onetrack

Yes, a wiring short circuit could possibly activate one of the HPSOV's - but not both, they are totally independent switches, circuits and engine ECU's.

If that were the case, the incorrect switch position would immediately be obvious to anyone in the cockpit - and the contacts for each position wouldn't be activated. In addition, how could BOTH switches be left incorrectly located on the locking ridge? One, perhaps, but not both. Just one switch left in an incorrect centre position would stand out even more than both being incorrectly positioned.

Further searching reveals an Australian company selling Australian Merino wool, leg and knee warmers - so here we have good warmth, insulation and fire resistance all in the one product - and you're buying local as well. Merino Wool Warmers | Breathe Vélo BREATHEVELO.CC Superfine Merino Leg and Knee Warmers

If you're really worried about burns in a crash, wear a Nomex fire suit, as the race car drivers do. I'd have to opine the greatest threat from a fire breakout after or during a crash, is the high likelihood of lung damage, caused by ingesting flames, soot and smoke. No fire-resistant clothing can prevent that.

The MAMIL's use these, to keep their legs warm whilst cycling in freezing conditions. But they are made from from flammable polyester/elastane. They have zippers for ease of fitting and removal. Thermo-fit Leg Warmers, Black - Unisex WWW.SCODY.COM Stay warm on cold rides with SCODY’s unisex black thermo-fit leg warmers. Made from lightweight Italian thermal fabric for comfort, stretch, and insulation. Thermo-fit Leg Warmers, Black - Unisex

.......evidence of Cappys ancestor, Capt Josiah Cooks visitation to the Island, with a pewter plaque nailed to a coconut tree, claiming the Island for ownership by the Cook family. Akamulakikaipo Duke Turbine became enraged at the pewter plate claim and tore it down, replacing with a pewter plate claiming the Island always was, always will be, a Turbine clan possession. From this small event, we can see how the Turbine and Cook clans have become engaged in constant bouts of one-upmanship over the centuries, and the chest-beating claims of each clan become more outrageous with each passing year, to the extent that................

Like any bloke, I enjoy the feel of getting pantyhose off. 😄

Has this bloke got a beef with ATC or CASA?

Brendan, I never worked underground as a miner, I was a surface miner, I like seeing the sun when I'm working. But I worked closely with the underground miners, and got the "inside info" on working conditions. I only went underground on odd occasions, and was glad to be back on the surface when I got out.

When I was in the 17th Construction Squadron, RAE, in S Vietnam, we ran a Land Clearing Team comprising about up to 6 Cat D8H's operating in close quarters, to clear large areas of raw jungle, to deny the area as a hiding place for Viet Cong and NVA soldiers, and to also open up land for agricultural use. It was a pretty intense experience to be clearing and also occasionally under fire via mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire - as well as being the target of mines and booby traps. There's one of our D8H's on display in an RAE museum with the engine blown right off its mountings, and holed in numerous places as well, as a result of a buried improvised mine, that comprised a 44 gallon (200 litre drum) filled with high explosive, that was ransacked by the VC and NVA, from U.S. aerial bombs that quite often failed to explode. We were shown captured NVA films of NVA engineers disabling unexploded U.S. aerial bombs, bypassing the anti-handling mechanisms by a "trial and error" method, and then hacksawing the bomb casing to within a millimetre of the high explosive - then cracking the casing open with a sledgehammer, and then scooping out the free explosive, to be re-used against the "invaders", in improvised mines and booby traps. We utilised standard D8H Caterpillar blades, as well as an aftermarket style of special clearing blade, called a "Rome plow". The Rome plow was permanently angled, and had a horizontal cutting edge at the bottom. The Rome plow cut the trees and vegetation cleanly at ground level, and rolled it to one side in a large windrow. It also contained a sharp spear on the forward corner, that could be used to splinter large trees before removal. Here's some photos, shown with accompanying aerial support, that was invaluable to us. https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C320671 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2103163 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C42031 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1277620 https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C2103136

Seems like a typical "Pommy" military ill-organised, slow and expensive clearing operation. As a former military engineer, and a full time dozing and clearing contractor in my earlier life, we cleared large areas rapidly, cheaply, and effectively, by utilising "chaining" - dragging a long length (400 to 800 feet - 120 to 240 metres - of heavy anchor chain, usually 2" to 2.5" - 50mm to 63mm diameter - stud link chain, between two dozers. Carried out under the correct conditions (damp soil, without it being too wet for good dozer traction), many dozens of acres an hour can be flattened. In my own case, our clearing charges were as low as $2 an acre (approx $5 Ha), and rarely above $6 an acre ($15 Ha), in the 1960's and 1970's. Here's a video of some major habitat destruction in Qld in 2014. The Wilderness Society wouldn't want to have been around in W.A. in the 1960's or 1970's, clearing 500 acres a day wasn't uncommon. There were dozens of dozing and clearing contractors in operation in W.A. in that era.

300 hrs of flying in his first month is a huge and tiring level of flying hours. That's 10 hrs a day for 30 days straight. Surely, fatigue, as much as weather conditions, would have played a part in Harry Hartwigs demise?

I personally think it's disgraceful that so many people in so-called "authoritative positions", who should know better, are jumping on the "pilot suicide" bandwagon. The figures bely their definitive, hard opinions. There have been maybe 10 pilot suicides in commercial aircraft in the last 30 or 35 years (taking out deliberate acts of aircraft terrorism such as 9/11) - with perhaps another half dozen crashes where the reason was never found, but suicide was on the suspicion list. In contrast, in the same time frame, there have been hundreds of incidents, some resulting in major crashes, where inadvertent pilot error, mistakes in switch and controls selection by crew, major errors in following emergency procedures, and even distraction by crew members, or concentration on less important warnings resulted in the overlooking of major warning signals, occurred. As a result, the chances of this crash being caused by a pilot suicide is a vastly less likelihood, than the likelihood of one of the range of crew errors mentioned above.

The paint job makes the aircraft look like it's infested with worms, from a distance! 😄 Pipistrel really are at the forefront of the electric-powered aircraft revolution, aren't they?

Four fatalities attributed to this crash, unfortunately. 😞 Possible EFATO?

I've spoken to and had transaction dealings with Rod Lovell, I found him to be a decent bloke, and he copped a lot of abuse and unfair treatment from aviation authorities, and even the flying fraternity over this crash. I didn't know about this crash until well after I'd dealt with him. After I discovered the story of the crash, I personally think Rod was unfairly maligned, and he made the best of a bad situation. It doesn't pay to fly ancient junky old aeroplanes if you value your aviation reputation.

But the electrical pulse is initiated by the closing of switch contacts, which can only happen with the physical movement of the switch mechanism? I would like to see a description of what could cause an electrical pulse to the fuel valves, without any physical switch movement? Then there's the description in the preliminary report that the fuel cutoff switches were moved back to RUN, and an attempt to relight the engines was made - which accordingly indicates the switches were initially placed in the OFF position? Add to that, the report stating there were no reportable 787 issues identified, that needed to be communicated to Boeing?

The chances of an event like that happening are so remote, it's not worth considering. There were no "jolt" conditions on takeoff, and the other wild theories about a manual or iPad falling on the switches are equally fanciful. No professional pilot in possession of an ATPL would have anything loose in the cockpit on takeoff - especially something that could fall on critical control levers or switches. The switches were moved on purpose. Only further, deeper investigation may find the reason why. The switches are a pretty standard Honeywell design that comes in huge variety of design choices and varieties. The part number is 4TL837-3D, and the spec sheet is in the link below. The locking mechanism problem was found to originate in the locking collar becoming able to rotate, enough to misalign the locking collar notches with the projections on the switch body, and thus allowing the locking mechanism to be bypassed. It appears Boeing decided it wasn't a serious enough problem on the 787, perhaps because the AD was issued, which made pilots and maintainers aware of what to check for. I've been on a Virgin B737 flight that stopped on the taxiway and the crew called in an LAME to tighten the thrust levers mechanism, as it appeared the crew became wary of a potential thrust lever rollback, a common Boeing problem. So the crews are well aware of potential controls glitches and faults and I'm sure the pilot and co-pilot of Flight 171 were well aware of the AD relating to the fuel cutoff switches ability to bypass the locking arrangement. https://datasheet.octopart.com/4TL837-3D-Honeywell-datasheet-31974395.pdf?_gl=1*1r8bggd*_gcl_au*NjIxNDk4MTU3LjE3NTIzMjQ2NDk.*_ga*MjA3MTA3MDU1LjE3NTIzMjQ2NDg.*_ga_SNYD338KXX*czE3NTI0MDU1ODkkbzIkZzAkdDE3NTI0MDU1ODkkajYwJGwwJGgw

Lyndon, the following CASA advisory articles are relevant to your planned build. https://www.casa.gov.au/certification-amateur-built-abaa-aircraft https://www.casa.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/advisory-circular-21-04-amateur-built-experimental-aircraft-certification.pdf

I fail to understand how one can design a single rotor helicopter with no tail rotor. What does it use for directional control, if it has no tail rotor?

A gasoline-powered jet! I never knew they were built. But I guess it was the standard fuel of the U.S. military forces at that time, so that makes sense.

Nev - There is a fuel supply valve in the fuel line to the engine that is part of the fuel cutoff system. Activating the fuel cutoff toggle switch in the cockpit closes contacts that sends an electrical signal to the engine ECU, which then sends an electrical signal to the solenoid that activates the spring-pressure loaded HPSOV (High Pressure Shut Off Valve). The HPSOV must be electrically activated to move to either position, On or Off, because the spring-loaded detents hold the HPSOV in whatever position the last electrical signal told it to do. This is Boeings fail-safe system for the HPSOV. As it is obvious from the preliminary report, the fuel cutoff switches were moved in the cockpit - and the crew voices confirm that. As the PF is fully concentrating on the lift-off, and has both hands on the yoke, it seems it was the PNF who moved the switches. I think that the reason why he did so, may never be found. As I understand it, the PNF is carrying out a purely monitoring job, so he has little reason to operate important flight controls - unless he saw an emergency. But no pilot should ever take any drastic engine control measures at takeoff, 400 feet is the minimum critical altitude mentioned in all manufacturer and training information. I feel there's a Boeing design failure here that allows engine fuel cutoff switches to be activated at under 400 feet. The interesting part is that the fuel cutoff switching system is not mentioned in the B787 Thrust Management System, because it is designed only to used on the ground at shutdown - or in an emergency, such as an engine fire. But no pilot would ever shut down an engine that's on fire, when they're at a critical altitude, so that critical altitude protection should now be written into the fuel cutoff switching system logic, to prevent a crash like this one happening again. Boeing 787 Thrust Management System Explained WWW.TRANSGLOBALTRAINING.COM Discover how the advanced Thrust Management System in Boeing 787 enhances safety, efficiency and reduces pilot workload

The German Consul in W.A., imported 2 Klemm monoplanes in late 1929 and early 1930. The Consul, a Mr H.C. Ittershagen, ran a company called the Aerial Commerce Co., and tried to sell the Klemm aircraft with barnstorming sessions, and much advertising and visitations by the aircraft, and giving joyrides, in many rural regions of W.A. H.C. Ittershagen was also the local dealer for German Lanz tractors, and he was intent on selling the Klemm aircraft to wealthy farmers. However, it was the height of the Great Depression, and most peoples thoughts were on survival, not purchasing aeroplanes. The farming community was under stress as commodity prices had collapsed below the cost of production. As a result, sales of the Klemm aircraft failed to eventuate, and I believe the company was wound up before the Great Depression was over (1934). The two seater Klemm apparently survived until the early 1950's, and was apparently flown unregistered and secretly during the War by an unlicenced pilot. https://encore.slwa.wa.gov.au/iii/encore/record/C__Rb1920207?lang=eng&ivts=x9%2FQXzsNh%2Bv1jvs6BeSDUg%3D%3D&casts=xs0LRgWFEu0M%2B8o995kfRA%3D%3D https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/33345002 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/244479910?searchTerm="Aerial Commerce Co" https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/33346529 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/32309256 https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/264201167 https://www.airhistory.net/photo/564927/VH-ULU

..........gaps in his maps and charts. However, the novice suddenly became aware, once airborne, that the countryside below didn't seem to match his maps and charts. This led to a great deal of consternation, until he realised that the maps and charts he was in possession of, dated to 1943 and contained information such as "likely enemy target", amongst other things. What was even more unfortunate, was that one of the "likely enemy targets" listed was the Turbine Industries Cat Farm. Upon reading the word "enemy", our novice was overcome with emotions that made him start looking on board for his American flag, and he then sought out the whereabouts of his armaments, which comprised.........

From a Flight Operations Briefing Note: Introduction: The failure rate of aircraft engines has reached an all-time low. This means that many flight crews will never face an engine failure during their career, other than those in the flight simulator. However, simulators are not fully representative of engine failures because accelerations (e.g. due to a failed engine), noise (e.g. caused by an engine stall), or vibrations (e.g. in the event of a blade rupture), are hard to simulate. Consequently, flight crews are not always able to identify and understand engine malfunctions. Incorrect crew understanding of engine malfunctions can lead to unnecessary engine shutdowns, but also to incidents and accidents. Statistics and Background: When the jet engine was introduced in civil aviation in the 1950s (de Havilland Comet, Sud-Aviation Caravelle), the available thrust was less than 10,000 lbs. Today, high by-pass ratio engines produce up to 115,000 lbs of thrust. During the same time, the rate of In-Flight Shut Downs (IFSD) has decreased as follows: IFSD (per 100,000 engine FH) 1960s - 40 Today - Less than 1 In other words: • In the 1960s, on average, each engine failed once a year • Today, on average, each engine fails every 30 years. This improvement in the rate of IFSD has allowed the introduction of ETOPS (Extended Twin Operations) in 1985. Among other criteria, to be approved for ETOPS 180, the rate of IFSD must be less than 2 per 100,000 engine flight hours. This also means that pilots that start their career today, will probably never experience an IFSD due to an engine malfunction. However, despite the significant improvement in engine reliability, the number of accidents (per aircraft departure) due to an incorrect crew response following an engine malfunction, has remained constant for many years. This prompted a study with all major industry actors involved (aircraft and engine manufacturers, authorities, accident investigation agencies, pilot organizations). Among the results were: • The vast majority of engine malfunctions are identified and handled correctly. However, some malfunctions are harder to identify • Most crews have little or no experience of real (i.e. not simulated) engine malfunctions • Simulators are not fully representative of all malfunctions • Training does not sufficiently address the characteristics of engine malfunctions. The following crew undue actions, caused by engine malfunctions, have been observed: • Loss of control (trajectory not adapted to the engine failure) • Rejected takeoff above V1 • Shutdown of the wrong engine • Unnecessary engine shutdown • Application of the wrong procedure / Deviation from the published procedure.