Garfly

I'm keen to know, for instance, at about what distance an RPT (or other IFR flight) might pick me up on their fish-finder, If we discover that we're converging somewhere in Class G space. If we each have a map view of the other's relative position it makes our radio back and forth a lot quicker and more effective. I also found it interesting that Glen reckons we're likely to have at least 20nm 'visibility' to an AirServices base station. It helps to know that if you're in some kind of emergency situation knowing that Area can see you; it would free you up to take care of aviating. Also handy to know even if you're just planning the safest route around tiger country (and trying to remain conspicuous). I have found that even the audible alerts offered by the AvTraffic app gives you plenty of time to identify and avoid a threat. Typically, it seems to be a good 30 secs or more. (Although when used as a stand alone app it is subject to cell system delays, of course.) Don't know about others. Yes, if one or the other aircraft has the other on their "radar" - and they're talking - it should be okay. But just knowing what to reasonably expect from this fairly new, low-cost tech seems pretty desirable to me. Not only about 'range' but anything and everything else about it; another tool in the safety kit bag.

Glen, so would you expect proper TSO'd ADSB-IN / CDTI gear to 'pull in' your average EC target over greater distances than, say, another EC/EFB device would?

That's a handy number, since many of us fly with a 10nm ring of confidence on our EFBs anyway.

Yes, good point. Just because we 'see' targets 40miles away, doesn't mean we're 'seen' at that distance. Not that we'd need to be, by other traffic. To be seen at a distance by ATC, though, might be useful (or not ;- ). The low-power of the SE2, then, amounts to a self-filtering mechanism, preventing us, the aerial hoi-polloi, from cluttering traffic displays over vast areas. (≈5000 sq. miles given a 40mile range).

Yes, that article saying that "it is expected that with a new ATC system on the way, SkyEcho2 transmissions will be displayed to controllers, for situational awareness only, using distinctive symbology" suggests that it's just a software tweak (if anything at all) that was needed to allow EC 1090 transmissions to display. Anyway, I guess it means that Area controllers, too, for the most part, are able to see us now - given line of sight and <40NM. There are quite a few RAAus aircraft that operate out of Canberra - including a certain CT with the moniker 0000 (which they used to call "double zero, double zero" but now [by special arrangement?] goes by "Charlie Tango, double zero"). The rest are addressed by numbers alone - minus the generic "Romeo". E.g: "eighty seven, fifty-five". Of course, these aircraft, would be using proper Mode S transponders, since no EC thingy is kosher in Class C). Yes, for sure, or as the Feds put it "The prime objective of SkyEcho2 is air-to-air traffic awareness"

Thanks for doing that experiment kgw. This is good to know. The authorities seem a bit quiet as to the when and where of ATC's 'awareness' of EC devices. I wonder if it's already happened, right across the country. The next question is, what percentage of commercial/IFR aircraft are already equipped with ADSB-IN of some kind? For example, are most (all?) RPT flights, able to see EC devices on their CDTIs - as we see them, on our ADSB/EFBs? (TCAS, I understand, still doesn't cut it for that purpose.) At any rate, here's the official advice from a couple of years back: VFR and visible _ Flight Safety Australia.pdf Can ATC ‘see’ my SkyEcho2? The prime objective of SkyEcho2 is air-to-air traffic awareness – the device is not certified to the performance standards needed for ATC separation services. Nevertheless, CASA envisages the device being used for situational awareness by ATC. By early this year, the Airservices Australia ATC system had not been modified to display SkyEcho2; however, it is expected that with a new ATC system on the way, SkyEcho2 transmissions will be displayed to controllers, for situational awareness only, using distinctive symbology which will prevent the application of surveillance separation standards to those aircraft. Given the COVID crisis, there is uncertainty about when this capability may be delivered by Airservices Australia.

Yeah, but I gather it was an issue of being on the wrong frequency at the wrong time. "When I look back on the incident, I wonder what more I could, or should, have done to prevent it from even happening. Lessons learnt: Perhaps if I had listened out on the Brisbane Centre frequency as well as the Archerfield Tower frequency during our direct track to Park Ridge, we may have been alerted to the presence of the twin. As it turned out, the only things that saved us from a mid-air collision on that day were pure luck and a sliver of time"

"THE FIRST WE KNEW ABOUT THAT AIRCRAFT WAS WHEN ITS NOSE APPEARED IN THE TOP OF OUR WINDSCREEN, SLOWLY OVERTAKING US AND GRADUALLY DESCENDING." https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2023/03/too-close-for-comfort/

Especially when they're also Rock Stars! (see lower right)

As Sam Goldwyn famously put it: “Let's have some new cliches.”

Absolutely, you've got to sift heaps of chaff on YT - and most social media. As you say, the Comments are susceptible to a whole world of opinionated ignorance. On the upside, there's a large installed base of subject-savvy contributors, as well. One has to grit one's teeth and be ready to speed-scroll. That being said, it's gonna do my head in if I have to be told, once more, that "There are old pilots and there are bold pilots ...blah, blah, blah." ;- )

As are others in their own way.

Wow, sorry to misdirect you and waste your time on a mere forum.

Really? I found a few of them that added more than I'd gathered from some other forums. AMREP 3 weeks ago I have many thousands of hours acting as PIC on this model. I don't buy the rudder trim issue. I can think of no reason for the rudder trim to be set fully in one direct or the other except for checking that it has unrestricted full travel during the ground checks. Could have become distracted and failed to center it again after the check. However, This airplane has some pretty serious balls when you open the throttles for takeoff. I can't imagine a pilot of a twin turboprop not immediately aborting the takeoff at the first sign that the airplane was pulling incredibly hard in one direction or the other. The incredibly strong pull would have happened long before the airplane was fast enough to fly. I.e., if it was the rudder trim issue, it would have pulled so hard prior to 'RedLine' that it would have been suicide to not abort and keep it on the ground at ALL costs! Sadly, when everyone in the airplane is lost, we have to go with what we think might have happened. My guess is )and I am one of a handful of pilots around the globe that don't automatically become a crash investigator immediately after an accident) that there was more to this than meets the eye. My sympathy to their families. Wally Wally 3 weeks ago This still haunts me I knew Max the driver, we used to cross paths on various charters, I’m convinced Max had a medical event and simply couldn’t handle this flight on the day. I’ve got 4000 hrs on type, the plane can handle the full trim deflection, Max couldn’t. RIP to all Darryl Day 3 weeks ago Thank you, I wondering how an experienced pilot could make so many errors before flight and then during the flight fail to raise the gear and apply rudder once airborne. Makes sense now. Animula 3 weeks ago That makes sense because the longer roll than normal and the gear being left down too. He must have had something major distracting him and thought he would get past it as he took off, but then he figured out it was too serious and sent the mayday but couldn’t manage the aircraft because of whatever was going on. 3 weeks ago Thx Wally, I came to comments to see if someone with knowledge could verify my suspicion that it wouldn't have been trim. 4 passengers is a light load. Seems like something else was likely. Charles Brewer 6 days ago Thanks for your video. Some comments though. You said the retail centre was just outside the airport. In fact it was built within the original airport grounds. This is an increasing problem in Australia as airports have been sold off to private operators. //... In the event of an emergency there is now no where an aircraft can safely put down! This is a growing problem. At Bankstown (YSBK) the 18/36 runway was closed years ago and the area converted into commercial real estate. //... At Camden (YSCN) a nursing home has been built in line with the runway in a position that used to be rural land and was available for aircraft in an emergency. An aircraft cannot return to the runway unless it has reached around 1,000 ft,//... In the case of Camden, that means into the nursing home! Local Councils must be held to account for their irresponsible planning decisions.

This is a video analysis of the Essendon accident. Interesting discussion in Comments section if you 'Watch on YouTube'.

Yes, to err is human; to minimise tragedy is the job of Aviation Safety organisations. For over a century they've done a pretty good job, working on the assumption that something can be done; even with humans.

Looks like an amazing project PP all the best with it. Just for your info, there is already a "Valkyrie" on the RAAus books, registered as 19-1684. It's this recently finished one-off build by Chris Weber over at Taree: CLICK FOR FULL SIZE:

Absolutely, and Senator Xenophon's concluding points make it clear how widespread the industry's disdain for the Mandarins was and, pretty much, remains: 1.22 Ultimately, this inquiry has exposed serious and significant flaws in Australia's aviation safety systems. The general industry attitude towards both the ATSB and CASA is incredibly concerning; it is a mixture of fear, suspicion, disappointment and derision. 1.23 It is my view that CASA, under Mr McCormick, has become a regulatory bully that appears to take any action available to ensure its own shortcomings are not made public. This poses great risks to aviation safety, and the safety of the travelling public. Equally, the ATSB—which should fearlessly expose any shortcomings on the part of CASA and other organisations to improve aviation safety—has become institutionally timid and appears to lack the strength to perform its role adequately. Both agencies require a complete overhaul, and I believe it is only luck that their ineptness has not resulted in further deaths so far. There is an urgent need for an Inspector-General of Aviation Safety, entirely independent of the Minister and his department, to be a watchdog for these agencies. 1.24 In the end, this report raises many questions. But if we wish to bring about change and improve aviation safety, we will clearly need to look beyond our inept regulators and ask: who will guard the guards themselves? Senator Nick Xenophon Independent Senator for South Australia May 2013 https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Completed_inquiries/2012-13/pelair2012/report/d01

Yes, I totally agree that the system is biased so that, in the end, it's mostly the pilot who's to blame. Which is why, in my view, we end up with endless reams of barely decipherable NOTAMs, all of which, we're, nevertheless, obliged to absorb in every last detail before we take-off. (And I note that the NTSB quite agrees with me ;- ) Anyway, I'd be happy to substitute "aviation officialdom" for "regulators" in regard to the ATSB's long lasting campaign to push for CDTI. But, in any case, CASA has been just as keen. They're the ones who (surprisingly, I thought) were quick to facilitate the approval process for conspicuity devices as part of the system. And, I don't believe either organisation is playing games when it comes to this issue. (I can't say the same for ASA, though, with its loopy Class E proposals.) In the end, the regulators are regulated by Parliament. And the Nick Xenophon Senate Enquiry into the Pel-Air ditching was a case where the government actually did its oversight job on behalf of the pilot and of justice. And in that case the ATSB and CASA stood together in the dock. "Additional Comments by Senator Nick Xenophon Who guards the guards themselves? 1.1 I would like to acknowledge the many submitters to this inquiry, and in particular the individuals who were involved in the incident itself. Their information and testimonies were invaluable to the committee and I appreciate their contributions, particularly in light of how distressing it was for them to relive the accident. 1.2 As the committee states, this inquiry was not an attempt to re-examine the circumstances of the ditching of Pel-Air VH-NGA, or to conduct an aviation accident investigation. Instead, it focussed on the reporting standards and activities of the ATSB and CASA in relation to the ditching, and general governance, transparency and accountability issues. 1.3 However, what is clear from this inquiry is that, while the pilot of the flight did make some erroneous decisions, he essentially became a scapegoat for serious regulatory failures on the part of CASA and the ATSB. // ..... " https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affairs_and_Transport/Completed_inquiries/2012-13/pelair2012/report/d01

Basic research might lead to this ATSB safety report from April 1991: A few excerpts: "The see-and-avoid principle serves a number of important functions in the Australian air traffic system. However, while it undoubtedly prevents many collisions, the principle is far from reliable. The limitations of the see-and-avoid concept demand attention because increases in air traffic may impose an accelerating level of strain on see-and-avoid and other aspects of the air traffic system." "Perhaps the most damning evidence against see-and-avoid comes from recent trials carried out by John Andrews in the United States which have confirmed that even motivated pilots frequently fail to sight conflicting traffic." "See-and-avoid has been described as a maritime concept originally developed for slow moving ships which is now out of place in an era of high speed aviation (Marthinsen 1989)." "The Americans, having recognised the limitations of the concept, are looking to other methods such as the automated airborne collision avoidance system (TCAS) to ensure traffic separation." Sounds like a warning to me. see_and_avoid_report_print.pdf

Say what? Better we spend our 'basic research' time on History and Social Psychology to explain why we humans tend to cling to principles and dogma beyond their obvious use-by date - not to mention countless other unforced group-think errors. I don't catch your drift. Yes and no. Nobody can transmit 1090 Mhz signals without government approval [ADSB-OUT] Anyone can receive/display such signals. The liberty to have either IN or OUT on board would be meaningless if your likely 'collidees' had neither. Our regulators are not the problem here. They have been warning against relying on "see and avoid" for at least 30 years.

This is the video the ATSB posted to accompany its "cockpit visibility study", a follow up to it's Mangalore final report: And the still image below is from a series used to illustrate the limitations of "see and avoid" in this case. It shows the 13-seconds-to-crash view from the Left Seat Pilot's perspective. In fact there'd been some clouds about - making it worse - but this imagery uses CAVOK for a best-case outlook. The lower left section shows what a standard CDTI (cockpit traffic display) would have shown the pilots had one been installed. The yellow text is the aural warning that such a system would have provided at that point (not the first warning, BTW; aural or visual ). CLICK THUMBNAIL TO EXPAND: A Sky Echo2 type conspicuity device would have displayed the threat differently - on a tablet device - but, in the ATSB's view would likely have served the same collision-avoidance purpose. Anyway, there's lots more detail in the actual report https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2022/aair/as-2022-001

This is a follow-up study by the ATSB into the "see and be seen" implications of the Mangalore accident. Feel the exasperation. It seems the lag to fear most is the one due to ideological inertia. https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2022/aair/as-2022-001 What the ATSB found The study found that the pilots of both aircraft were unlikely to have acquired the other aircraft visually due to meteorological factors, aircraft closing speed and shielding of the opposing aircraft by cockpit structure with 2 of the 4 pilots likely having the opposing aircraft shielded from their view at key moments. The ATSB analysis indicated that even in clear conditions, more favourable to visual acquisition, the closing speed and shielding by the aircraft structure would have limited opportunities to acquire the other aircraft. Neither accident aircraft was equipped with ADS-B IN systems. The study shows that had the aircraft been equipped with this technology the pilots would have been alerted to the position of the other aircraft much earlier than by visual acquisition. Both a cockpit display of traffic information with an ADS-B traffic alerting system or an electronic conspicuity device connected to an electronic flight bag application could have provided this. // ...

Aro, I don't notice the lag you speak of, other than with internet based displays, of course [as opposed to ship to ship systems - including SE2]. Even from the ground, I can see the target turn as soon as the aircraft in sight does. [I suppose there's some delay, even with radio TX/RX.] Anyway, with the accident we're discussing here, there were, what?, twenty long seconds wherein a quick scan - in either cockpit - might have done the job. And yes, normally, in the circuit we are 95% eyes outside - sometimes pre-alerted, sometimes not. Still, we spare a second or two for the ASI, the fuel pump, hatches, harnesses ,Ts&Ps, fuel quantity and, depending, maybe even a second or two for a traffic display. After all, we're aware of how many times one aircraft has descended, oblivious, onto another on final - after having been converging for a good half minute or so. I'd guess that any road user with some miles under the belt can recall times when that last-second, double-check of a side mirror has saved them swapping paint with a fellow traveler - mere inches away. I don't see a big diff. BTW I think that it's in the circuit that aural traffic alerts might be distracting and more trouble than they're worth. (Nothing's quicker at getting 'the picture' than the visual cortex ;- )