You have been told - by kevin walters

[eightyknots]

I reckon people will do it (Instinctively) in some cases whatever way they are trained/taught. You have to believe as an instructor, that some of the good advice will sink in, but listening to what turn-back people have said and Jim Davis as well "they don't know why they did it". When a pilot especially an inexperienced one crashes the question will always be there How was he/she taught? The instructor MUST know that he covered the subject fully and that the important minimum skills were passed on . How anybody reacts under pressure will only really become known when an actual situation happens. GOOD training will cover in a lot of situations . Nev

This is a very interesting comment.

 

When I was at Kilcoy airfield earlier this year, John (a.k.a. JG3 on this Forum) and I had been talking to a pilot just before he took off in an ultralight plane that he had done some work on. Just after take off, estimated at only 150 feet AGL, his engine misfired, spluttered and stopped for about 5 (v-e-r-y long) seconds. The pilot immediately pointed the nose of his little aircraft down, glided for those interminably long seconds and then managed to restart his engine. He did not attempt a turn around and he obviously did not pull the stick back. Fortunately his engine restarted and he immediately sought to gain altitude. As soon as possible after that, he returned to the aerodrome (airfield for those who prefer this word) and safely landed. We had a chat to him afterwards and he said words to this effect: "it is not a nice feeling when the engine conks out at such a low altitude and but when it did my training made me push the stick forward rather than backward and steer straight ahead." He continued to say how valuable that training was especially if the engine had continued to stay off.

 

When you wrote the above, F/H, I straight away thought of the situation that we observed at Kilcoy.

 

 

[octave]

My problem with labeling pilot's who have made a poor decision as an "idiot" is that, I don't consider myself as an idiot and I have been trained not to turn back, so I don't have to worry about it because, only an "idiot" would do it, so obviously I wont do it. I am much more interested in why experienced pilots sometimes make these bad decisions rather than just labeling them as fools.

 

I think the psychology of it is easily understood, the roads are full of idiots, means -I am not an idiot therefore I wont have an accident and if I do have an accident, it can't my fault it is the is fault of one of those "idiots"

 

Air France Flight 447 - pilot pulls back on stick despite stall warnings - we could say what an idiot or we can ask what causes an experienced pilot to make such a basic mistake I recall taxiing up to the fuel bowser where I found on the tarmac the fuel cap to an aircraft that had just taken off, rather than saying it happened because the pilot was stupid (not like me of course!) I wan't to know how it happened and how I can avoid making the same mistake.

 

The other approach could be something along the lines of, pilot finds themselves in fog, forced to land on road - cause of incident, well it's obvious pilot must be an idiot.

 

 

now - standing by to be called an idiot!

 

regards

 

Graham

 

 

[ahlocks]

Yes there have been posts deleted and holidays will be dished out if it keeps up......

 

 

[dutchroll]

Now this is an interesting argument my friend. If we presume that all we need is the information, then we would have no problems with obesity (could lose a few kios myself) or smoking (luckily I never went down that path). Just knowing better is no guarantee to a reduction in risk taking behaviour. After all, it won't happen to me, will it? Surely not. Learning vicariously through others mistakes only goes so far.

Naturally the "information" isn't the only thing required, however it is a prerequisite. You might not quit smoking if you have the info, yet don't give a crap, as is precisely the case with some people I know. One thing human beings excel at is not giving a crap about either their own welfare or that of others. But you sure as heck won't quit it if you don't have the info in the first place and thus have no clue what it's going to do to you.

So yes I agree having the knowledge is not a guarantee of reducing risk taking behaviour, but it's a vital first step.

 

 

[Louis Moore]

another one. made me grab my seat a few times

This one is not fair! You can hear him trickle in the power on a few of those approaches!!!!!

 

 

[Pilot Pete]

I think it fair to say that most of us have had a say on this topic and that before things are said in anger or frustration that arent really meant, then we should lay this one to bed. I value everyones inputs on the varied subjects on the forum and I think its the very nature of being able to discuss things in a friendly manner and supporting each other in our endeavors to fly safely that makes Aircraft Pilots one of the best forums on the web

 

 

[Wayne T Mathews]

I think it fair to say that most of us have had a say on this topic and that before things are said in anger or frustration that arent really meant, then we should lay this one to bed. I value everyones inputs on the varied subjects on the forum and I think its the very nature of being able to discuss things in a friendly manner and supporting each other in our endeavors to fly safely that makes Aircraft Pilots one of the best forums on the web

Sounds like a good call to me, Pete... Goodnight all, I'm out of this one...

 

 

[Powerin]

OK...another hypothetical scenario as I'm curious. It seems the biggest danger in turning back is stalling in the turn because the pilot is trying to maintain height to make it back to the actual strip. In the C182 video above you hear the stall warning all through the turn. Scary. But what if you are not trying to make the strip, have difficult terrain ahead, within a 30deg turn (say trees or rocks), but have a suitable space below you, next to you or just behind you. Is a 90-180deg descending turn still dangerous if you are willing and able to accept the height loss to maintain airspeed?

 

Disclaimer: I will NOT take any answer as being something I would ever try. But I like to arm myself with any knowledge as to cause and effect in these situations.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

A: A good pilot is always learning.

 

I am guessing the "no turn around" rule came into practice during WW2 when having a fully fueled and armed plane trying to make a forced landing was risking more lives and planes. I could be wrong but I am guessing that's how the rule eventuated.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Good point Pow.

 

The problem is, there are too many variables. At what height could you normally perform a steep power off 180? In what type? On what sort of day? At what % of All up weight etc.

 

The biggest and most dynamic factor is height. Its changing by the second on a takeoff, every second in the air presents more opportunities with regards to glide distance etc. When dealing with these sorts of things, the more "normal" you can keep the "abnormal" situation, the better. For instance, we dont like to do much turning below 500 feet. So by commencing a turn onto crosswind at this height should see you leveled out on xwind by say 600-700 feet. From that position its no longer an EFATO, its a forced landing with the usual rules of thumb applying.

 

If from that postion the best option is back towards the runway then a normal glide to that spot would not be too much of a drama, providing a good attitude is maintained.

 

But the initial leg engine failure, as a rule, straight ahead is all you should consider.

 

cheers

 

 

[turboplanner]

Good point Pow.The problem is, there are too many variables. At what height could you normally perform a steep power off 180? In what type? On what sort of day? At what % of All up weight etc.

The biggest and most dynamic factor is height. Its changing by the second on a takeoff, every second in the air presents more opportunities with regards to glide distance etc. When dealing with these sorts of things, the more "normal" you can keep the "abnormal" situation, the better. For instance, we dont like to do much turning below 500 feet. So by commencing a turn onto crosswind at this height should see you leveled out on xwind by say 600-700 feet. From that position its no longer an EFATO, its a forced landing with the usual rules of thumb applying.

 

If from that postion the best option is back towards the runway then a normal glide to that spot would not be too much of a drama, providing a good attitude is maintained.

 

But the initial leg engine failure, as a rule, straight ahead is all you should consider.

 

cheers

The variables also don't let you transfer action to the subconscious - you have to have a consistent and very simple action ingrained.

 

Remember, with subconscious action you'll have taken action to get glide speed straight ahead in about 1/5 of a second, and once the aircraft is flying without power you aren't going to have a fatal unless fate steps in and puts a tree/ditch etc in the way after touch down.

 

On the other hand, if you have to remember something, your reaction time extends to 2 to 3 seconds, and that's about the time span of when it all went wrong in the Luskintyre accident.

 

 

[Mick]

Yes there have been posts deleted and holidays will be dished out if it keeps up......

Holidays??? Are you giving away holidays? I'll have mine at Duxford!

 

.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

I'll take mine at Toowoomba.:)

 

 

[RKW]

I'll take mine at Toowoomba.:)

Please don't send him to Toowoomba. I think he wants to visit a forumite there!

 

 

[motzartmerv]

[fly_tornado]

Have you ever thought the role of mid level management in society is too resist change? Maybe that's why you feel the way you do?

 

 

[motzartmerv]

The variables also don't let you transfer action to the subconscious - you have to have a consistent and very simple action ingrained..

Exactly..:)

 

The contents of this entire thread could be summed up with that one line.

 

 

[turboplanner]

A: A good pilot is always learning.I am guessing the "no turn around" rule came into practice during WW2 when having a fully fueled and armed plane trying to make a forced landing was risking more lives and planes. I could be wrong but I am guessing that's how the rule eventuated.

It was a well known rule in 1915; I'll post a particularly apt turnback story when I extract it out of the book shortly.

 

The story is quite apt because the power to weight ratio and flying characteristics are not all that different to the slower RA aircraft, and the pilot involved was a cutting edge military pilot and test pilot.

 

 

[turboplanner]

The Turnback story, Fighter Pilots, Edited by Jon E. Lewis

 

Story by Duncan Grinnell-Milne, training for military service in WW1, in 1915

 

At the aerodrome a treat was in store for us. A brand-new aeroplane of the most modern type had just arrived on a visit. It was being flown around the country upon a series of test flights by a well-known pilot from the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, accompanies by a civilian expert.

 

We gathered in wonder, mindful of the pilot’s request that we should not touch anything......

 

.....I gazed at the pilot with envy while my imagination soared faster than the swiftest biplane.

 

Some day I too would wear Flying Corps “Wings” upon the left breast of my tunic, I too would steer a wonderful B.E.2c, and learn to manoeuvre it with graceful ease. I would fly such a machine in France; my wings would darken the skies above the expectant battle-front.......

 

At lunch in the Mess that day we were very quiet, listening in awed silence to the instructors and the pilot from Farnborough, discussing technicalities almost entirely over our heads.

 

It was thrilling to hear the names of famous airmen bandied familiarly about , to hear of all the different types of aeroplanes with exaggerated speeds which we might hope to fly, and particularly to hear this so experienced pilot (a test-pilot!) give his views on how to do this and that, how to turn quickly and with almost vertical banking, how to do a spiral glide, how to deal with the ever mysterious “spinning” and so on. It was rumoured that this pilot had frequently looped.

 

......He decided to leave. We hurried down to the aerodrome to watch him go.

 

The beautiful machine was wheeled forward, her engine started, warmed up. The test-pilot and his civilian passenger donned much leather flying clothing , climbed into their seats.

 

The engine having been run up and found satisfactory, the wooden chocks were removed, and the machine turned and taxied out to the far side of the aerodrome. A short pause, and the pilot gave the engine full throttle, taking off obliquely towards the sheds.

 

Against the wind the machine rose at once and began to climb steeply. The pilot waved farewell as he passed us by, about fifty feet up, heading west into the sunlight.

 

Against the bright sky the machine was silhouetted, hard to see beyond the end of the sheds. But, as we watched, shading our eyes, there came to us suddenly the spluttering of a starved engine.

 

The steady roar of the exhaust died down, the nose of the machine dropped.

 

And now this too expert pilot made his great mistake.

 

In the course of the short flight, he had attained a height of about one hundred and fifty feet and had crossed the boundary of the aerodrome.

 

A road, a line of telegraph wires were beneath him, ahead a series of small meadows intersected by ditches. Rough ground, but possible in an emergency, especially as the strong wind against him would make the run on landing exceptionally short.

 

There was, strictly speaking, no alternative for a safe, a wise pilot.

 

But this pilot was exceedingly clever, and he wanted to save his beautiful machine from damage. Not that it would have suffered anything worse than a broken under-carriage, possibly a smashed propeller, from the forced landing; he wished to avoid even that much.

 

And so he tried something which, in this instance, he had not one chance in a thousand of bringing off.

 

He turned back to the aerodrome.

 

In the very few seconds that followed I remember feeling, in spite of my utter ignorance of piloting, an intense admiration for the brilliant way in which he handled the machine. Without a moment’s hesitation he turned down wind as quickly and as flatly as possible so as not to lose the little height he had gained, held a straight course for an instant, then over the shed began another sharp turn that, when completed, would bring him into wind with a space of fifty to sixty yards of smooth ground on which to land.

 

Actually it was just possible of achievement , although as I see it now he was taking a terrible risk; but the whole performance was cut too fine. He failed by much more than inches.

 

As he came towards the sheds, his speed downwind seemed terrific, yet in trying to maintain his height he had in fact lost the essential flying-speed. He was stalling even as he banked over the sheds. The nose went down with a jerk in the first turn of a spin.

 

He missed the roof by a miracle, but within a second of the machine’s disappearance behind the shed we were horrified to hear an appalling crash.

 

Naturally we rushed forward in spite of the first-shouted order that all pupils should stand back – the sight of a probably fatal crash, it was rightly thought, might - we had to see; we ran for it.

 

Beyond the shed the new aeroplane lay flat on the ground, a mass of wreckage. Both men sat in their smashed cockpits motionless. Unconscious or dead? We were not long in doubt for worse was to follow. As we came nearer the wreck from which mechanics were already trying to extricate pilot and passenger, there was a flicker of flame from beneath the fuselage. And all at once the mechanic sprang back as with a roar a great flame shot up from the burst petrol tank.

 

It swept back over the passenger; when it reached the pilot he moved uneasily; seemed to shake himself, fumbled with his safety belt, then jumped out just in time, his clothing on fire.

 

There were cries for extinguishers, for axes to hack through broken wings, for help to pull away the wreckage, for the ambulance – for anything and everything to save the passenger. He was still in the machine and still alive. Mercifully he did not recover consciousness – afterwards it was found that his skull had been fractured in the crash – but he kept moving. And we were powerless. The extinguishers had no effect upon thirty gallons of blazing petrol. The strong wind blew the flames into his face. Before our very eyes he was burnt to death, roasted. It took a long time, it was ghastly.

 

The fire died down, smouldered awhile, went out. The wind dropped, the sun set and the sky glowed with rare beauty. But we pupils walked back to the Mess in glum silence.

 

Upon the following morning all officers were summoned to the squadron office. We expected the summons, although I do not quite know what we expected to hear. I suppose that, among other things, we thought to be given news of the pilot in hospital, but possibly to be complimented upon the vain efforts we had made to penetrate the barrier of fire, and upon the sang-froid we had shown afterwards. Perhaps more than anything we hoped to hear that the fire had not been so intense as our eyes had led us to believe, that the unfortunate victim had in some way been protected – by his goggles, by his flying helmet or by his leather clothing – from the devouring fury of the flames, so that there might be a chance of his recovery. Or did we hope to be told that something mysterious had gone wrong with this new aeroplane, something very startling and unusual which could not occur again, that flying was not like this, horrible, cruel?

 

The Squadron-commander strode into the office, flung his cap upon the table, drew a cane chair forward. Placing one foot upon the chair, he rested an elbow upon his knee.

 

“With regard to this unfortunate and unnecessary happening” he began harshly, “the first and only thing to do is to find out the causes of the accident, to see where the pilot was to blame so as to learn what lessons we may.

 

“Now in this particularly stupid case......”

 

I thought him terribly callous.

 

“A pilot must never turn down wind at a low altitude when faced with the possibility of a forced landing.

 

“A pilot in difficulties after leaving the ground must keep straight on.

 

“A pilot must save himself and his passengers first, not the aeroplane. It is better to smash wheels and propeller than burn a man to death.

 

“A pilot must take particular care to maintain flying-speed after engine failure....”

 

Those were the lessons. If the manner of their teaching was hard, it was also effective.

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Good story Tubz. A little graphic, but certainly hits home.. cheers

 

 

[Guest Maj Millard]

Great story there Turbo and thanks for sharing it, and a good lesson no doubt for those student aviators, if a little harsh.

 

As Motz mentioned in an earlier post, I was also involved in a fatal turnback accident some years ago. I was not a pilot at that time, but an active and experienced skydiver.

 

After a days jumping at Batchelor NT, myself, another jumper, a female tourist, and the commercial licensed jump pilot boarded the C182 for the return to Darwin. The aircraft had only one seat, no right door, and we wern't wearing parachutes, we were just along for the ride and easy return to Darwin, after an active and enjoyable day.

 

Myself and Wendy the tourist sat on the bare floor in the rear positions, and as she was not a skydiver, and this was her first ride in a light aircraft with one side door removed, I reached over and fastened a lap belt only around her waist. As I was beside her, and by the door, I did the same, and also fastened a lap belt around me. Had the three on board all been jumpers, I don't believe we would have used those seat belts. We never did in those days. We simply wern't in the habit of falling out the open door, unless of course we fully intended to.

 

The 182 (VH-EQU) with a full load of fuel on board, accelerated down the long runway, and lifted off. We probabily had not got more than a 150 ft above the end fence, when the engine suddenly went dead silent !...Full noise to dead silent in one second, without any warning or even a splutter !!..

 

I was not immediatly concerned, I knew this pilot well, and had previously been through one emergency return to the field at Camden NSW, a few years earlier from a greater height.

 

He turned around to me and yelled " hang on !", and then immediatly commenced a rapid, and deliberate, rudder-assisted left turn. The left wing probabily dropped to about a 60 deg bank. I looked across Wendy on my left, and out the cabin side window straight to the ground.

 

Then against some G forces I raised my head to look foward through the windscreen, and saw only rapidly approaching trees.

 

Fred the pilot had in fact turned the plane 180 deg that day, as we hit facing the way we had come. The left (inside wing) had stalled violently, and was the first thing to hit the ground, being completely torn from the aircraft in the process. We simply had run out of air in a big way. The seat lap-belts saved myself and the Wendys'' lives that day, although we both suffered serious injuries. The pilot and other jumper up front died on impact unfortunatly. Had the full load of fuel exploded on impact, I would not be sitting here writing this.

 

What did Fred have ahead when the engine quit ?....solid trees, ...and a long 5000' strip behind !...He had only a split-second to make a decision, and unfortunatly it was the wrong decision. Fred was not a bad pilot, he was in fact well trained at Bankstown, a commercial pilot, and had flown jumpers, and jump planes for many years. He was a capable, experienced, and current pilot

 

How do I look back on the whole thing now, being an active pilot myself, and as I read the entrys in this post ?.... Three things stand out above above all to me......

 

1,....An attempted low altitude turn back after EFAT will not work, and will probabily kill you after the inside wing stalls rapidly.

 

2,...Regardless of your flight experience and training, the temptation to turn, and return to the safety of the strip is extremly strong.

 

3,...We must as responsable pilots, resist this temptation above all, and must always land straight ahead in a controlled fashion, after an EFAT....................................................................................Maj....

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Thanx Maj..

 

 

[fly_tornado]

wow, you where lucky to survive that.

 

 

[Powerin]

Ok, thanks Motz and Tubz! So the lesson is to stick to landing ahead, because you can learn to do that subconsciously. If you introduce variables you have to weigh up options and make decisions and you waste precious seconds that you probably can't spare.

 

And for the record that's what I always have and always will plan to do

 

 

[motzartmerv]

Exactly right. Infact, Maj told me a trick one night in the chat, which at first I didn't like, but it slowly grew on me. If you have 2 Altimeters, set one to Zero at your field before takeoff. That way you have a quick reference to your height AGL without having to perform sums under pressure, ie, Altitude-field height=???..

 

Seems logical to me..