Air India crash

[Garfly]

5 hours ago, Red said:

Some information?, you're kidding...how much more would you like there to be? .

Deficiencies in Boeing QA was all over the internet and MSM last year, especially after the door falling off fiasco because they didnt even fit the bolts.

All widely discussed.

 

 

 

 

Red, SP isn't kidding; his comment is a lot more specific than "Boeing QA" in general.

 

The Plane That Crashed Yesterday Was the Same One a Dead Boeing Whistleblower Warned About

GIZMODO.COM

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Critics of Boeing have long expressed criticisms of the 787 Dreamliner and the company's standards.

 

 

 

[FlyBoy1960]

On 13/06/2025 at 9:11 PM, Underwood said:

Once its in a resin build up you cant just recycle it like aluminium...will be the next century's Asbestos IMO, horrible stuff

🔄 Can carbon fibre composites be recycled?

When carbon fibre is mixed with resin (typically epoxy), it forms a thermoset composite, which is very difficult to recycle using conventional methods. The challenge lies in the chemical structure of the resin:

• Thermoset resins, once cured, do not melt or soften with heat. This makes separating the carbon fibres from the resin extremely difficult without damaging the fibres.

---

♻️ Recycling methods (and limitations)

There are a few recycling approaches under research or limited industrial use:

1. Pyrolysis (heat-based)

   • The composite is heated in an oxygen-free environment to burn off the resin.

   • This leaves behind carbon fibre, but the process can damage or weaken the fibres.

   • The result is often shorter, lower-quality fibres not suitable for structural aerospace use.

2. Solvolysis (chemical-based)

   • Solvents and supercritical fluids break down the resin.

   • This can preserve longer, higher-quality fibres, but the process is complex, expensive, and not widely adopted yet.

3. Mechanical grinding

   • The composite is ground into filler material.

   • This doesn’t recover usable fibres—just filler material for concrete or plastic products.

---

🛑 Key limitations

• Recycled fibres are typically not certified for structural aerospace applications.

• The cost of recycling often outweighs the value of the recovered material.

• Most end-of-life carbon fibre parts still end up in landfill or incineration, though this is slowly changing.

---

🌱 In development

Researchers and manufacturers are working on:

• Recyclable resins (e.g. thermoplastics or reversible thermosets)

• Cleaner separation techniques

• Circular economy models for aviation and automotive industries

But as of now, recycling carbon fibre composites remains difficult, energy-intensive, and limited in output quality.

[Admin]

There has been 2 more 787 incidents after the Air India one, one with British Airways and another with Air India

Second Air India 787 Incident in 4 Days Sparks Fresh Safety Concerns

WWW.YAHOO.COM

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An Air India flight bound for New Delhi was forced to return to Hong Kong shortly after takeoff on Monday due to what the airline called a "technical issue" — the second serious incident involving one of its...

 

[IBob]

Air India will  get a pounding: an article I cannot now find explained how India's aviation authority is chronically undermanned with a very large proportion of positions (40%...50%???) unfilled.

[kgwilson]

There will be a fair bit of scrutiny on Boeing as well. During the 737 Max & the door blow out fiasco a number of Boeing Engineers working or had worked on the 787 project  were scathing of Boeings build and safety processes, some saying they would never fly on a dreamliner

[Red]

6 hours ago, Garfly said:

 

 

Red, SP isn't kidding; his comment is a lot more specific than "Boeing QA" in general.

 

The Plane That Crashed Yesterday Was the Same One a Dead Boeing Whistleblower Warned About

GIZMODO.COM

---

Critics of Boeing have long expressed criticisms of the 787 Dreamliner and the company's standards.

 

 

 

 You basically reinforce my point by giving a link to a story on the issue.

As I stated, there is an abundance of information available on this subject.

The world moves on, headlines change and people have short memories but the Internet retains this stuff if you take the time to look

[Garfly]

 

 

1 hour ago, Red said:

 You basically reinforce my point by giving a link to a story on the issue.

As I stated, there is an abundance of information available on this subject.

The world moves on, headlines change and people have short memories but the Internet retains this stuff if you take the time to look

Red, it's not like that "point" of yours was ever at issue ... there was a distinction involved, but let it pass.

[Litespeed]

My take on the crash is this ..

 

Pilots not at fault, during takeoff it has suffered a complete engine stoppage on both at the same time. The flaps were extended.

They had no electrical or hydraulic systems operational after dual engine stoppage.

The Ram Air Turbine deployed as it left the airfield in the initial climb, this only extends when total power is lost.

 

Once the RAT deployed, they were a dead plane falling and had no opportunity to save the aircraft. The height was far too low to allow the RAT to provide any opportunity for control power.

 

It would appear a  complete electrical system failure stopping both engines. Fuel is not suspected, other aircraft had the same fuel without incident.

 

My view is a Boeing problem unrelated to air India. Dodgy build and swarf shorting a wiring harness?

 

Time will tell.

 

A tragic state of affairs.

 

If it's Boeing, I ain't going.

[IBob]

Question: do the flight recorders have their own emergency power? And how much can they 'see' to record if other systems have lost power??
Yep, two questions again.........

[onetrack]

The BBC article below outlines the investigation procedures. The Boeing investigation team are deferring to India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) as the investigation leaders.

 

As the article states, investigators will have a pretty good handle on what happened within a few days, but gaining understanding of WHY it happened, will take a lot longer. The recorders on the Dreamliner are high tech, and record a vast array of inputs, unlike early recorders. Therefore I would presume that they have backup power in the event of total engine failure.

 

I'm not sure that the engines failed completely, but a check of engine component damage will soon reveal whether they were running or stopped. 

 

The BBC article is fairly well done, but there's an error where it states the aircraft was carrying 100 tonnes of fuel. The aircraft is capable of carrying 100 tonnes of fuel, but according to my information, 50 tonnes of fuel is adequate (with statutory reserves) for a flight from Ahmedabad to Gatwick, and that's what Flight 171 was carrying.

 

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gkd555jlko

 

 

Edited 17 hours ago by onetrack
forgot to add link...

[BrendAn]

Systemic overload: A crisis-filled weekend in Indian skies

 the Indian aviation sector endured a barrage of operational crises following the Air India crash. Within just 36 hours, four separate in-flight emergencies were reported, raising widespread concerns about preparedness and safety culture.

On June 16, an Air India Express flight to Ranchi returned to Delhi after technical issues were detected shortly after takeoff. That same day, an Air India flight from Hong Kong to Delhi had to turn back due to a suspected technical snag. Air India later confirmed the Boeing 787 aircraft landed safely and was being inspected as a precaution.

In yet another episode, a Lufthansa flight enroute to Hyderabad from Frankfurt turned back after a bomb threat was received mid-air. Passengers were safely screened upon return and investigations are underway.

 

Meanwhile, a British F-35 fighter jet made an emergency landing in Kerala due to low fuel—prompting full emergency protocols at Thiruvananthapuram Airport.

Although none of these incidents resulted in injuries, the sheer number and timing have amplified public anxiety and tested the resilience of operational frameworks

[Marty_d]

None of them are particularly related either, apart from the 787 with "suspected technical snag" whatever that is (complex sausage?) which did a precautionary turnback.  A bomb threat and a low fuel fighter have nothing to do with the Air India crash.

[BrendAn]

32 minutes ago, Marty_d said:

None of them are particularly related either, apart from the 787 with "suspected technical snag" whatever that is (complex sausage?) which did a precautionary turnback.  A bomb threat and a low fuel fighter have nothing to do with the Air India crash.

they are just pointing out a bad week in aviation in that part of the world.

[Thruster88]

13 hours ago, IBob said:

Question: do the flight recorders have their own emergency power? And how much can they 'see' to record if other systems have lost power??
Yep, two questions again.........

AI Overview

 

The Boeing 787's flight data recorder (FDR) system architecture relies on a robust electrical system for power and data acquisition. The FDR, often referred to as a "black box," is connected to various aircraft systems through a flight-data acquisition unit. This unit gathers data from sensors throughout the aircraft and transmits it to the FDR. The 787's electrical system, which includes multiple power sources and redundancies, ensures the FDR remains operational even during power interruptions. 

 

Here's a breakdown of the key components and their interaction:

 

1. Electrical System:

• Generators:

  The 787 has multiple generators, including those driven by the engines, the APU, and a ram air turbine (RAT). 

   
• Power Distribution:

  The generated power is distributed through AC buses and converted to other voltage levels as needed. 

   
• Redundancy:

  The electrical system is designed with redundancy to ensure continued operation even with generator failures. 

   
• Backup Power:

  In addition to the main battery, the APU battery, and the RAT, the main battery can also be used as a backup power source. 

   

2. Flight Data Acquisition:

• Sensors:

  Numerous sensors are strategically placed throughout the aircraft to monitor various parameters. 

   
• Flight-Data Acquisition Unit:

  This unit acts as an intermediary, collecting data from the sensors and preparing it for the FDR. 

   
• Common Data Network (CDN):

  The CDN facilitates data transfer between different aircraft systems, including the flight-data acquisition unit. 

   

3. Flight Data Recorder (FDR):

• Crash-Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU):

  The FDR is housed in a ruggedized CSMU that can withstand extreme conditions. 

   
• Solid-State Memory:

  Modern FDRs utilize solid-state memory, which are more reliable and less prone to mechanical failure than older systems. 

   
• Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS):

  The Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) includes a RIPS, which provides power to the recorder in case of a main power failure. 

   
• Location Devices:

  The FDR is equipped with an Underwater Locator Beacon (ULB) and an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) to aid in recovery after an accident. 

   

4. Common Core System (CCS):

• Integrated System:

  The CCS integrates various physical and logical networks, including the ODN (for non-critical systems) and the IDN (for flight-critical systems). 

   
• Data Transfer:

  The CCS facilitates data transfer between different aircraft systems and within the CCS itself. 

   
• Panel Interface Pods (PIPs):

  Many cockpit panel switches interface with the CDN through PIP logic circuit card assemblies. 

   

In essence, the 787's electrical system provides the necessary power and the data acquisition system gathers the critical information. The FDR, protected by its CSMU and RIPS, records this data for later analysis, ensuring that valuable information is available in the event of an incident. 

 

 

[IBob]

 

51 minutes ago, Thruster88 said:

Recorder Independent Power Supply (RIPS):

The Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) includes a RIPS, which provides power to the recorder in case of a main power failure. 

 

Okay, so it looks as though the recorder itself would function through a power outage, provided the cutover is seamless ( I would be surprised if it is not).

 

51 minutes ago, Thruster88 said:

• Sensors:

  Numerous sensors are strategically placed throughout the aircraft to monitor various parameters. 

   
• Flight-Data Acquisition Unit:

  This unit acts as an intermediary, collecting data from the sensors and preparing it for the FDR. 

   
• Common Data Network (CDN):

  The CDN facilitates data transfer between different aircraft systems, including the flight-data acquisition unit. 

 

I wonder what powers this lot. I guess my thought is that, while the FDR may continue to operate, in the event of a power loss there may be no data arriving for it to record.

[facthunter]

Never heard of that happening. There's a lot of experience with these recorders and they only get better.  Nev

[Thruster88]

My guess in this fly by wire and FADEC aircraft there would be many levels of redundancy. To have no control of the flight controls or engines would be unthinkable. 

 

Un commanded double engine failure?  Don't think so.

[facthunter]

Most are now saying wait for the Black box results.   Nev

[onetrack]

The electrical system of the Dreamliner is staggering in its complexity, as compared to earlier models. It uses six generators along with miniature "substations" to provide electrical power.

Its design relies a lot more on electrical componentry, and a lot less on pneumatics, with the design aim of reducing weight and increasing efficiency.

Even the hydraulics are electrically controlled on the Dreamline, a major design change from earlier Boeings.

 

However, I harbour a feeling that the investigators will find a cause for the thrust and power failures that will come from out of left field - a reason, that no-one, especially the Boeing designers and testers, ever imagined could happen.

 

Remember the FADEC blips on the Qantas Airbus that flew near the U.S. Navy communications base at Exmouth in 2008? The aircraft did an uncommanded descent of 650 feet before the crew intervened and corrected the flight path deviation.

It was found after extensive investigation, that the U.S. Navy low frequency radio wave generation overwhelmed the FADEC protection systems and more FADEC shielding had to be installed in the Airbus.

 

I'm wondering if some unexpected powerful radio signal generation in the Ahmedabad airport area, produced EMI interference with the Dreamliners electrical power systems?

 

GaryBPilot on YooTube points out an interesting thing about Flight 171 after takeoff. Everyone is trying to figure why the undercarriage didn't retract - which it should have, as soon as positive climb rate was established (normally only seconds after liftoff).

 

GaryBPilot outlines how the Dreamliner MLG bogies are electrically canted forward, prior to being retracted into the wheel wells. Conversely, the bogies are electrically canted backwards prior to landing.

This bogie canting process assists in improved undercarriage stowage when retracted, and assists in softer runway contact when landing.

 

Gary says he can see the undercarriage bogies commence their canting, which indicates the undercarriage retraction lever was selected. But then, the undercarriage goes no further in the retraction process. That would seemingly indicate a major power failure to the undercarriage retraction mechanism. This could be an indicator to further electrical failures that led to loss of thrust.

 

Another point is that India is the home of some pretty destructive critters, such as rats. If a rat got aboard undetected and chewed up important electrical componentry or wiring, and thus damaged redundancy features as well, that would go a long way to explain how "foolproof" aircraft systems could be damaged to the point where redundancy failed.

 

http://787updates.newairplane.com/787-Electrical-Systems/787-Electrical-System#

 

Edited 21 minutes ago by onetrack
addendum and name correction...