover. That size extinguisher would seem to me to be about what one would want as a hand-held in something like a Fokker F 27, to deal with a fire in the electrical rack; but there's no way one could use it in a motorglider cockpit - there's simply not room to manoeuvre one that big, let alone room to stow it where it can be reached in flight. One that size may well extinguish the crew as well as the fire, I suspect. I'm still trying for some guidance on this, but I think it comes down to what sort of fire is likely in your aircraft? That's an interesting question, in a composite aircraft; and I recall the fire chief at Camden having to be physically restrained from dumping 3000 gallons of foam on a K13 glider, which landed in a hurry after one of the crew dropped a cigarette butt onto the fuselage fabric covering (they beat it out with their giggle hats); but in a metal aircraft that does not have flammable cabin lining, and with an electrical system that complies with AC 43 Chapter 11, realistically you're looking at either a burning Ipad or a frying radio or some such piece of electrical gear. Once the power to that is off, it should not take a lot of extinguishant to calm it down. My answer to a burning Ipad, by the way, is to mount it in a stainless steel tray with a lid that acts as a hood to keep the sun off it, and vent the hood to the outside, so it sucks cabin air out past the ipad to cool it - and to get rid of the smoke it it gets excited.

See thread #13

Andy, I was not having a go at you - apologies if it seemed that way. Just trying to answer the question of "where does the empty weight in the POH come from?" - Answer - it comes from the aircraft being weighed. (so does the empty centre of gravity). If you look in the front of the log book, you should also find a page that gives the record of empty weight alterations. These things are required by CAO 100.7. This is normally done, for factory - built aircraft, at the factory, just prior to the production flight tests; and provided the aircraft is not modified (which includes re-painting, by the way), it normally does not need revision in the life of the aircraft. However, for decades, the applicability of CAO 100.7 was overlooked by the RAA.

See CAO 100.7. RAA aircraft ARE NOT exempt from this.

1.1 Kg hand-held $325 + GST

Well, we now have the equivalent of an FAA AC, i.e. a simple straightforward explanation, in regard to trailers; I used it when building my glider trailer. You mostly do not have to re-invent the wheel; just read the reference and apply it. Same principle applies with aircraft. Look at FAA AC 23.15 thru 23.19. They don't give all the answers, but they do give quite a few of them.

Try going up the mast on a 12-metre yacht, in a bosn's chair. if you make the mistake of looking down, it's like looking down your leg at your shoe; your brain tells you it's going to fall over. Dreadful feeling. Never get it in an aeroplane (except maybe a Drifter) because you're IN the thing, not ON the thing. Witches really have it tough . . .

Yes.

The Sapphire may have started out as a 95.10; Scott was selling them before 95.25 came along. No, "real" trainers were mandated by HORSCOTS. Yes, people wanted them; but it was HORSCOTS that pushed CASA into creating first CAO 95.25 and then CAO 101.55. That was when the AUF really started its main growth surge.

Yes, it was. I never understood why spin testing was not there, either; however I suspect the Sapphire would have been very difficult to test without exceeding its flight envelope limits. The spin test requirement was not there in CAO 101.55 either - tho it was done for both Skyfox and Jabiru.

Not to my knowledge - and no formal testing is on record, also to my knowledge; it was not required by CAO 95.25.

Are you aware that the ADRs were originally formulated by CASA's Ron Smith, who set out to apply the philosophy of the aircraft design standards, but reduced to a codified form as far as possible? Ron worked with me on the original draft of CASR Part 21 - and in the process, gained such an understanding of FAR part 21 that the FAA invited him over there to explain it to them. The aircraft design standards were written in their current format as a result of Ralph Nader, who pointed out that one should legislate for the end, not the means - and as a consequence aircraft certification got a whole lot more costly. One needs to be aware of the vast library of Advisory Circulars that support FAR 23 etc; especially FAA AC 23.15 thru AC 23.19

No, it's the past that people have been ignoring.

Definitely not mine. If you can't pass spin testing; fundamental marketing technique - if you have to have an inconvenient "fix", paint it red and make an advertising feature of it

WRONG. The CATEGORY weight limit was 544 Kg; it has been increased to 600 KG. The MTOW is NOT the category limit. It's what the aeroplane was designed for, and must not be exceeded regardless of the category limit.

AMEN.

The gliding clubs provided a scholarship basis for 15 year olds who were in the air cadets. So the dads came along to see whether it was safe to let the kids fly in gliders - result - a number of dads added to the club membership.

Ian, one of the things that irritates me about the site, is the need to keep repeating various messages. Over the time I've been using the site, there have been a number of threads that produced information that was worth converting to an indexed reference. However, new arrivals have no way to look that information up, other than by browsing endlessly through the history. Therefore, one possibility you may perhaps like to consider, would be a topic index, for your moderators to use to allow visitors to use the site as a reference source.

Just to get some perspective on the controllability of an aircraft following a control system disconnect - how many of you have ever trimmed the aircraft and then taken your hands and feet off the controls, and watched what the aircraft does? A properly set-up, normally stable aircraft will pretty much fly itself; normally it will gradually drift off into a turn, which will gradually self-steepen; however if you keep it straight with either the rudder alone or the ailerons alone, you should be able (in smooth air) to fly like this for protracted periods. If it has sufficient dihedral on the wing, you should be able to perform up to rate one turns using the rudder alone; a good test is to fly a gentle figure eight on the rudder alone. It's advisable (cheap insurance) to get to know your aircraft in this way. If it won't do this, it's not set up correctly, and you should find out why. All this should be true whether it uses a fixed tailplane and elevators, or an all-moving tailplane. Some aircraft may start to "porpoise" slowly; this is called the "phugoid" pitch oscillation. It normally is quite slow - around 20 to 30 seconds per cycle, and it should damp out after a few cycles. If it does not, the aircraft has a form of instability that will make it more difficult to fly on the pitch trim system. If your aircraft is properly set up, and you always fly it in trim, a control circuit disconnect need not be a particularly exciting event - especially if the controls are fully mass-balanced. The main danger with a control system disconnect is that the loose part of the control system may jam - this is a particular hazard with pushrod systems.

If that means people are finally starting to look at design standards, and actually think about them, GOOD. FAR 23 applies to everything up to commuter aircraft - read the bit that applies to your situation & ignore the rest.