Emirates B-777 incident at DUBAI.

[Bennyboy320]

I've never seen a Passenger jet "bounce " in the general sense, from inside or outside the cockpit.

Been there done that, training some of our 200 hour total time second officers, i.e. our SO's operate as a pilot in the right seat doing take offs & landings unlike most other airlines where they occupy the seat in cruise drink coffee & eat crew meals while doing R/T & the flight log, with these inexperienced pilots they tend to have problems below 200ft in maintaing the aim point or they become fixated on it & have no appreciation of the ground rush & either forget to flare which requires an immediate take over to prevent a hard landing & potential bounce or in my cases they over flare & balloon with the thrust levers at idle, so now you're below Vapp with idle power back at 20ft, you don't have much time but you have to select TOGA (fire wall the thrust levers) maintain pitch attitude don't change config & wait to spool up & accelerate to fly away safely then clean up, on a few occasions we actually bounced on the runway as engines spooled up, whist you are on the ground the config warning also starts blearing away because the computer thinks you are taking off & you are not allowed to do that in config full, so as you can see its a very dynamic & at times confusing maneuver for a line crew, definitely more complicated than a norm go around.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

Emirates B777 crash was accident waiting to happen

 

• BYRON BAILEY
   
   
  
• The Australian
   
   
  
• 12:00AM August 9, 2016
   
   
  
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[*]128

 

The crash of an Emirates B777 during an attempted go-around in Dubai last Wednesday was always an accident waiting to happen.

 

It was not the fault of the pilots, the airline or Boeing, because this accident could have happened to any pilot in any airline flying any modern glass cockpit airliner — Airbus, Boeing or Bombardier — or a large corporate jet with autothrottle.

 

It is the result of the imperfect interaction of the pilots with supposedly failsafe automatics, which pilots are rigorously trained to trust, which in this case failed them.

 

First, let us be clear about the effect of hot weather on the day. All twin-engine jet aircraft are certified at maximum takeoff weight to climb away on one engine after engine failure on takeoff at the maximum flight envelope operating temperature — 50 degrees C in the case of a B777 — to reach a regulatory climb gradient minimum of 2.4 per cent.

 

The Emirates B777-300 was operating on two engines and at a lower landing weight, so climb performance should not have been a problem. I have operated for years out of Dubai in summer, where the temperature is often in the high 40s, in both widebody Airbus and Boeing B777 aircraft.

 

Secondly, a pilot colleague observed exactly what happened as he was there, waiting in his aircraft to cross runway 12L. The B777 bounced and began a go-around. The aircraft reached about 150 feet (45 metres) with its landing gear retracting, then began to sink to the runway.

 

This suggests that the pilots had initiated a go-around as they had been trained to do and had practised hundreds of times in simulators, but the engines failed to respond in time to the pilot-commanded thrust. Why?

 

Bounces are not uncommon. They happen to all pilots occasionally. What was different with the Emirates B777 bounce was that the pilot elected to go around. This should not have been a problem as pilots are trained to apply power, pitch up (raise the nose) and climb away. However pilots are not really trained for go-arounds after a bounce; we practise go-arounds from a low approach attitude.

 

Modern jets have autothrottles as part of the autoflight system. They have small TOGA (take off/go-around) switches on the throttle levers they click to command autothrottles to control the engines, to deliver the required thrust. Pilots do not physically push up the levers by themselves but trust the autothrottles to do that, although it is common to rest your hand on the top of the levers. So, on a go-around, all the pilot does is click the TOGA switches, pull back on the control column to raise the nose and — when the other pilot, after observing positive climb, announces it — calls “gear up” and away we go!

 

But in the Dubai case, because the wheels had touched the runway, the landing gear sensors told the autoflight system computers that the aircraft was landed. So when the pilot clicked TOGA, the computers — without him initially realising it — inhibited TOGA as part of their design protocols and refused to spool up the engines as the pilot commanded.

 

Imagine the situation. One pilot, exactly as he has been trained, clicks TOGA and concentrates momentarily on his pilot’s flying display (PFD) to raise the nose of the aircraft to the required go-around attitude — not realising his command for TOGA thrust has been ignored. The other pilot is concentrating on his PFD altimeter to confirm that the aircraft is climbing due to the aircraft momentum. Both suddenly realise the engines are still at idle, as they had been since the autothrottles retarded them at approximately 30 feet during the landing flare. There is a shock of realisation and frantic manual pushing of levers to override the autothrottle pressure.

 

But too late. The big engines take seconds to deliver the required thrust before and before that is achieved the aircraft sinks to the runway.

 

It could have happened to any pilot caught out by an unusual, time-critical event, for which rigorous simulator training had not prepared him.

 

Automation problems leading to pilot confusion are not uncommon; but the designers of the autoflight system protocols should have anticipated this one. Perhaps an audible warning like “manual override required” to alert the pilots immediately of the “automation disconnect”.

 

My feeling is the pilots were deceived initially by the autothrottle refusal to spool up the engines, due to the landing inhibits, and a very high standard of simulator training by which pilots are almost brainwashed to totally rely on the automatics as the correct thing.

 

Byron Bailey is a commercial pilot with more than 45 years’ experience and 26,000 flying hours, and a former RAAF fighter pilot. He was a senior captain with Emirates for 15 years.

 

 

[fly_tornado]

Why isn't the co-pilot monitoring the engines/throttles?

 

 

[Marty_d]

Ok that's a record - same article posted 3 times in the same thread...

 

 

[Bennyboy320]

Don't know about the Boeing but on the Bus the standard calls for a go around attached.

 

 

 

[Guernsey]

Ok that's a record - same article posted 3 times in the same thread...

It's called Post Bouncing.

 

Alan.

 

 

[Marty_d]

It's called Post Bouncing. Alan.

Isn't that when you roll over and go to sleep?

 

 

[dutchroll]

The following copy was sent to me recently, maybe Dutchroll can comment on the content.Wayne.

It's possible that that something resembling that actually happened, but maybe not exactly in that order. The TOGA switches are inhibited below 2 ft radar altitude. It is a B777 SOP that if a go-around is initiated after touchdown, the thrust levers must be physically pushed forward. In any case, if the aircraft bounced more than 2 ft in the air, which seems likely, the TOGA switches would not have stayed inhibited. So how did it get to 175ft with thrust not applied? There's something just not quite right with some bits of his theory.

I think saying it was "inevitable" is a bit over the top. I disagree with that.

 

The Airbus (any model) does not have TOGA switches. Boeing does. So it's not true to say "modern jets have TOGA switches". On the Airbus the thrust levers must actually be physically pushed to the TOGA detent (full forward) to get the plane into "go around mode".

 

Why isn't the co-pilot monitoring the engines/throttles?

That's one of many things he would/should glance at but the non flying pilot actually has a lot of other stuff to do in a go-around.

 

 

[dutchroll]

Don't know about the Boeing but on the Bus the standard calls for a go around attached.

Similar principle.

Standard go-around for a B767 (which would be almost the same for a B777 except the "go-around switch" is called a "TOGA switch")

 

First:

 

 

Then:

 

 

 

[red750]

Dubai crash survivor defies odds with $1m lottery win

 

A passenger who escaped from this flight has won a $1,000,000 lottery at the airport duty free. See report:

 

Dubai crash survivor defies odds with $1m lottery win - BBC News

 

 

[cooperplace]

It's possible that that something resembling that actually happened, but maybe not exactly in that order. The TOGA switches are inhibited below 2 ft radar altitude. It is a B777 SOP that if a go-around is initiated after touchdown, the thrust levers must be physically pushed forward. In any case, if the aircraft bounced more than 2 ft in the air, which seems likely, the TOGA switches would not have stayed inhibited. So how did it get to 175ft with thrust not applied? There's something just not quite right with some bits of his theory.I think saying it was "inevitable" is a bit over the top. I disagree with that.

 

The Airbus (any model) does not have TOGA switches. Boeing does. So it's not true to say "modern jets have TOGA switches". On the Airbus the thrust levers must actually be physically pushed to the TOGA detent (full forward) to get the plane into "go around mode".

 

That's one of many things he would/should glance at but the non flying pilot actually has a lot of other stuff to do in a go-around.

I agree: how did he get to 175 ft with the engines at idle? That doesn't add up to me either.

 

 

[Roundsounds]

, i.e. our SO's operate as a pilot in the right seat doing take offs & landings unlike most other airlines where they occupy the seat in cruise drink coffee & eat crew meals while doing R/T & the flight log,

Unless the SO holds a Type Rating, as opposed to a Cruise Relief Type Rating, they cannot occupy the RHS below 10,000 or 20,000' - varies with NAA.

The Boeing 777 GoAround procedure is pretty much as described by Dutch Roll. The investigation results will tell what occurred as opposed to any speculation.

 

 

[Bennyboy320]

Unless the SO holds a Type Rating, as opposed to a Cruise Relief Type Rating, they cannot occupy the RHS below 10,000 or 20,000'

They do, paid as a SO but doing the work of an FO with the aircraft rating etc.

 

 

[Roundsounds]

They do, paid as a SO but doing the work of an FO with the aircraft rating etc.

So that would make them First Officers then?

 

 

[dutchroll]

Not quite sure of the way HK civil regs work but in QF at least we never used to have S/Os with a "cruise relief pilot" rating as such. They simply held a "copilot" instrument rating. When I joined they could be in the seat not below 5000' though that was a company SOP and was regularly flouted with them getting out of the seat fairly late. I recall an uncomfortable rushed seat change on final approach, which was a bit ordinary and definitely not the way it should be done. Now it's 20,000 ft before they can hop in or have to jump out and that's enforced fairly rigorously.

 

First Officers here hold a full command instrument rating on type and are trained to the exact same flying standards as the Captains. This is because if the Captain is in the bunk and the S/O is in his seat, the F/O is actually deputised "in command" of the aircraft. The only exception is that F/Os don't do low visibility approaches, i.e. your Cat 3 ILS approaches down to 50 ft or less with automatic landing. That's "Captain-only" business, although there is no technical reason the F/O can't conduct one from the right seat if the Captain decided to keel over in flight and the weather was that bad. The controls and button pushing are all the same from either seat.

 

 

[Bennyboy320]

Our cadets arrive from Australia/NZ were they do a CPL or MPL with about 150hrs total time, they then do a conversion to the A320 & a full a/c & instrument rating for the RHS, they then complete another 80 sectors on the line with training capt, however most require extra sectors before they are given a final line check to the line, they are second officers by rank & pay, once on the line they have reduced x/w & increased vis/cloud base min, so yes they are wearing the rank of an SO however doing the work of an FO, as you can see this greatly increases the workload for line capt, especially this time of year with TS, typhoons & wind-shear.

 

 

[Roundsounds]

Our cadets arrive from Australia/NZ were they do a CPL or MPL with about 150hrs total time, they then do a conversion to the A320 & a full a/c & instrument rating for the RHS, they then complete another 80 sectors on the line with training capt, however most require extra sectors before they are given a final line check to the line, they are second officers by rank & pay, once on the line they have reduced x/w & increased vis/cloud base min, so yes they are wearing the rank of an SO however doing the work of an FO, as you can see this greatly increases the workload for line capt, especially this time of year with TS, typhoons & wind-shear.

In fact, they are co-pilots then. The first/second officer title is not a recognised term in any NAA reg's that I'm aware of.

 

 

[facthunter]

Sounds like they are cutting corners with that low experience/ hours situation and doing landings which you say they are not doing very well. I don't think the MPL is used by any Australian Airlines yet. Enlighten me if I'm wrong. I have serious misgivings with the concept of it, and hear of people going on line with very low actual flying hours, with an attitude of "I've paid my money, where's my licence" at the place they trained who are pressured to pass them or risk a diplomatic situation . Not everyone is cut out to be a pilot. I'd like to know my pilot up the front can actually fly the plane if they need to. There is increasing evidence that they (some of them) can't. Nev

 

 

[dutchroll]

Cuttings corners is par for the course in the modern commercial world FH. The airline industry is no exception.

 

The institutional investors and the accountant managers of modern day airlines have the mentality that as long as money is being made and hulls are not being lost, everything is absolutely fine and dandy. They don't particularly care what risks are taken, as long as we don't crash. Even then I heard several years ago that a manager of a certain low-cost carrier said "off the record" (as if there's any such thing) to a colleague "yeah we've factored in a total hull loss and the death of everyone on board, and we still reckon we can be profitable as long as we don't have another", or words to that effect.

 

Fortunately here in Oz (some other countries have it too) we have a regulatory framework which gives substantial protections to the PIC for ensuring the safe operation of the aircraft, and I've certainly seen it used on many occasions.

 

 

[flying dog]

Hang on.....

 

The Airbus (any model) does not have TOGA switches. Boeing does. So it's not true to say "modern jets have TOGA switches". On the Airbus the thrust levers must actually be physically pushed to the TOGA detent (full forward) to get the plane into "go around mode".

That's one of many things he would/should glance at but the non flying pilot actually has a lot of other stuff to do in a go-around.

So reminiscing back to the early days of airbus, the pilots were going in to land, tried to do a "Go round" and the plane flew into the bushes.

 

They would have had the throttles to the firewall, and it didn't do that.

 

(But that's a whole other story)

 

 

[Bennyboy320]

They would have had the throttles to the firewall, and it didn't do that.

I was waiting for this one to raise it's head, I won't go into describing the flight control laws of the airbus, however the A320 was doing exactly what it was supposed to do at the altitude they were flying i.e. 30' thinking it was going to land, the crew did select TOGA when they realized they were getting close to the trees but way to late & crashed as they were spooling up.

 

 

[facthunter]

You are correct. 26 June 1988 . Aircraft did a low pass at airshow. A 320 model. Nev

 

 

[flying dog]

But they cant press a TOGA switch/button, if such a thing in not on/in an airbus.

 

 

[facthunter]

The A-3oo which is an early fly by wire twin aisle, has them. Nev

 

 

[planedriver]

There was talk that the early A300's mainly got airborne at MGTOW due to the curvature of the earth:wink: