Garfly

ATSB Quote "encountered a tailwind during landing ... resulting in a hard landing" Yeah, I reckon the ATSB would take your point. At the same time, they probably feel their role constrains them to minimise judgemental language in their general safety messages. (That's what social media is for. ;- )

Yeah, anyway, as ATSB says in the YT Description, one of the cases they'd dealt with locally was a 6A: "In January a Van’s RV-9A encountered a tailwind during landing on a private grass airstrip on French Island, Victoria, resulting in a hard landing. The aircraft bounced, and its nose gear then collapsed. The aircraft subsequently nosed over, and came to a rest inverted, resulting in serious injuries to both occupants, and substantial damage to the aircraft. The accident was similar to a few others, including one investigated by the ATSB in 2017. In that accident, the nose gear of a Van’s RV-6A collapsed after the aircraft bounced during a heavy landing on a dirt airstrip in north Queensland. In light of these accidents, the ATSB is urging owners and operators of Van’s RV-6A, RV-7A and RV-9A aircraft to consider Van’s Aircraft Service Letter 19-04-30."

Yeah, actually the Service Letter shown in the video mentions only the RV 7A and 9A (the commentary, though, for some reason, mentions "6A") Anyway, I think it's good to see ATSB getting on the front foot with well made safety videos for the home-built crowd. Maybe it will even extend to RAAus-only types.

Hey OME, Tooraweenah and Butler get a gig in this one. (I wonder if Aussie airline pilots still mutter "Stone the flamin' crows!" when delayed at the holding point? LOL )

Talking about when SYLLABUS meets HUMAN FACTORS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vv0NNjQOCkI

Yes, we can all agree on the Human Factors effect. But when it comes to what coulda, shoulda, mighta been done, absent the startle, I'm still with 'Fred Flintstone' (in the YT Comments): "Without the rudder to counteract the immediate left yaw from applying full power I am guessing this happened very fast. He did not know he lost the rudder but taking out the power and letting the plane go straight would have probably kept him on the airport but maybe not the runway." But that's all conjecture upon conjecture - all apart from the weld failure, that is.

Yes, maybe he was going around because he felt his approach was a bit hot. But then his rudder failed, just when he needed it most. If it hadn't, everything would have been fine and dandy. So for me, this one's firmly in the 'mechanical failure' column, sub-section: hidden metal fatigue. In some ways, though, it's the above-mentioned Challenger fatal that hits closer to home. A reminder that as a homebuilt owner/operator it's down to me to keep on top of the issue - hidden or not. (Mechanically challenged or not ;- )

Yes, a fascinating read. And here's a video about it:

EDIT: Yeah, exactly, and in the church-steeple war-story the pay day loan scheme worked out very well for our intrepid borrower,

Yes, it's that sink immediately following the sudden config shift that's the issue (which Cherokees with their simple handle allow but electro-flapped Cessna's don't, so much). As I understand it, the whole lift/drag, AoA/inertia situation takes time to sort itself out; seconds in which you lose lift on the swings before you shed drag on the roundabout. Maybe "dumping" is the mirror image of "popping" the flaps which the STOL mob use to steal a quick lift bonus without paying the drag penalty for the entire take-off run. Also, I remember once reading a story of an aviator who found himself in a pickle on climb out; staring down a church steeple dead ahead, which, it seemed, he wasn't going to clear. With his back already against the power curve, he knew his wings had no more to give - including, I guess, any kind of turn away. Anyway, according to my memory of the tale, he ended up saving the day by resorting to some flap popping. At the very last moment he dropped a stage which instantly bunted his path just overhead the pointy bit. After that, of course, he'd plenty of time to pay off his drag penalty in open air with cleaned up wings.

True, but I don't see here (albeit without much to go on) a case for blaming the training, either. I do remember in my own PA28 140 ab initio work in Moresby, yonks ago, dumping flap in a go-around was absolute anathema. (The littlest Cherokee never seemed to have trouble climbing away, 2-up, full flap, despite the heat and the humidity.) To dump flap is to dump lift, was the mantra. The lever had to be left where it was until a positive rate - on runway heading - was established and then, ever so gently, progressively eased off. So if this young chap's training was anything like mine, flap dumping would've been the last thing to have 'kicked in', as they say. Actually, I remember doing just that once, on a go around with an instructor who, as our climb-slope sagged alarmingly, went apoplectic, saying I'd get us killed doing that. On reflection, I realised I'd done it reflexively; the imprint of all that touch-and-go practice, where you usually do need to dump landing-flap quick-smart before powering up again.

Anyway, Instructor Google has some interesting insights into the four left-leaning amigos: (Torque, spiraling slipstream, P-factor, and gyroscopic precession) Technique - Left Turning Tendencies WWW.AOPA.ORG

We don't actually have much detail to go on regarding what happened in those few seconds between his 100' decision to go around and his ending in the shrubs. Certainly not enough, IMHO, to confidently condemn the young pilot. His decision to go missed in the first place, due an "unstable" approach, may well be counted a 'good' one; reflecting 'good' training and good learning. And then, if the rudder did 'break' right at the point he went max power (with armfulls of forward stick and bootfuls of right rudder - as per propertraining) then who's to say that that wouldn't have caught out a 15,000 hr pilot as much as a 150 hr one? After all, aren't we supposed to add at least 3 seconds for the WTF! factor while practising 'realistic' emergencies. Why not cut this guy at least that much slack?

Excerpts from the Youtube comments. (I'm with Fred Flintstone on this one ;- ) Thomas Altruda 1 day ago Loss of the rudder still won’t cause the crash.. this doesn’t make any sense. The plane should still have climbed away from the ground and cleared the trees.. the pilot still had the ability to add full power, control of the ailerons, elevator, flaps… I don’t see this as the cause of the crash. Definitely cup and cone though! Lol Fred Flintstone 1 day ago @Thomas Altruda Without the rudder to counteract the immediate left yaw from applying full power I am guessing this happened very fast. He did not know he lost the rudder but taking out the power and letting the plane go straight would have probably kept him on the airport but maybe not the runway.

Yes, perhaps one of the few times it's crucial is in take-off/go-around mode, catching you unawares, as in that case.

On the subject of fatigued metal bits giving up the ghost: NTSB report: Report_ERA21LA183_102905_6_10_2023 6_57_08 AM.pdf

Yeah, me too. If it was just a SkyEcho2 (as opposed to a proper Mode S/ES transponder) it would show that the system is working - even for we, the masses. ;- )

Looking for more detail, I searched for the video BrendAn referred to. I think it's this one: ... which led me to the TSB Canada reports etc, that it was based on. My takeaways from all that: first, just how seriously federal agencies in Canada take ultralight aviation and its safety. (Imagine so comprehensive a report being done by the ATSB on an ultralight crash, and RAAus, of course, doesn't have anything like the resources needed.) And, second, that flying any fairly basic homebuilt ultralight might, itself, weigh-in on the pro side of a BRS installation, where practical. After all, it's not like either this particular pilot/operator or the kit manufacturer were heedless or clueless regarding the importance of the wing bracket that failed. In fact, the manufacturer required that the part be replaced before 500 hours - as, indeed, it had been. Anyway, I'm more convinced than ever just how crucial it is for all ultralight owners to keep a sharp pre-flight eye on lift-strut attachments (and to keep up a strict inspection schedule). Hidden metal fatigue is still a killer, especially in aeroplanes built for lightness. Annual Report to Parliament 2019-20 - Publications - Transportation Safety Board WWW.BST-TSB.GC.CA Annual Report to Parliament 2019-20 EXERPT: Risks associated with ultralight wing brackets On 30 July 2018, a privately operated Quad City Challenger II advanced ultralight aircraft crashed into trees en route from North Bay to Rockcliffe, Ontario, after the right wing separated from the aircraft. The single occupant was fatally injured. As part of its investigation (A18O0106), the TSBissued Aviation Safety Advisory A18O0106-D1-A1, “Quad City Challenger II Advanced Ultralight – Bracket Failure,” to alert Transport Canada to the possible risks associated with the failure of the attachment brackets that secure the wing lift struts on the aircraft. Quad City, the Canadian distributor of the Challenger II, is conducting a stress analysis on the addition of a fixture to reduce flexing and spread loads around the bolthole, where fatigue cracks appear to start. In response to the safety advisory, Transport Canada issued Civil Aviation Safety Alert 2019-02 to inform owners of the possible failure of the brackets and the need for disassembly, inspection and part replacement. Air Transportation Safety Investigation Report A18O0106 IN-FLIGHT SEPARATION OF RIGHT WING Quad City Challenger II (advanced ultralight), C-IGKT 30 July 2018 a18o0106.pdf EXERPT: Safety message The lift strut brackets used on the Quad City Challenger II have been in service for 35 years and are installed on more than 4400 aircraft worldwide, of which 608 are in Canada. In this accident, a fatigue crack on the right front lift strut bracket went undetected during the routine inspection cycle undertaken by the pilot, and the bracket failed in flight before the 500-hour stipulated life span. The failure led to the right wing separating from the aircraft, resulting in an unrecoverable loss of control and collision with terrain. Examination of additional brackets obtained from other aircraft, with various amounts of time-in-service, found that fatigue and delamination cracks are not isolated to the occurrence bracket. As this occurrence demonstrates, it is possible for fatigue and delamination crack failures to occur on these brackets within recommended time-in-service limits and to remain undetected during basic manufacturer-recommended inspection practices. Cracks that develop on an airframe component need to be identified before the component fails completely. This is especially true when the component’s failure can result in an irrecoverable loss of control in flight. Page images from the Report (click to enlarge):

"Birds often fly in groups and so do ultralight pilots. On June 3rd, a group of 10 aircraft took off from Hólmheiði (BI43) for a fun group flight to Reykjavík Airport (BIRK), where the 'Reykjavík Airshow' took place after a break of several years. In this section you will see and hear how group flights take place with us into controlled airspace. In order to reduce the load on the tower, only one program is entered in "formation" and 9 chasers."

Anyway, it looks like La Salette is a mere piece of cake compared to Valloire Bonnenuit. But again, our intrepid Jodel and Skyranger drivers show they know what they're about. From the Description (via Google translate): "As promised, here is Valloire Bonnenuit, well known to cycling and Tour de France enthusiasts, on the Col du Galibier road. The north/south oriented runway is located at 5600 ft, is 340 m long with a 9.5% gradient. We face south. The terrain is delicate with valley wind (downslope), with a venturi effect that can be pronounced. The final approach is very engaging, you really enter a funnel (at the origin of the venturi). Go-around is only possible as long as the valley is wide enough to turn around. It quickly becomes impossible. Pilots have died here for forgetting it. So if we get too high, too fast, we land anyway and we stop against the embankment at the end of the runway, sorry but alive! The visual of this rising valley makes it difficult to mentally represent the 5% plane on final, which can be tricky and cause us to approach on too weak a plane. If moreover that day, the wind is tail (mountain wind this time) and accelerates in the venturi when approaching the track, it is a blow to not being able to reach the track, even full throttle. It is therefore necessary to take the altimeter reference of the runway threshold during the low reconnaissance, then climb outward to the altitude of the downwind (here 6100 ft). Finally, once on final, check the plane with the vario once the runway is stationary in relation to the bonnet mark. Based ULM pilots, who are at home, must have other benchmarks. The next video will take us to La Tovière Val d'Isère, still in Savoie. Explanation of the venturi effect in detail: The AFPM field sheet indicates that the approach can be tricky in valley winds. It is important to fully understand how this may influence the approach in order not to make the decision to go around. Valley wind is created by the radiative cooling of air aloft in the mountains that flows up and down the valleys as it becomes denser than the surrounding air. The analogy with flowing water is quite telling. The stronger the radiative effect (cold soils at altitude), the larger the valley (supply surface), steeper and narrower, the stronger the wind will be. By watching my video you have surely noticed this small hill on the right on the short final which creates a pronounced restriction at the bottom of the valley. If the valley wind is present, it will increase sharply at this location. Now let's imagine an airplane on stabilized final. Approaching the venturi he will encounter a very strong positive wind gradient which will have the effect of increasing his indicated speed and/or causing him to pass above the plane and which may lead the pilot to believe that he is much too high and too fast to land and that at the same time, he has such climbing performance that he can turn around by overshooting. It is a decoy, because once past the venturi the opposite phenomenon occurs. It is therefore necessary to resist and be patient when aiming for the threshold of the runway, even on a very strong plane. Runway excursions at the end only exist if the speed relative to the ground is too high, but this is not the case. The indicated airspeed parameter will naturally decrease when exiting the venturi allowing the landing. Once the phenomenon is well understood, it will come naturally that it is suicidal to attempt a take-off in these conditions, the venturi can get the better of the planes that have the best climbing performance, unless they can pass well above the hill." SPEEDJOJO Blog: http://speedjojo.blogspot.com/ Shop SPEEDJOJO T-shirts: https://www.tostadora.fr/speedjojo/ca...

Yeah, not only does the device need to see the sky but you also need to see it's face to check for 'three greens' before trusting it. The BAT/ADS-B/GPS all need to give the green light. If GPS reception/transmission gets dodgy it will turn orange and finally red.

Did you catch Bertorelli on dodging meat bombs? (He has a little sting in the tail for we of the "perfectly good aeroplane" brigade ;- )

The man on the Clapham bus thinks the same about anyone who goes up in one of them little aeroplanes; jumping out looks like the safe option.

Or ....