As usual, a very thorough investigation and report from the ATSB.
Theres a couple of things that really stick out for me in this accident. Pots has covered most of them above.
The biggest lessons to come from this accident (I feel) are for Instructors. The Instructor involved with this accident had almost 4000 hours, quite a reasonable amount of experience by anybodys standards. Its appears he was bitten by a cranky 'type' during a critical phase of flight and was unable t0 recover the aeroplane in time. The sad thing is, it looks like it was 'almost' recovered.
Something I talk about with other instructors quite often is the fact that experience does not always work for you, it can work against you.
The captain of the Titanic, had crossed the Atlantic literally hundreds of times in his long career. He knew the waters well, he knew the weather well. But he didnt know 'his machine'. The Titanic was a beast of a thing to turn, normally when an ice burg was spotted, they would manourvre around it.
But on the night of the sinking, a few things worked against them. But the last line of defence, the turn to avoid, was simply impossible due to the turning radius of the massive ship.
The captain was chosen due to his vast experience and knowledge of the waters. He had driven full speed across the berg field many many times before, so thats what he did this time.
When flying any new type, it would be easy for an experienced instructor to fall victim to the same thinking. Yea sure, when doing a conversion he/she may do a few stalls, a few steep turns etc. And the other edge of the sword is, the guy checking HIM out on the new type would know hes experienced and any conversion would be likely to be more of a pleasure flight with a stall or a glide chucked in. And to be honest, in MOST types of training aircraft ( the types where most Instructors spend the majority of those thousands of hours) this perfectly fine. But in a type like this, there are demons lurking just beneath the surface.
An example. A lot of people take some flap before turning base. In cessnas and pipers etc. Fine, no dramas. But if you do that in a type like this, and you dirty up just before turning base, you could easily be behind the drag very quickly as the attitude changes due to flap, AND you crack on a turn.
Thats just an example of ' negative transfer' from one benign type to another.
A less experienced pilot, would maybe have that little element of " hhmmm, she feels different this one" and may be less likely to allow things to get out of hand.
I once flew with a nervous young (low time) instructor who was so jumpy and nervous, but he wold react with lightening speed if I got 1 knott slow, or went to take flap when the white arc wasnt quite reached.
The hardest part of the instructing, IMHO is warding off complacency. Its so so easy to fall into a lull, a false sence of security. A real " ive done this sequence thousands of times, this one will be no different".. Theres a real lesson for ALL pilots but particularly Instructors in this accident.
The other factor I see being significant is the way stalling is handled 'in general" and how it very rarely relates to a stall thats likely to kill us.
We climb up high, we do some checks, we crack idle and try and remain level etc. Advanced stalling we may use power and flap, And maybe even try it in a turn...Scarey hey?
But who ever lost control at 3500 feet and spun in while flying the mother in law around looking for whales.?
Its the slow, mushy, out of balanced turn onto base and final that kills people. And the thing with this type of stall, is the nose is almost invariably "DOWN" as the stall is encountered. Not pitched up like pilots are shown in " stalling'. Very very confusing, and by the time the pilot works out hes in a spin, its well too late.
I believe that 10 hours would be sufficient time on type for an experienced instructor PROVIDING a good portion of that time was spent in the "nasty zone" and actually spent getting to 'feel' the aeroplane.