Garfly

BTW, the writers of that AVweb article (Surviving VFR into IMC) reckon that this US AOPA online-course is the best education aid on the subject they came across: https://www.aopa.org/training-and-safety/online-learning/online-courses/weather-wise-vfr-into-imc

There's a story behind that 178 seconds notion which is told in this article: Surviving VFR into IMC VFR into IMC events have a distressingly high fatality rate. Here's why they happen and some strategies for surviving based on research into reports from pilots who successfully handled the challenge. https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/technique/surviving-vfr-into-imc/ EXCERPT: "Perhaps you’ve seen the widely distributed aviation video 178 Seconds to Live. The narrative starts: “The sky is overcast and the visibility poor. That reported five-mile visibility looks more like two and you cannot judge the height of the overcast. . .” It continues: “. . . You find yourself unconsciously easing back just a bit on the controls to clear those none- too-imaginary towers. With no warning, you are in the soup. . .” And then, dramatically, “You now have 178 seconds to live!” Or do you? As a survivor of a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) incident that lasted a lot longer than 178 seconds, I often wondered about the veracity of 178 Seconds to Live. It certainly wasn’t true in my case. Where had this video come from? Was it a follow on to those old “scare ‘em straight” propaganda movies they fed us in high school? A post about the video on a social media site mentioned a “study with 20 subjects.” I started doing research. The oldest reference to the phrase “178 seconds to live” in a VFR into IMC narrative I located was an article with the same title published in the January/February 1993 issue of FAA Aviation News. I then discovered that the “study” was really part of an experiment—the results of which had nothing to do with what eventually became 178 Seconds to Live. And, after the research I conducted into surviving a VFR into IMC encounter, I can’t help but wonder whether teaching that a pilot has but 178 seconds to live has caused fatalities because some who got into what is a frightening situation gave up rather than do what was needed to survive. In 1954, the University of Illinois published a report entitled The 180—Degree Turn Experiment. The objective of the experiment was to see if 20 non-instrument-rated pilot subjects could be taught a technique for making a 180-degree turn and controlled descent in instrument meteorological conditions. In order to document the progress of the subjects, there had to be a baseline established for the abilities of each at the beginning of the project. Each pilot was evaluated on his or her ability to maintain control of an airplane under simulated instrument conditions. During his or her initial flight, each subject eventually placed the airplane into what the report referred to as “an incipient dangerous attitude.” The minimum time to reach an incipient dangerous attitude was 20 seconds; the maximum time was eight minutes. The average was 178 seconds. 178 seconds was the average of baseline measurements taken for the purpose of evaluating the results of an experiment. I think it is also important to note that most of the subjects had little or no experience with the type of aircraft used in the experiment, a Beechcraft Bonanza, and that they were flying it with only a bare minimum of instruments—what we would call partial panel. Over the years, that baseline measurement took on a life of its own. It morphed from being the initial evaluation of a subject’s ability to control a complex aircraft in simulated, partial panel IMC into an urban myth that an unwary pilot can survive for less than three minutes in an inadvertent IMC encounter. Variations of “178 Seconds to Live” have been promoted by the civil aviation authorities of both Canada and Australia. Are pilots who encounter IMC on a VFR flight doomed as the video claims? Hardly. While they are seriously at risk, a look at the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System reports finds that pilots can and do survive VFR into IMC encounters ... "

Public speculation about possible pilot error is not not pointing fingers.

Although, I see the Mazda/Wankel is back, but now as a range extending genset for its new EV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-3gzQVGEqF4

Yes, strangely, Loctite is not included in their testing but I notice that, in this full official version of the promo, adhesives - and locking wire - do, at least, warrant a mention (at 02: 45) Anyway, that other (truncated) posting of the video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kx-DyuIcGGc has a Comments thread about Loctite, which I found interesting (albeit, as an interested spectator only, regarding aero-mechanics ;- ) Jerry Cann 4 days ago I was working on aircraft when Loctite put their pitch to use that product on fasteners in the aero industry. I went to a seminar on their products which were superior to many types of securing nuts including cotter pins. There was only two types of locktite back them, red for permanent lock and blue for threadlock. I would have liked to see how loctite compares to Nord-lock both in performance and price

It's also something to do with Kenneth More as Douglas Bader in Reach for the Sky making it quite clear to his chaps that it's not the done thing; referring to their aircraft as 'kites'. Also, well done, little Aussie battler, TurbAero.

I doubt the porkies are coming from the pilot. Only a pro-propaganda outfit could make that stuff up.

This bloke asks the same question ... and adds some speculation about the 'story' that doesn't add up.

An update by Bertorelli:

A Nordlock promo video:

A bit more about it here from 05.30 to about 06.30 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QQuaC79JjxE&t=16s

Yes, it can be a really tricky situation needing a lot of judgement and experience to manage safely. And if your ab initio training happens to have been at either a controlled airport - where you are told exactly what to do - or at a very quiet strip - where you might never have needed to negotiate sequencing with anyone, you'd be very unprepared when arriving at a busy uncontrolled regional port. Especially one where RPT traffic's involved. Throw in multiple runways and the game of checkers turns to chess. So maybe complex uncontrolled circuit work should be a specific subject on the syllabus. Although good places to train are not always easily available. Failing that, I've sometimes thought that a cricket pitch might make a fine classroom for some cheap basic training ; a bunch of fellow students walking the 'circuit' (at various speeds) yelling out their locations and intentions. Maybe an arm in the air indicating 500' above and knuckle dragging, 500' below. (Of course, all done at the risk of being bundled off by the constabulary to a safe place somewhere ;- )

Or (a bit) closer to home you can stay in a DC3 - and have it all to yourself (at The Lily, Stirling Ranges (near Albany) WA.) https://www.thelily.com.au/accommodation CLICK FOR FULL SIZE:

I believe what Turbs found hilarious was my suggestion in a post (on p.4) that this level of (uncontrolled) terminal congestion could be worrisome. Which I posted in response to Thruster88's comment (on p.3): "Imagine you are inbound to this airport. How many radio calls would it take to get situational awareness versus what can be seen in a few seconds on a screen. The future is here, we just all have to get on board. "

That's heroic. But we're discussing here the case of just two professional PICs, each more than 'up to the task', colliding mid-air in G-space, due insufficient awareness of each other (at the Gold Coast, as at Mangalore and Ketchikan, Alaska) and the conclusions of safety boards that readily available tech should alleviate the danger. That was the point. Not trying to be funny.

The NTSB final report is now out: Report_CEN21FA215_103073_4_2_2023 3_13_06 AM.pdf https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/ntsb-says-midair-pilot-overshot-pattern-turns/?MailingID=1293 NTSB Says Midair Pilot Overshot Pattern Turns By Russ Niles Published:April 1, 2023 "The NTSB has cited airmanship and an air traffic control failure in the midair collision of a Cirrus SR22 and a Key Lime Air Swearingen SA226TC at Centennial Airport in Englewood, Colorado on May 12, 2021. The board found that the Cirrus pilot was going at least 50 knots over the recommended speed as he prepared to land. As a result, he overshot his turns from downwind-to-base-to-final by so much he ended up crossing the extended centerline of the adjacent parallel runway. That’s exactly where the Swearingen happened to be and the Cirrus sliced through the twin’s fuselage. The Cirrus pilot activated the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) and settled about three miles from the airport while the cargo plane, missing a big chunk of its fuselage, landed “uneventfully” according to the report. There were no injuries."

Yet you can spread tonnes of Super all day long up and down countless acres and not for a second take your mind off the job. Go figure! ;- )

Yes, I reckon that'd be the case, SP but in that post I was referring to an Archerfield near-miss story in the latest Flight Safety Australia mag: https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2023/03/too-close-for-comfort/

That's quite an interesting case. Yeah, there'd be a lot of (competing) thoughts running through any such pilot's head - whether to pull or not, the big red handle. But destruction of the plane ain't likely to be one of them. Even sans insurance. Anyway, there's no guarantee that wheels running on paddock or backroad would do less damage. Cirrus have their reasons for urging the big pull when in doubt. For myself, the question of whether that nicely installed - but untested - BRS in the Skyranger will actually work if called upon, does prey on my mind, a bit. Which is why one reason for hitting the silk early would be in case it doesn't work; there still might be time to set up for a conventional forced arrival. (Which is how it turned out in this case above.) Another, issue would be: do I really want to end up hanging from my straps - after an otherwise okay forced landing - with a powerful explosive right by my head, now on a half-pulled, hair-trigger? For that reason (all else being deemed equal) it may be better to eliminate that danger - to self, pax and first responders - by giving the rocket it's head, aloft, and returning to earth hands free and happy. On the other hand, if the landing did appear pretty straightforward on a nice piece of flat earth then it'd be real tempting to avoid becoming famous on the evening news and the "Aircraft Incidents and Accidents" forum. In any case, I doubt that a serious consideration would be whether or not my chosen way would be deemed 'chute-worthy' by a jury of my (remote) peers. ;- )

And remembered to this day, 75 years on, in Nundle.

Without one, the choice is easy. With one, it can get complicated.

Flying Harry of Iceland rides his Nynja to a Fly-in at BIEG (Egilsstaður) over on the east coast. And takes part in a local Skyranger family reunion ;- )

This got me to wondering what the industry standards were in that regard. I found these tidbits interesting: https://www.ifr-magazine.com/training-sims/flight-traffic-displays/ "TCAS is the touchstone that all systems reference. It interrogates surrounding transponders much like ATC secondary surveillance radar. The system must have a 14-mile range, but most extend to 40." So the range of our SE2s is not so shabby, after all; at least in their primary (air-to-air) role and at our relatively leisurely closure rates. Regarding Traffic Advisory standards: "Proximate traffic is within six miles and 1200 feet, but not a threat. TAs and RAs are based on a closest point of approach (CPA) based on time. (Provisions exist for slow closure rates.) An aircraft with a CPA of 20-48 seconds sets off a TA, with higher altitudes yielding the longer times. A target with a 15-35 second CPA sets off an RA in TCAS II." And regarding CDTI (Cockpit Displays of Traffic Information) standards when TCAS info is combined with that of ADSB et al: "TCAS, TAS, and TCAD follow the same display scheme. TIS adds a vector showing an aircraft’s ground track in 45 degree increments. ADS-B mixes things up. Traffic display standards for ADS-B traffic relay directional information by using an arrowhead symbol in either white or cyan. An altitude climbing or descending arrow, a directional vector line extending from the point of the arrowhead, and call sign are also shown for ADS-B Out traffic. Non-ADS-B craft show as “Pacman” symbols with altitude and climbing/descending arrows provided by TIS-B. Ground traffic displays as brown/tan. Ground vehicles are also brown/tan as a top-view rectangle with “wheels” that take some imagination to see. Combining TCAS or TAS with ADS-B modifies the display of traffic. Non-ADS-B Out traffic will be depicted using standard TCAS symbology. Display of traffic with ADS-B Out will show new symbols combining the arrow head into either an amber circle for a TA and red square for an RA."

Yes, something to be aware of: OUT is universal but IN isn't, in commercial/ IFR aviation. I'd still like to know how many RPTs - jets and turboprops - that venture down among the G weeds, have ADSB-IN traffic displays. I can't understand why they wouldn't. Yes ... but also 'carry personal "IN" devices for situational awareness'.

Yeah, well I guess we'll figure it out as we go along. It'd be great if CASA did some comprehensive field trials of EC gear and published the data. But I don't see it happening soon. In the meantime, little experiments like the one done by kgw (above) can help us calibrate our expectations regarding the INs and OUTs of the SE2. Actually the IN part we can figure out for ourselves. That evidence is right before our eyes.