Dieselten

Lady, and Gentlemen, What this thread clearly shows more than anything else is just how stupid it is to try and regulate an activity by setting out a series of regulations under different categories and then giving exemptions from those regulations. It is the worst of all possible results with the best of all possible intentions - and it is exactly the preferred model of bureaucracies around the world because of the endless confusion and the need for interpretation (i.e. "bureaucratic empire-building") which is the inevitable result. Clarity and brevity are mutually-exclusive, and the current system proves precisely that. Hundreds of public servants are gainfully employed in writing these regulations, writing the exemptions to these regulations, and hundreds more are gainfully employed in interpreting them, trying to explain what the real meanings of the regulations - and exemptions - are. It is classic "Yes, Minister"...unfortunately it is anything but a comedy, or a fiction. It is a self-perpetuating industry based on confusion, interpretation and layers of administration for its own sake and it is increasingly dysfunctional. Now, let's get a bit pragmatic here. You have a set of regulations and exemptions under the regulations. As a pilot, you do your best to "stay within the intent, as much as the letter, of the law". You will be unlikely to come to the unwanted attention of the authorities if you conduct yourselves and operate your aeroplanes (no matter what category they fall into) sensibly and keeping the intent of the regulation - and the exemption - uppermost in mind. There are always a few who are determined to push the boundaries, both literally and by a novel re-interpretation of an existing regulation and exemption. In the old days we called them "pioneers". Now we call them "statistics" because they sometimes become one. Winston Churchill said "rules are made for the blind obedience of fools and the guidance of wise men". A rule (regulation, etc) exists because a set of circumstances, or a situation, brought them into being. Wise men look at the rules, understand why they exist and draw their own conclusions as how to best stay within their confines under any given situation. Wise men also know that if a rule has to be "bent", then two conditions must be met. First, never bend a rule beyond it's hysteresis-limit. That is, never bend a rule until it reaches the point at which it is likely to suffer a permanent deformation...because that's also what you may suffer, financially or physically, or possibly both. Second, if you have to bend a rule, at least give yourself half a chance of getting away with it. In other words, don't bend a rule in a place, in a manner or at an altitude, where breaking it is likely to have immediate and unhappy consequences, or be witnessed, or photographed. A rule that is very gently "bent" on rare occasions is far better than one which is wilfully, repeatedly and brazenly broken. In "Lord Of The rings", Gandalf said "he who breaks a thing to see how it is made has left the path of reason". There is much wisdom in this saying, especially when it comes to rules relating to aviation. Remember, in extremis, regulations can and will be waived (such as a "Mayday" situation etc). Another thing that helps is stay within the flight-envelope, and your own personal "skill-envelope", at all times. If you must stand on the "sticky gummed edge", it's your own damn fault if you come un-stuck. This thread is in danger of degenerating into the age-old argument about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. I'd summarise it by saying "for every rule, there is an equal and opposite exemption" (to paraphrase Newton). Actually, the issue seems to be pretty much insoluble from one point of view, and firmly settled according to several others. Ada asked for clarification. The only clarification will be a new set of regulations specfically setting out what is permitted, without a raft of expemptions from existing regulations. They are coming. So is Christmas, and I know which will arrive first. As for me, well, I'll try to use my prudent and considered judgement as a pilot to prevent me from ever getting into a situation where I have to fall back on my technical skills and/or luck to extricate myself from it. Not many of us fly with one hand on the controls and the other holding the regulations. Keep one hand on the controls; keep the intent of the rules and exemptions in your head as far as you can, and fly as safely as you can, as often as you can.

I'll bear that in mind when I'm hanging the next load of Mk82s on the racks on the J160.

I have always been of the opinion that at any stage of the circuit you should be able to get back to a runway (not necessarily the one you took off from) if the engine fails - built up area or not. That's what I teach and if a student gets too far away in the circuit (not flying parallel to the runway on downwind, going too far on crosswind, etc) I'll just simulate an engine-failure and let them see what the consequences would have been as they run out of altitude and options. Once usually drives the lesson home.

How much accuracy do you really need? It's pointless calculating to the fourth or fifth decimal place of a minute of arc when real world accuracy requirements are to within ten feet or so. Be pragmatic.

The smaller the turbojet engine the less fuel-efficient it is. This is definitely a case where size does matter. A cruise missile is extremely aerodynamic at its design cruise-speed, and it's only got to carry enough fuel for a one-way trip. You really don't want it turning around and coming back! Until kerosene weighs nothing - and costs less - we'll never see a practical small jet engine on a small aeroplane.

The pilot failed well before the airframe did. Nice save though. Now he can do it so someone else's aeroplane.

Coming from an military family (father in the RAF and RAAF in WW2, RAN after the war), I wish the damn politicians (and the festering media) would stop revealing what our lads and lasses in uniform are going to do, where they are going to do it, and the weappns systems they are going to do it with! It is the most apalling breach of military security. You don't go telling your enemies via the media what resources and assets you are comitting to a fight, and you certainly don't show them the faces of those who are going to be in the front-line. This is madness driven by populism! Yet this is exactly what politicians - and the media - are doing. The definition of treason in this country is far too narrow for the country's own good. My best wishes to all our servicemen and women, no matter where their duties take them. Thank you for your service. Come home safe.

Rachel is a friend of mine and I am very saddened to hear of the accident and the loss of Colleen Keen. I wish Rachel a full recovery and my deepest and most sincere condolences to Colleen Keen's family and friends. I've flown in VH-HRG ("Bluebird") with Rachel and it was a fast-mover, easily reaching 160 knots.

HGFA-registered weightshift microlight. Pilot and pax both deceased. No details as yet. I knew both of the people involved. I will refrain from posting further until investigation(s) and coronial inquest have been held.

The demise of manned fighters has been predicted before - and yet we are still seing them being designed, developed and produced. Back in the mid fifties, a certain government minister called Duncan Sandys in the UK famously called for the cancellation of all manned fighter development in England because "all future wars will be fought with misiles." England at the time was a world-leader in fighter development. As a result, it lost the lead to the Americans, who had (correctly) decided future wars would still require fighters with a man inside them. The infamous UK Defence White Paper is now widely regarded as a classic example of someone totally ignorant of a subject taking the best advice of his coterie of experts and completely "screwing the pooch". The British have so thoroughly screwed the pooch so many times there should be a special category at Crufts for "screwed pooches". The Americans are not immune to screwing the pooch either. In the 1970s, the they decided that although they had fighters with one (or often two) men in them, a gun on a fighter was a stupid idea because" all future jet combat will be done with missiles." A few years later in the skies over Vietnam, US Navy and USAF F4s repeatedly found themselves well within gun-range of the Mig 15s and 17s used by the NVAF, but were completely unable to engage them because they were too close for a missile shot (the missiles wouldn't even arm in the short flight-time) and their modern fighters did not carry a gun, and were never designed to carry a gun. So the Migs survived, and some shot down USAF and USN aircraft as a result. The lesson was learned with the F15 and the F16...both had guns integral to the design. The F/A-18 likewise has integral guns. They all carry missiles too. So does the British Typhoon and the French Rafaele. Russian designs have had guns and missiles in every incarnation. So I am immediately sceptical about any so-called "expert" who predicts we will not need fighters in future air-combat scenarios, and that future air warfare will be carried out by UAVS, UCAVs and what are generically called "drones". Likewise I have reservations about experts who tell us all future wars will be fought with sub-calibre assault-rifles simply because back in 1944 a bunch of beleagured Germans fought their way out of Stalingrad using the STG44, the first true assault-rifle which (by definition) fired a reduced-length, reduced-charge cartridge at a high cyclic rate-of-fire. Ask the soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq how well their sub-calibre assault-rifles function against determined opponents, then ask them what calibres and weaponry are being used by the precision marksmen and snipers. They are anything but sub-calibre. About all the experts really excel at is re-equipping armies, navies and air forces to fight the last war, with weapons systems so expensive they may as well be gold-plated, which are designed to fight the next war - which is probably going to be totally different to the last one. Every time we re-invent the wheel we seem to have this enormous argument about what colour it should be. The Australian Defence Material Organisation has one of the most dismal histories in this regard (it has been re-named a few times to try and sanitise its tarnished image); the Wamira project, the Collins-class submarines, the SeaSprite Helicopter to name just a few. It's probably full of experts, most of whom didn't participate in the last war anyway, who have unlimited funds and unlimited time to re-equip our defence forces with gold-plated weapons systems which cost incalculable amounts of money - and not so long ago the Army was short of ammunition for the Steyr assault-rifle. No idea of what the man on the ground really needs, but lots of pie-in-the-sky ideas about systems and logistics and buzz-words. I'll bet the grunts were really impressed. About all a defence expert is really good for is being a speed-hump in a Woolworths car-park - and there's a queue of fifty-thousand school-leavers in front of him. Listen to the expert who says there is no future for fighters and ignore him completely - he'll get everything so wrong it will be risible.

The period for submissions has ended, now we must wait to see if the "mountain groans and gives forth a mouse." Those concerned with any potential loss of value of their Jabiru aircraft might draw some comfort from tthe fact that their potential loss pales into insignificance compared to the loss of credibility, respect and wordwide standing which this has caused CASA as an organisation. It must now be perceived by many similar organisations, as well as influential individuals in governments, as a deeply-flawed, role-playing bureaucracy, terminally-infested with ex-military buffers and empire-builders who have little or no concept of civilian aviation operations, economics or its importance in the general economic health of the nation. An incoming head of the organisation might well see this debacle as a suitable pretext for a thorough sweeping of the Augean stables. He certainly has a big enough broom, if he cares to use it.

Much fuss and fury, predictably. The Instrument is a Draft. Currently it is not in force. At the moment it doesn't apply. DO NOT PANIC! What it has done is brought the issue to a head. The manufacturer of the engine (Jabiru Aircraft Pty Ltd) is being made to confront a perceived issue with engine reliability. It is probably well overdue. "The gun is loaded, the action is cocked and CASA are about to pull the trigger" but the sky isn't actually falling in - yet. Now, the statistics of engine failures will have to be produced. If they can't then the premise of CASA's introductory paragraph is fatally flawed. Analysis will have to be made, and when it is there will be several quite clear conclusions. Once these are made, then the manufacturer will be aware of what issues need to be addressed, with some guidance as to possible remedies. It will also pinpoint, with some precision, those engines most at risk and those which are at a very low level of risk. Then - and only then - the Instrument can be refined. What is of concern is the vast variation in "Jabiru engines". There are at least 9 on my local airfield, and they range from one 4-cylinder unit with a 3-digit serial number to a couple of brand-new roller-cam 3.3-litre engines which have just been installed. Most - but not all - have had the through-bolt upgrade. Some have been recently re-built with all the current upgrades. Clearly there is no "one-size fits all" solution here. The two most pressing issues are through-bolt failure and exhaust-valve failures. These are mechanical issues rather than design issues. I believe the engine is essentially well-designed, and from my own experience (engine-failures), it is a tough engine because even with a major failure it ran long enough to get me back to a runway - twice. From my own experience I can say the little Jab engine is a tough little unit, and the airframe is just about "unkillable". At the price, there isn't a better training-aircraft available. CASA could have simply grounded the entire fleet of Jabiru-powered aircraft in Australia, but what they have done is forced people's hands so the matters can be thrashed out and solutions found. It's my belief that was the intention of this in the first place. So by all means make representations to your local MP, to Lee Ungerman and the Minister, but be respectful, polite, positive and bear in mind the thrust of this proposed Instrument is to fix a problem, not ground a fleet of aircraft. As for the immediate future, about all I can confidently predict is the email server at CASA is about to crash due to the volume of emails being received from all over the world, and the receptionist at Jabiru will most likely require stress-leave when this is all over. One other observation, if I may; if the reaction to this proposed Instrument is as violent and widespread as some would have us believe, it may not reflect all that well on the regulator or on the person or persons who drafted it.

Here (verbatim) is my post on Pprune on this particular accident:- Quote:- "At a presentation I attended given by the Australian Cirrus agents some months ago it was explicitly stated the Cirrus can recover from a spin without using the CAPS, but only if there is sufficient altitude. That's the key thing - sufficient altitude. In the case of the Blue Mountains accident, there wasn't sufficient altitude, and the only way to save the situation was to fire the 'chute. Result? Three people walked away alive, rather than being carried away, dead and charred, in body-bags. The lack of altitude in this case was no fault of the Cirrus aircraft. We were also told at the presentation that in training the Cirrus instructors use the simulator to put potential Cirrus purchasers (many of whom are highly-experienced pilots) into situations from which recovery is not possible, and these highly experienced pilots repeatedly wind themselves and the simulator into the ground, rather than firing the 'chute. The habit of flying the aircraft "as far into the crash as possible" (attributed to Bob Hoover) is so deeply ingrained that the idea of reaching up for the firing-handle and pulling it just doesn't seem to occur...until the pilot has crashed the sim a few times, and realises that the 'chute would have saved them. When the sim is put into an irrecoverable situation and the instructor sees the student's hand reaching for the firing-handle, then the message is starting to sink in. The Cirrus requires a major adjustment to pilot mind-set. It is a matter of re-educating these pilots to use the aircraft parachute system before the situation becomes so bad that even the 'chute is not going to save them because it is being operated outside its design limits. If used within its design limits, the CAPS does save lives, and Cirrus has the statistics to prove this. Go ahead, ring them up and ask them. Ask them how many people have survived parachute deployments on the Cirrus when the 'chute was operated within its operational envelope. Ask them what their injuries were for those incidents. Is there anything fundamentally wrong with the Cirrus? Probably not. Is there anything fundamentally wrong with many of the pilots who fly it? Quite probably, yes there is. It is not for the low-hour GA pilot, for a start. It is not a "seat-of-the-pants" aircraft. It has to be flown "by the numbers", the same as any similar high-performance single-engine aircraft. Like any other IFR-equipped aircraft it requires a pilot to be current and up-to-date on IFR techniques to be successfully and safely operated in IFR flight. Some aircraft are designed to be deliberately stalled, and some are not. I personally think the de-emphasis on stall and spin-recovery training is not a good thing in GA. Even so, there are many GA training aircraft with adverse stall and spin characteristics (Chipmunk and Tomahawk, for example); aircraft which you did not intentionally get into a stalled or spinning situation at low altitude. The debate about whether it is better to have a training aircraft with a benign stall or a sudden onset with rapid wing-drop has been raging for decades now, each side arguing the their case with the ferocity of wizened clerics arguing an abstruse point of canon-law. However, the Cirrus (or Lancair, or Columbia, etc) are not training aircraft, and therefore not designed to be intentionally stalled or spun. Equipping the Cirrus with CAPS was not an admission of failure on the part of the aircraft. It was an attempt to give pilots who make a series of successively greater mistakes resulting in loss of control one last chance to save themselves and their passengers. It is one of relatively few aircraft to do so. It has saved lives in the past which would have been lost, and it will continue to do so in the future. And, even though it may not save the life of a Cirrus pilot who has a fatal heart-attack in flight, if his or her passengers fire the 'chute, it will almost certainly save them." End of quote:-

I like it. About all that's missing is the area of the filter element, the pressure at which the bypass-valve operates and the porosity of the element-material. Just goes to show the complexity in a modern oil-filter. Well done and nice pix too!

The 18mm thread will fit the Jabiru spark-plug hole, but the air-fitting may need to be changed. It looks like a Ryco fitting. I prefer high-volume Nitto, and just to confuse the issue, there is yet another fitting fairly commonly encountered, called a Jamec-fitting. The Nitto is the one to use, but it all depends on what fitting your compressed-air hose has on the end of it. You could make an adapter, or just remove the Ryco fitting and replace it with a Nitto. A hydraulics/compressed-air/air-tools specialist shop will have the necessary hardware. BOC Gases, Gasweld, Hare & Forbes etc are good suppliers. Bunnings probably won't have these fittings, although they might have Nitto, if they sell air-tools.

Aircraft Spruce Differential Pressure Tester Model E2A stock number 12-01012. The 18mm adapter is stock number 12-00830.

Aircraft Spruce sell one for small-capacity engines with the 18mm adapter.

See if you can find someone who is building something like a Jabiru or an RV and pay them a visit - or better still, several visits to see the progress. That will give you a feel for structures and materials and the way aircraft are constructed which in turn gives a good insight into how they are repaired/maintained, and with what. The good thing about this is you are looking at an actual aeroplane instead of a car or other vehicle. There are fundamental differences in construction philosophy between aeroplanes and every other form of transport, and understanding what those differences are is enormously helpful. I have yet to meet an aeroplane-builder who resented anyone taking an interest in what they are doing.

For the life of me I cannot understand why Cessna didn't drag out the old jigs for the 152, announce they were going to resume production, make 5000 of them and nail the price down to a realistic one, with a trade-in offer for old 152s (e.g. those airframes over 25 years old). Every flying school currently using high-time, aging 152s would have jumped at the opportunity to get rid of their old aircraft and replace them with new units, and Cessna would have removed a lot of tired old aircraft from the skies, which has to be a bonus from the safety standpoint. I reckon they would have pre-sold the entire 5000 before they cut the first sheet of metal. The crazy thing is they could still do this, but I see no evidence of any backbone in Cessna's management. Bewitched by the LSA market, which they grossly over-estimated, they then produced an aircraft which was marginally capable, overweight and far too expensive. No-one else can make 152s, yet Cessna stubbornly refuses to resume production, hoping sales of the 172/182/206 series will justify keeping the single-engine piston production line open. A bad case of corporate tunnel-vision and neglect of a core market, in my view.

As a paid-up, card-carrying member of "The Jabiru Engine-Failure club", who is still being hauled around the skies behind a Jabiru engine, I am all for Camit developing a product-improved version of the engine they build for Jabiru. Once the engine has accumulated the hours, been de-bugged, tweaked and generally fettled into the best it can be, either Jabiru or Camit ought to bite the figurative bullet and get it certified so it can be fitted to 24-registered aircraft. I'll bet this has already been anticipated by the current Jabiru management, and has been right from the very initial stages of the project. The Camit-built, Jabiru-sold-and-supported engine has always been a bit of a work-in-progress. However, it is slowly becoming a pretty decent powerplant, and given another decade of development and refinement it will be well on its way to becoming an aviation classic. The huge cost of certification, and the time involved, is the biggest single impediment. Clearly Camit have seen an opportunity to move in a direction which must ultimately be beneficial to both companies. Camit don't have all their proverbial eggs in one basket, and a component-supplier who can do something beneficial for his end-customer also does something beneficial for himself in the process. That way no-one loses. Rod Stiff admitted to me in conversation several months ago "if I had known it was going to be as successful as it did I would have done some things differently". I smiled wryly at his candour. Success brings its own constraints, one of which is a need to focus on getting products out to customers on-time and on-budget, and this gets in the way of areas of R&D which a manufacturer might wish to pursue. So, let Camit get as many of these engines in the air as it can and let the hours accrue. Time will soon show if they are on the right track or not.

CAO 20.9 4.1.1.

Aviation Salvage, Taren Point NSW.

A transponder usually puts the issue beyond all doubt.

Jabiru engines must be run on an ashless dispersant aero-engine oil (after engine break-in on a non-compounded aircraft engine oil). That is laid down in the manuals. If you decide to deviate from what Jabiru specify, you have become an (unpaid) test-pilot. Aeroshell Sport Plus 4 specifically states on the labelling on the back of the bottle the following: Quote: "DO NOT use Aeroshell Sport Plus 4 in engines that are designed to use ashless dispersant aviation piston engine oils such as Aeroshell W oils. This includes air cooled Teledyne Continental Motors, Textron Lycoming and Jabiru engines". If you know of people who are using this oil in Jabiru engines, please ask them to reconsider;- they are not doing themselves - or their engines - any favours. The oil-manufacturer and engine-manufacturer probably know more about engines and oil than the aircraft owner or user, so why deviate from what the manufacturers specify? Aeroshell Sport Plus 4 was specifically engineered by Shell, in conjunction with Rotax-Bombardier, for the liquid-cooled Rotax 912-family only. That series of engines have unique requirements for their oil because the oil also lubricates the gearbox and clutch-assembly, and the wrong oil can rapidly decommission those two item. The Jabiru engine is direct-drive; it has different requirements and therefore different lubricant specifications. If the Phillips oil meets the specification set out by the aircraft/engine maker, then it is acceptable - as are the others Jabiru specify. The question then becomes what is commonly available where you normally operate and/or maintain your aircraft? I'd venture to suggest you'll find Aeroshell, Mobil or BP aircraft engine oils are a lot more commonly available at most airfields/airports/maintenance facilities here in Australia than Phillips. I have no doubt Phillips oils are very fine aviation-grade oils. Are they readily available and how do they compare pricewise to the others? I have no issues with Aeroshell W100 Plus, although I prefer to use Aeroshell W100 in my Jabiru. I change it and the filter every 25 hours because at that point it is loaded with lead oxide from the Avgas, and changing oil every 25 hours is the cheapest maintenance you can do for your engine. Remember, the Jabiru engine has relatively little oil-capacity to keep it small and light, and the limited volume of oil is pretty much at the end of its life at 25 hours anyway. If you use mogas only, you can get away with oil and filter-changes every 50 hours. Aeroshell oils are excellent for their intended purposes, and they are traceable via the Release Note. So are any other aircraft oils that meet the specs set out by Jabiru. The oil-filter is so cheap you may as well change it at the same time, and always cut the element out of the old filter and inspect the pleats for any metal. Only then do you know how things are going internally. That and regular leakdowns are the best indicator that all is well inside the powerplant. "Leaving the engine much cleaner" is pretty meaningless. Think about it this way:- if the oil comes out dirty then that "dirt" isn't in the engine any more is it? If the oil comes out clean, what's been left behind in the engine that should have been removed with the oil? Changing the oil regularly is the cheapest and best maintenance the owner can do for his aircraft engine. Using the correct oil is just more of a good thing.

Capt. Chesney Sullenberger and Capt. Richard De Crespigny faced similar challenges but with one important difference. Sullenberger knew his aircraft was only going in one direction - down - whereas De Crespigny had an aircraft cruising and with thrust available which gave him time to develop a strategy for survival. Sullenberger had a couple of minutes only, and he shut out everything that wasn't an immediate priority. He did not waste valuable time - and altitude - trying to re-start what he had to assume were bird-strike-damaged engines. He got the RAT (ram-air-turbine) out for emergency electrical power and began a controlled descent, evaluating the performance envelope that was left to him. His increasingly terse, almost monosyllabic replies to the controllers offering him alternative runways and airports shows how focussed he was (1- Fly the aeroplane). His decision to land in the Hudson was taken early and he didn't deviate from it (2- Navigate:- make it go where it had to go for the forced-landing). He did less and less radio communications as the situation unfolded and he and his F/O concentrated on getting the aircraft into ditching configuration and making a survivable water-landing. He told the controllers he was going down in the Hudson quite early in the piece...and that's precisely what he did (3- Communicate - but only if you have the time and not at the expense of points 1 and 2). Result? A successful outcome. De Crespigny and his F/O had time on their side...time enough to work out the aircraft whether the aircraft was flyable or not. Trained to trust what the computers were telling him, he and his F/O at first worked through the established procedures, but ever-multiplying fault menus and critical alarms - both valid and spurious due to the severity of the damage to wiring for both data and flight-controls - were leading them into a deeper and deeper hole. The turning-point came when a decision was made to cease actioning the ever-increasing pages of faults and determine how much of the aircraft was left for them to use to get back on the ground. At that point the situation became retrievable. Using basic knowledge, a calculator and some prudent airmanship, good judgement and sheer aeronautical common-sense, they managed to build a basic "Cessna-style" aircraft which they could control and configure for landing. The aircraft's computers simply failed to come up with a solution to the approach and landing-speed problems because too many faults were present for them to find an algorithm that would deliver an answer. So the crew worked out a speed which they felt, given their level of experience and knowledge of that particular aircraft at the time, would allow them a single attempt at an approach and a landing and enough deceleration to not over-run the runway.(1- fly the aircraft) Knowing they had a basically controllable aircraft, albeit with massively impaired capabilities, they began descent and headed back to the airport. (2- Navigate - make it go where it has to go). As far as the third requirement - communication - De Crespigny and his crew kept his cabin-crew, his pax and the controllers on the ground well-informed. Time was available for this and good use was made of it in terms of keeping the passenger-cabin calm and organised as well as letting controllers know what facilities would be needed for the aircraft's arrival (3- Communicate with who you need to communicate with, as and when time permits). Result? A successful outcome. Both situations could have been catastrophic in terms of lives lost. Both were effectively catastrophic in terms of damage done to the aircraft. But both are excellent examples of what professionalism, staying focussed on the priorities, and not getting sidetracked by irrelevancies can achieve. Where do we fit in with all this? As recreational aviators we can, and should, practice our emergency procedures and drills, in our minds as well as in our aircraft. However I would add a caveat; to wit:- if you want to practice emergency procedures, I strongly urge you to do so with an Instructor in the aircraft with you. Practice makes permanent is true, but proper practice makes perfect and if it's going to be permanent then let it be perfect.