Oscar

The simple fact that CASA had the power to audit RAA airworthiness documentation and ground RAA aircraft - both specific aircraft AND at least one entire manufacturer's line - is surely sufficient proof of the fact that ANY Sports Aviation organisation operates at the remit of CASA. To suggest otherwise is at worst specious, and if done by an organisation purporting to offer a 'better way' of managing their slice of the Sports Aviation 'pie', it is either naive in the extreme or wilfully misleading. Those with knowledge of the legal action taken by the family of one of the deceased following the double-fatal Sting accident near Goulburn ( and I do not intend to go into any discussion of that, it has been covered elsewhere) are aware that BOTH RAA and CASA were joined as defendants, for very sound legal reasons. Given CASA's history of, and strong corporate emphasis in terms of resources applied to, evading blame for anything that happens in Aviation, it is ridiculous (and possibly mendacious) for any organisation to suggest, even obliquely, that it can operate other than by dancing to the tune CASA plays.

If you fly gliders, every landing is a gliding landing - without go-around as an option. Your ONLY reference point - forget local landmarks for where to turn - is the threshold and the angle of declination that you know is appropriate to your machine. You do NOT blindly follow the 'tramped-out track', you vary your approach according to how your energy management (which is height and speed, power is not a factor) - relates to arriving at the threshold at the right height and speed. Without doubt, effective airbrakes are a major part of your calculation - but I personally - as trained - only used them to wash off excess energy at the last few dozens of feet, to hit the threshold at the minimum possible distance. Until then, we glider pilots keep a reserve of energy up our sleeves.. Has saved me some embarrassment on more than a few occasions.

Has a study yet been done on Boomerang ( of the non-powered variety, not the CAC Boomerang nor the Whitney Boomerang) engine failure rate? It is likely to show that there has been an above-average rate of non-powered landings. And as a result, we should - on-experience - be bracing ourselves for a CASA requirement for anyone who flies a Boomerang to sign before every flight a declaration that they are: a) of legal minimum age for consent to appreciate the risks involved; b) have successfully undertaken a Boomerang flight in the past 28 days; c) have a recognised Boomerang Training Facility endorsement on the specific type of Boomerang involved; d) will NOT sue CASA in the event they suffer an injury resulting from the Boomerang flight, and e) will NOT sue CASA in the event they suffer an injury resulting from the Boomerang flight, and f) will NOT sue CASA in the event they suffer an injury resulting from the Boomerang flight, and g) will NOT sue CASA in the event they suffer an injury resulting from the Boomerang flight. All to be notarised by the Pope, the Queen of Australia, and Donald Trump....

|When I worked at the Australian War Memorial, I had an almost unique opportunity to be down and personal with quite a number of very historical aircraft, amongst which were the bF109g, Spitfire MK IIa, ME 163 and 262, Mosquito, Kittyhawk, Boomerang, several Sea Furies, the A6M2 Zero, and a considerable number of others. Just about all of which I actually had to move, at various times. Even a casual inspection of a bF109 vs. a Spittie tells a great tale of the vast complexity for maintenance (let alone repair) of the two. I believe it was possible to do an engine swap in a 109 in 20 minutes, and you can see how that is possible; whereas the Spittie is a bloody nightmare of parts to be disconnected and then re-connected. Think doing an engine swap in a Datsun 1200 vs a Jag. Mk.12, and treble it.. I have never had the opportunity to look at a Hurribus; but I believe they were a far better ( more stable) gun platform than a Spittie. Douglas Bader flew both, and though I have not done extensive research, I think he achieved almost half of his 'kills' in a Hurribus.

OK, I don't have more!, though I should correct that quote: I just checked it on the NLA's 'Trove' site (A BRIEF RECORD OF GREAT ADVENTURES - The Australian Women's Weekly (1933 - 1982) - 21 Apr 1945 0 ), and the correct figures are: 340 mph at 20 feet. (see: F/Lt. Ron Hosking). Like many others, he didn't want to talk about his wartime experiences (and was a somewhat difficult man at times to discuss much at all with, very reticent by nature). I believe - but cannot support this - that he was at least one of the youngest Wingco's in the RAAF. I only found out about the Peenemunde flight from a large 'coffee-table' history of the Mosquito he had at home; when I was courting his daughter, I saw it, and being fascinated about Mosquitos even as a young kid, I asked him why, he simply said, ' I used to fly them, they were great'. So I looked up the index, and found a couple of paras on him and that flight; I still wonder what else he did that earned him the sobriquet of 'the redoubtable Ron Hosking' in the very much unemotional text. That those particular photos are considered important can be seen from: RAF's wartime reconnaissance photos go online in new archive. The actual circumstances were somewhat prosaic; Ron was on the way home, saw the ramp structures, fired off some shots of them. It took the skills of the legendary Connie Babcock to interpret what was in the pictures. I never did find out what other of his exploits were notable, but the idea of mostly ultra-low-level work suggests possibly the Nazi submarine pens in France, and possibly gathering intelligence for the Amiens prison raid. But I MUST state that this is pure speculation on my part. As far as I know, the PRU Spitties were always used for high-altitude work; the Mozzies were fast enough to be able to do the low-level stuff and not be caught too often. The thought of being required (and delivering) missions that entailed weaving a Mozzie at below the tree-tops (and many buildings..) at 300 knots is something I simply cannot even imagine.

My father-in-law flew Mosquitos for the PRU, though not Spitties. He took the first photos of Peenemunde, on the return from a reconnaissance flight from England down to North Africa and back around the top of Germany: 23 hours, mostly on one engine for economy. However, most of his service was done at low-level: '350 knots at 50 feet'. Loading for the PRU aircraft was hairy, at best. The best cameras were large and very heavy. Cotton is memorised for ignoring a Supermarine dictate to NOT put a certain camera in the back of a Spittie as it was considered to be too heavy; my FIL was awarded a DFC for saving an experimental camera by landing his Mosquito at something like 180 kts, because he ran out of up elevator at lower than that. It broke his back. I had as family friends two 10 Squadron pilots: Sir Richard Kingsland and Bill Riley, who operated the gliding school and glider sales for Blaniks and IS aircraft, at Tocumwal. Sir Richard's exploits are well known - totally 'hero' stuff'; Bill's are rather less well-known, but he was equally both a superb pilot and a total larrikan in the best Australian tradition. As is so typical of WWII flying personnel, very hard to get to recount any experiences. It was a job that they did; they survived, they did not glorify that. 10 Squadron had large losses. The Sunderlands flying out of the UK were a formidable weapon, both against the U-boats and against German aircraft. Known by the Germans as 'the Flying Porcupine' because of the formidable firepower they bought to bear against attacking aircraft.

I believe that those comments would hold up against conventional wisdom, but perhaps it would be instructive if we could get a genuine, proven expert to provide more information. I know one, but he no longer contributes to this site; and I could suggest another who might: Keith Englesman, for many years, chief test pilot at CASA. However, I return to my earlier comments: I believe that this accident occurred due to more factors than simply flight control. IF ATSB can deduce the actual flight path overlayed onto BOTH of the topography and an accurate analysis of the wind direction - especially the vertical wind path relative to the ground - it may well explain the pilot's actions. Where - on the scale of responses - would you place a conscious decision to tighten a turn vs. obviously flying into the ground on the current flight path? I suggest that the former is - for an experienced and competent pilot, which appears to me to be evident from his experience and history - a 'last-ditch' attempt to mitigate the situation. Whereas the latter is a capitulation to the inevitable. I would take the former, personally speaking. The concept of a 'black box' for every aircraft, of heavy-aircraft capability, is a furphy. However, there are a number of quite accessible aids to usable flight-recording. Most EFIS systems have GPS-encoded flight path information, and a simple 'dash-cam' camera - or a forward-facing Go-Pro - have recording capabilities to hard media that may provide recoverable information even from a water-based crash situation. Speculation, at the moment, seems to me to be based on no actual concrete information. Hence, speculation on the accuracy of other's speculation (and of course, that includes my own), seems to me to be second-generation debased as to accuracy.

Nev: I agree entirely, that LL expertise had almost everything to do with this situation. But: RAA can hardly be linked with training/bfr for a Beaver pilot, surely?

Again, with respect to everybody, the RAA training syllabus is in no way relevant to this thread. A good topic, but not for here.

Nev: I take the statement that 'Your relative airflow is at an angle higher than normal level flight' means that your relative airflow is negative relative to the ground. With which I completely agree. There was a quote in one of the Press reports from the Vice-President of the Australian Seaplane Pilots Association ( if I have that right, I can't find the report at the moment) that suggested a rotor from the northern shore could have been the problem. He would have experience that I simply do not have. But - FWIW- may I add here a personal experience of how strong such a rotor may be. I have a mate with a Pine plantation in the area between Taragla and Oberon. |We share work on our respective farms, and on his place, we have planted, and pruned, more than 70,000 pines. About 20 years of constant work, so you can imagine. we don't f-around with fire hazard reduction work. On a really serious wind day from the immediate West - directly upwind of his property - in at least 25 kts of wind, we did a hazard reduction burn on the eastern side of a ridge aligned almost due north-south. (We had permission, we were all members of the local RFS with many years of experience of hazard reductions to our credit with RFS management). First line of burn, across the ridge a few metres below the edge. The wind curl-over took our burn line up to the top of the ridge and then blew it completely out. Then we went to the bottom of the hill and lit up across the face. The curl-over wind took that burn-line straight up the hill to our previous break, and then the HR burn simply disappeared. Self extinguished. Not a damn spark went into my mates Pine forest, only on average about 50 metres from the line at the bottom of the hill where we lit it. Curl-over is a very strong feature of wind behaviour.

With great respect to all here, I think that the 'airspeed' question is immaterial. I agree with SD and Nev that airspeed per se does not change with consistent wind speed and direction. However - and once again, I exhort people to look at the topography in Satellite View from Google Earth or even Google Maps and try to overlay a likely image of the flight-path onto that. With my knowledge of the area, and constrained by my very limited power flying experience, I have tried to visualise what that flight-path might have been from the pilot's perspective. I have assumed that the pilot was extremely experienced and competent in flying that aircraft and would not have willingly, or incompetently, flown the thing right on the edge of stall speed.. I suggest that the major operative factors here were not airspeed per se but climb gradient, SOG, air mass horizontal direction and the geographical limitations of the area.. Let's look first at climb gradient. In crude terms: if you have a climb gradient of - let us say - 1:10 over a flat terrain (or water), and the terrain changes to an elevation gradient of +1:10, then you have a zero climb gradient. You are not increasing your AGL distance, even though your climb angle has not diminished. SOG: At a constant climb angle, turning downwind increases your SOG so climb gradient decreases. If you are flying into what amounts to a narrowing canyon, the terrain is coming up at you faster and you are effectively climbing out of it more slowly. Visually: the ground is rising around you and at the same time, your manouevering area is becoming tighter and tighter, very quickly. We recently had the double-fatal of the Icon Seaplane from turning into a narrowing 'canyon' where it did not - apparently - have the climb ability to avoid the rising terrain. In that situation, the pilot has only two options: try to fly the thing onto a slow hit on the side of the terrain, or try to turn away. I posted above a picture of Jerusalem Bay, and you can see how tight and steep the sides are, and what the local terrain comprises: it's all large trees. So suddenly, the very, very hostile ground is coming towards you at an increasingly fast rate. A tight turn to the right is likely the only option precluding an immediate crash. In the narrow confines of Jerusalem Bay, it appears that the pilot managed to execute that turn into wind - at least partly - successfully. Full marks to him. That SHOULD have put the plane into a considerably better effective climb gradient: but then horizontal air flow hits it. From long-time local knowledge, in any half-decent Easterly, there is a strong curl-over from the Eastern side of Jerusalem Bay. So instead of achieving a useful climb gradient, the air-mass is acting as (please excuse the emotive description), a giant hand pushing you down to the ground. I can all too easily imagine being the pilot, with the only choice left to me being to either fly into the side of the hill or try to tighten the turn to avoid that and hope to pull out over the water. Then, geographical limitations come into play. Jerusalem Bay at water-level is on average not much more than 200 metres wide. And when full of holiday boats, a bloody narrow target when everything has already gone very pear-shaped. I have very limited experience of power-flying, so do not claim to be in any way expert in my judgement. I am sure that others - and particularly, those with experience of flying a float-equipped Beaver - could provide a far better analysis of this scenario.

We are all - and absolutely I include myself in the 'we' equation - trying to find rational reasons as to why an apparently very, very experienced and competent pilot, flying what we have to assume for now was a very competent and fully-operational aircraft, ended up in this really ghastly situation. I sincerely believe that those contributing to this discussion are doing so with the best intent, so that others will gain an appreciation of a situation that evolved so terribly, not engaging in any sort of point-scoring. To do so would be a travesty of useful debate and a sad indictment of a forum conversation that hopefully can help improve safe flying. I state that my pre-occupation with this event is because it happened in an area for which I have a very special and lifelong attachment - it is as if it happened in my own backyard. As Nev has said above, the '30-degree limit', is merely a convenient number - it is NOT a physical limitation. The physical limitation is when the stall speed of the inside wing in a turn (and that has to be moderated by the effect of aileron position) is reached, and the outside wing is still generating lift, which drives the aircraft into a deep spin. I do not know, but imagine, that the drag of floats would lower the centre of drag possibly below the c/g, pushing the nose even further down before recovery. There is a damn good reason why test pilots won't start to investigate the limits of spin characteristics without having multiple thousands of feet AGL below them. If you look at the videos of Jabiru testing - and the Jabby is a renowned benign aircraft - you will see how much height it takes to recover from a 'serious' spin entry. Even the Sunbird Seeker - an aircraft that the FAA chief test pilot who flew it out here, remarked 'has possibly the most benign stall characteristics of any aircraft I have ever flown', and recommended that the FAA consult with the aero-engineer as to how that was achieved - would go to more than 70 degrees of bank, and a few times in early testing went inverted in early certification spin testing. I know the CASA test pilot for the Seeker; that is no exaggeration. Even the best pilots can be caught out. Many years ago, a mate - Paul Mander, a competition glider pilot - spiralled in while trying to climb out of low altitude, only about three kilometers from my place, over a large area of gently rolling pasture. He survived, but rather banged-up. I was horrified at the news, as I had done some minor repairs to his Pik 20B not a long time before, and immediately got in touch with him, but it wasn't the Pik, it was (from memory), a 17-metre Kestrel. His comment to me was (and I have to paraphrase here, we are talking 'way back in the day' stuff), that he'd gotten in well over his first turn just fine and 'then it just folded'. He had actually been on final approach for an outlanding - there was plenty of room for that - and hit a patch of lift, and tried to catch it. Look, we all know about the effects of wind shear. If we could SEE the wind, we could fly more safely for sure. Yachties - particularly those who race competitively - become pretty good at predicting the wind shift pattern around known areas bounded by major topographical features. Pilots who tread the same path many times ( such as croppies or glider tug pilots) become attuned to the likely local wind patterns. I hope, that a result of this forum discussion, readers may become more conscious of a 'danger envelope' into which one should try to NOT place oneself. That at least would be an honourable legacy for those who perished, so sadly, on a flight that should have been a wonderful experience.

A turn effectively crosswind would reduce the climb gradient, with rising ground ahead adding to the dicey situation; the subsequent turn back into wind should have helped BUT you have the three factors of a tight turn causing further loss of height, even more steeply rising ground, and increasingly limited maneouvering area. IF there was any curl-over, and the eastern shore of Jerusalem Bay is a prime location for that - suddenly, it would be all cards in the deck stacked against the unfortunate pilot. If you look at the photos here: Google Maps You can see just how steep the sides of Jerusalem Bay are ( the east side is the left-hand side in the photos)

Actually, there is a fairly close correlation between the effect of a rotor behind a steep hill for yachts and for aircraft, but you have to think in horizontal rather than vertical. You can be comfortably broad-reaching across the line of the shore in the true wind, which at that point is an off-shore breeze. Then, sail into the rotor, and suddenly you are in an on-shore breeze, and having to tack off the (now) lee-shore. And if you've been somewhat scraping along on that reach with a spinnaker or large Genoa up, you really have to scramble at times to get that off and things re-set for the tack away... I have seen West Head from WAY too close for comfort, in exactly that situation in a WNW breeze, and I was very conscious that it could happen.

I personally thought that Nobody's comment was polite, very well supported by his figuring, and worthy of consideration. (edited..mod)

Oh, thanks to Turbs's analysis and information, the maths is pretty simple. Going by this forum, there are about 8,995 RAA members who are sufficiently satisfied with how RAA is travelling, that they do not choose to engage in debate about it. (I am not one, I am not a current member of RAA) There appears to be about five - assuming all are RAA members - dissatisfied and querulous.

It doesn't take a vast leap of imagination to suggest that for the first half at least of 2016, 1/3rd of the RAA fleet - Jabirus - flew very, very limited hours. Especially for training, for which Jabbies were way the greatest component.

Oh dear, now you've gone and spoiled the New Year already for our Federal Treasurer!

Kasper: I can't answer your question; I haven't looked at the requirements for 95:10 kits, because, to be honest, I have no interest in this area of flying. Prima facie it seems incongruous.

Is it definite that it was the Morgan Cheyenne? - it certainly looks like it, but further comment should not be made until there is positive identification.

That would be the same set of bush barristers who have already dissected RAA's handling, of course. But jeez, louise, you had the opportunity to showcase (and with the wonderful benefit of hindsight, of course) ELAAA's enlightened approach - call it a 'taste of the lolly', perhaps? Surely ELAAA is not afraid to hoist its colours? You will have to accept that it will never be above criticism, and the Rec Flying community is nothing if not forensically and enthusiastically critical..so it's a given that some flack will come your way. Gosh, I'll bet that when JC walked on water, somebody complained about him stuffing up the fishing for the day. Such is life..

Keith - I did see your now-deleted comment, and I certainly was in no way offended by it, nor would have taken umbrage at all! However, site rules are site rules... I am, though somewhat deflated in my hopes that you would outline how ELAAA would have handled the Jab. engine issue. Here was an opportunity for you to lead by example in the search for transparency in the operation of any administrative body responsible for recreational aviation, that you reject. That is, of course, entirely your right to do, no one can force it upon you, but I do think you have rather tossed away the moral high ground on this one...

Keith: work is always the curse of the talking class. Everybody needs a break over this mad time. I look forward to your exposition of how the ELAAA would have handled the Jabiru situation. In the meantime, I note that you have re-focussed your comments towards the CASA audit. Now, the problems that audit found in RAA administration were a product of the 'old' RAA administration. That is an incontrovertible fact of history. The 'shiny, new RAA' that you so castigate has to ensure that the manifold problems of the earlier RAA administration will never again intrude on recreational aviators to ground their aircraft, reduce their MTOW to single-seat aircraft when they had paid large sums of money in the belief that they would have an effective two-seat aircraft etc. Not exactly a shining endorsement of the 'old' RAA. A cynical person might question whether the discarded rump of the 'old' RAA that had been found so deficient by CASA might be the best people to lead recreational aviation into a bright new future.

Kasper, I know (or knew, since one of them has passed away several years ago) two of the principal protagonists for those changes - their names appear in the minutes of evidence repeatedly - very well, and I am in NO way suggesting that there was any fault in the logic behind what came out of HORSCOTS. I believe it achieved, as you say, some very important developments improving safety for ultralight aviation in Australia. In fact, I suggest that it possibly emboldened the CASA of that era to look to a more realistic MTOW for the next upward 'class' of ultralights above that imposed by other national authorities such as evidenced in BCAR S and the similar JAR standards, that allowed for the development of some damn fine early ultralights by world standards, such as the Jabiru LSA55, the Lightwing series, etc. But my point is this: it seems to me that there is now strong criticism of the current RAA administration attempting to adjust to the changed expectations and demand - as evidenced by sales - for a class of what perhaps we should call 'very light' aircraft of comparable capability to the small and relatively simple end of GA. Yet, that - to me - appears to be qualitatively no different to the efforts of the nascent AUF at HORSCOTS to improve the situation at that time. Quantitatively, it has to deal with the situation of today, which is so much more complex and hence complexity is an unfortunate fellow-traveller to progress. In no small part, we have lawyers to curse for that; and I would think that any reasonable person could not place blame at the feet of RAA for the actions of lawyers. We have the intrusion of 'standards' for safety, product liability etc. that are NOT the product of RAA action. This phenomenon is not restricted to Aviation. The complexity, weight, cost etc, of a 'family' sedan car of today is several hundred kgs heavier, and multiples of the cost, of a comparable car of 20 years ago. It is all but impossible for owners to do ANY maintenance work beyond oil changes and perhaps brake pad replacement and spark plug changes, for the suitably experienced. You cannot tune it in the backyard garage. And perish the thought of modifying it.. Yet, I do not see any similar outcries for change to these 'impositions' that seems to be a feature for (some) recreational aviators. The call here seems to be that we should be left alone to do our thing, that we are a class apart, and that RAA is monumentally deficient in apparently conniving to not resist these impositions on our freedom. Let me state categorically that I wish that exactly these feelings could be achieved. It would make my flying so much easier. For what I want to do with my own aircraft, and in respect of the multitude of changes I have made to my old Jabiru, I would hugely welcome a more relaxed regulatory regime. BUT: times have changed. This is just a fact of our existence, that we - and RAA - must deal with. May I present an example of just how far 'times have changed'? Just before Christmas Day, our Prime Minister copped a $250 fine for not wearing a life-jacket while paddling an inflatable dinghy 20 metres from his jetty to the shore.. Here is his Twitter response: Yesterday I was moving an inflatable dinghy from a jetty into the beach - only about 20 metres and always very close to the shore. I wasn’t wearing a life jacket, but as NSW Maritime explained to me today when I called them, because I was in the dinghy alone, even for that very short distance the NSW regulations required me to wear one. The rules can often seem very technical, but they are there to keep us safe and we should all comply with them. So lesson learned; I will make sure I always wear a life jacket in my dinghy regardless of how close I am to the shore, just as I always do on my kayak. Please - think about this, and try for a moment to place yourself in the position of RAA trying to deal with this level of regulatory insanity that we all have to endure in our daily lives.

On quite a different note, I notice that KP has taken a holiday and chosen not to respond to my post #152. Hopefully, KP is having a well-earned respite from his travails against the RAA - and long may you prosper, KP. But when you return, I still want an answer.