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You are going to have to cop the losses on this one. RA-Aus aircraft are allowed to fly in rain, and can thereby get airframe icing. If rain was cloud, VFR pilots would be required to remain clear of rain. It isn’t and we’re not.

I found this amazing. https://www.vice.com/amp/en/article/bvzyx8/science-youtuber-wins-dollar10000-bet-with-physicist?__twitter_impression=true I will try and embed a video.

I think I’ll add course and distance to my summaries, as that will give me the basics while I get the paper map out.

This is the form?

So, the throttle is the throttle and the mixture is the choke. Obvious to me NOW... Thank you so much for posting.

Likewise, when I approach an aerodrome, telling my left from my right, and working out circuit height and overfly height is mental load that I need to avoid. Also, these are saved so I should avoid problems with writing down the wrong frequency. The green boxes are the active and standby frequencies (L and R) for COM 1 and COM 2 (top and bottom). The other pages are pages that are below the diagram, clipped to the clipboard. The blue bars are symbols of how long it will take to gain and lose altitude. All the diagrams are top to bottom of the page (not orientated) otherwise the writing takes too much room. I have 129 hours so this is not advice from an expert. Any reflections are welcomed. I think a bigger iPad would be too big, much as I would like to be able to see more. I hate having an iPad on the yoke as it changes the control feel.

I used to draw on maps and mark things on the map with removable sticky tape. That made flight planning take too long and stopped me taking advantage of iPads. However, I did not want to plan frequencies, calls, XPDR, QNH, and altitudes on the fly, as it were. Too much brain power. My new plan is to velcro a clipboard to my kneeboard and velcro an iPad mini to the clipboard. In the diagram, red is transponder and QNH, green in frequencies, purple is calls and checklists, blue is altitudes and obstacle heights, and black is the rout, airspace boundaries, and 10-mile range rings.

The poor load would kill it for me personally.

I don’t think anyone is actually arguing against maintenance. Just playing with ideas.

I don’t think that anyone is putting words in your mouth. Another way of looking at it is that engines are so reliable that any maintenance you do might be crap maintenance, because it increases risk. When you work on an engine, you you have A, B and C sign off?

Extra weight.

“Long covid” with psychological effects = literal brain damage. 10% chance of that happening to you if you get the delta variant. Risk of death from AZ vaccine is 0.0001%. The lack of vaccines is tragic.

I meant ones that are better than ICE aircraft.

I’m happy for topics to go off track. Also, I’ll stick my neck out and say electric power for airplanes is a long way off. Batteries are too heavy. Synthetic fuel (petrol or diesel), made from renewable electricity, water and carbon dioxide would be better.

I was a fan of a previous video that this guy did. Talking about a pilot shortage meaning that they take anybody AND talking about specific crashes with students frozen at the controls is really unfair IMHO. As far as I know there is no way to select out students who will freeze at the controls. I read about a B36 pilot who was well regarded who froze under difficult conditions. I read about a military jet pilot being instructed who froze. As for the instructor. If you can’t overpower the student, you will have to stab them in the eye with a biro. Does any instructor know to do that?

I posted a year ago about a bug in oz runways that they still have not fixed and recently found another one.

Got it. I was with my instructor.

I'm no meteorologist, but are you sure that it is not to do with the how much wind veers (moves to clockwise) when you get close to the ground? In other words, are you sure that it is not due to wind usually going at right angles to the pressure differential except when close to the ground? Maybe gusts act more like higher-up winds. Sin of 15° is about 0.25. So maybe you could expect a 20 kt wind to automatically have a 5 to 7 kt crosswind component with gusts.

I borrowed this from Garfly's post. (I'm not saying he agrees with me or does not agree with me and have not discussed borrowing his post with him.) Alerted See & Avoid In the modern age of electronic flight bags (EFBs), GPS, TCAS, and other electronic devices, pilots are more distracted inside the cockpit than ever before! Combine this with inconsistent radio communications, increased traffic density, and more frequent RPT traffic in regional areas, and the holes in the swiss cheese start to align! Near miss and loss of separation events are the fourth most common occurrence type reported to RAAus. Now, more than ever, it is important that pilots maintain regular and consistent radio calls and look out techniques in order to maintain situational awareness. Pilots must avoid the temptation to become dependent on position information displayed on EFB or TCAS displays - This technology relies on the fitment of similar equipment in other aircraft, often resulting in inconsistent traffic displays and the potential for traffic to go unnoticed. Whilst this technology is valuable in assisting situational awareness, it must not replace the requirement for pilots to maintain a constant lookout and the need for regular radio calls for efficient alerted see and avoid principles. Head of Training Development, Neil Schaefer, recently observed the importance a maintaining a visual scan when conducting a flight review with an RAAus pilot. The pilot, who was using a SkyEcho ADS-B receiver, showed signs of complacency by relying on traffic information displayed on their iPad. During the flight review Neil visually spotted two aircraft in the local area which were not identified by the pilot in command - Neither aircraft was displayed on the pilots EFB. https://members.raa.asn.au/safety/safety-focus/alerted-see-and-avoid/? Since about the 1980's people have been trying to decrease accidents in complex systems by doing a so-called root cause analysis (RCA) following a near miss and accident. The RCA tries to uncover the factors that contributed to the accident and happened earlier than the last error that actually caused the accident. For example, if the ergonomics of a cockpit contributed to pilot error, then the ergonomics of the cockpit were also a cause, even though the cockpit was designed years ago. In order for RCA's to work, the people who made the mistake need to be willing to come forward completely voluntarily and tell the truth. They will only do that if they feel safe that they will not be punished. This is what it means to have a just organisational culture (JC) (acronyms are my own, not official) (Basically, if someone is reckless or impaired by drugs, then they should be punished, otherwise they should not. Different organisations draw this distinction a bit differently.) When all the information is collated, all the underlying causes of the problem can be addressed and the organisation and its safety improve. The above example is contrary to organisational safety because it is contrary to RCA and JA. • JA: people are going to be discouraged to come forward when they see that someone who made a mistake is publicly criticised like this. There was no need to label an attitude as "complacent". They could have said that the pilot was looking at the iPad instead of having their head on a swivel. • JA: they said, "signs of complacency". This suggests to the reader that no one bothered to ask the pilot about it. If they had asked the pilot about it, they would have been able to find out if the complacency was real. I think that having an iPad is the opposite of being complacent. It seems that the RA-Aus people spoke about it behind the pilot's back and decided to big note themselves, on the Net, about it. • JA: they could have used the pilot as a role model by having them write a near miss piece for the RA-Aus website. Instead, they wanted to look like superior aviators. • RCA: there was no consideration of the factors that lead up to the pilot relying on their iPad instead of looking out the window, or why the other planes did not show up on the iPad. There was no consideration of the possible upstream factors that could have contributed to the problems or where RA-Aus fell down on the job of fixing them. • As I understand it, different electronic flight bags show up different sets of planes. RA-Aus has not been trying to get all traffic on all iPads • How did the pilot come to think that traffic would be on the iPad. RA-Aus has allowed things to be marketed without sufficient warnings. • How come the pilot was not aware of the other aircraft because of radio calls? • Was the pilot safe because other safety layers, like doing proper circuit procedures kept people safe? I will be complaining to RA-Aus about their stupidity and encourage you all to do so too. I'm pissed that RA-Aus are wrong *and* happy with themselves.

Looking at the windsock over time is a good idea. Again, there was very little to no movement on final until late.

I must say, RAAUS describing a pilot as being complacent and looking at his iPad is *really* rude. The pilot would be able to identify himself from the anecdote.

I completely disagree. a) How can it be overthinking to wonder why you ended up beside the runway and not over it? b) Thinking about why you ended up over the grass instead of over the runway is part of the fun of flying. When you say that there is overthinking, are you suggesting that thinking about how come the aircraft ended up in the wrong spot is actually harmful?

I don’t mind your comment in the least. I am actually grateful for it (really). One of the few benefits of being older is that I enthusiastically mention the mistakes I make, and ask him to make a mental not of them fir later. It was not a easy habit to get into. One instructor accused me of over controlling when I was sitting out a gust in cruise. And a few minutes before had told me to look on a map to find the hills that were 3500 ft high in front of us. They were 2500 ft but looked higher because that’s that they do. I did get shitty at him. The aircraft stayed wings level and was pointing pretty much straight ahead, so I’m not sure what control input would have caused that. (I would have expected to weathercock into a gust.) I could easily have taken four seconds to respond, as I was taken by surprise. It would have taken a while for the gust to accelerate the plane. On a side note, with the accident report you mentioned that the pilot used aileron and did not mention pushing the yoke forward. One of my pet hates with instructing is that the tell people that if you pull back on the stick, the aircraft climbs. (Not an original pet hate, but I came up with it myself.) I will quiz the instructor about my control inputs. They are as good as my other instructor who was a training captain in an airline.

That’s a lot more than I was told - just half the gust!

The POH of the Foxbat says to land flapless if the wind is over 16kt. I used to think of that as just being a cross wind thing. Now, I will think of it as any wind. I can see more why instructors are said to add a few kts to the book as a safety factor, even if it is a bad idea. Your speed has to decay somewhere, so it might as well be a foot off the ground, (even if it takes longer because ground effect decreases your drag). Thank you for the comments about thermals and eddies.